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Abstract 
 
 
Intergenerational Income Mobility and Family Dissolution 
by 
Karsten Marshall Elseth Rieck, Master in Economics 
University of Bergen, 2008 
Supervisors: Kjell Vaage, Espen Bratberg 
 
 
 
This study examines the intergenerational income mobility between intact families and 
families disrupted due to divorce or parental death. The data samples consist of children born 
in 1960 and 1970 along with their biological fathers and mothers. The income mobility is 
explored between sons and fathers, sons and mothers, daughters and fathers and daughters and 
mothers. The results of the analyses show that the income mobility differs between intact and 
disrupted families where the deviations and magnitude are dependent upon the child-parent 
mobility pair. The offspring in disrupted families seem to be socioeconomic disadvantaged 
relatively to offspring in intact families, regardless of type of disruption, something that can 
be explained by differences in transmission of human capital between generations. Finally, 
the study investigates whether the results are due to causal effects or a consequence of 
selection, using a difference-in-difference model. The results do not unconditionally support 
the causal effect interpretation, but there are too many weaknesses attached to the data 
samples to conclude on this matter. 
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1. Introduction 
The family structure in Norway has experience great alterations from the post-war era 
and up to now. The main characteristic is the dramatic increase in numbers of divorces where 
the annual divorce rate has risen from 7.7 % to 47 %  between 1950 and 2005, making 
Norway among the countries in Europe with the highest number of marital dissolutions per 
inhabitant (Tjøtta and Vaage, 2008; Statistics Norway, 2008a). These changes in marital 
status have subsequently been followed by transitions from intact two-parent families to 
alternative family structures like single parenthood and step parent families. In addition, other 
forms of cohabitations have grown rapidly, for instance cohabiting unions and partnership. If 
we consider offspring, the share of children between 0 and 17 years old living with both 
biological parents has dropped from 82 % to 75 % from 1989 to 2008. Of the 25 % who only 
resided with one biological parent, 14.5 % was living merely with their mother, 7 % with their 
mother and a step father and 2.7 % was living merely with their father by January 2008 
(Statistics Norway, 2008b).  
 These new transformations from intact families to multiple family constellations bring 
into question whether the associations and connections between parents and children alter 
with the family type. Especially, with children as the main focus, does the dissolution of intact 
two-parent families cause significant differences in the importance of family background and 
family environment on children‟s socioeconomic outcome between family types? 
Furthermore, are there deviations between sons and daughters their relations to fathers and 
mothers? One way to assess the association between parents‟ and children‟s socioeconomic 
outcome is by studying the income mobility between the generations. The amount of income 
mobility across generations quantifies the importance of family background in determining 
children‟s earnings or socioeconomic status, and the measure can be applied across gender 
and family structure to reply the displayed questions. In relation to the measure, a high degree 
of income mobility between offspring and parents implies that the earnings of parents are not 
that important in the shaping of children‟s earnings, i.e. that family background and 
environment are inferior to other sources that possess influential force on the outcome of 
children. Furthermore, the answers to the questions can be of great value to social policy 
reforms and distributional programs of welfare goods. If offspring and parents in certain 
families are worse off than others on grounds of family structure, it may call for social policy 
interventions to direct welfare goods and benefits towards the disadvantaged family types. 
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Since Norway is a welfare state with high notions of equality, redistributional policies 
between individuals with different income are important instruments. 
The existing literature on intergenerational income mobility and family dissolution is 
scarce and the results are overall non-conclusive. Of the main contributors on the field, 
Biblarz and Raftery (1993), Couch and Lillard (1997) and Fertig (2004) display significant 
and comparable results from estimations. While Biblarz and Raftery‟s (1993) and Fertig‟s 
(2004) estimations suggest that the earnings mobility between biological fathers and offspring 
are higher in alternative families, Couch and Lillard‟s (1997) results display the opposite 
pattern. The studies which show no significant patterns are Peters (1992) and Bjorklund and 
Chadwick (2003). 
This study sets out to explore the association between the earnings of parents and 
offspring between intact families and families disrupted due to divorce and parental death. Of 
the disrupted families the divorced ones will be the primary focus. The data material consists 
of offspring born in 1960 and 1970 and their respective families who are followed during the 
children‟s adolescence in two separate data sets attained from Statistics Norway. During the 
children‟s adolescence the family members are observed multiple times and the family 
structure is identified. In addition, I observe the earnings of offspring and parents, which 
allow us to explore the income mobility between the family types. The regression model 
which will be utilized to investigate the income mobility is a reduced form model pioneered 
by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992). In addition, to distinguish the income mobility 
across the distribution of income, matrices with computed transition probabilities will be 
presented. In this way, I contribute to the scarce existing literature on earnings mobility and 
family dissolution. 
Another important aspect is whether differences in income mobility between family 
types are due to causal effects or selection into divorce. That is, is it the family dissolution 
itself that cause the differences or are there underlying factors that influence both the 
intergenerational income mobility and affects the probability for family disruption. Of the 
quoted studies it is only Fertig (2004) who addresses this issue, and results indicate that 
selection is partly the source of the observed differences in her study. To contribute to the 
knowledge on this field, the issue of causality and selection will be investigated if the 
preceding results display differences in earnings mobility across family types. In that respect, 
two approaches will be utilized, namely difference-in-difference and instrumental variable 
regressions.  
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The thesis first gives a broad overview of the intergenerational earnings mobility 
model and transmission of human capital between generations in chapter 2. In addition, 
transition matrices and selection approaches are presented and reviewed. In chapter 3 a 
thorough discussion of the consequences of family dissolution regarding parents and children 
are presented followed by a detailed review of the existing literature on income mobility 
across family types in chapter 4. Further, in chapter 5 the utilized methods are presented along 
with a discussion of the design of the data. The data samples which are concentrated around 
the 1960 and 1970 birth cohorts are presented in chapter 6 while the results of all estimations 
are reviewed in chapter 7. In chapter 8 I discuss and interpret the results from chapter 7 in 
addition to interpreting them in the light of the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. 
Finally, in chapter 9 I sum up the discussion with concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
4 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I first present a theoretical model outlined by Becker and Tomes (1979) 
and some theoretical extensions presented in Becker and Tomes (1986).
1
 The model presents 
ideas concerning the underlying mechanism of intergenerational mobility. Then, I explore the 
statistical model of intergenerational transmission of labour earnings outlined in Solon (1992) 
and Zimmerman (1992). I look at the foundation of the model, estimation problems and 
possible solutions to the problems. This is followed by an expansion of the statistical model to 
include different family types, and a review of transition matrices. Finally, I introduce the 
notion of selection and present two approaches that address this issue.  
 
 
2.1 Theoretical model 
Becker and Tomes‟ model is an overlapping-generation model where each person in 
the economy lives for two periods. The first period can be described as the adolescence where 
the person in question accumulates human and non-human capital. In the second period the 
person enters the economic life whereas he or she works, consumes and breathes his or her 
own children.
2
 To simplify, I limit the presentation of the model to two generations; one 
cohort of parents and one cohort of offspring. The parents are born in the t-2 period and enter 
the economic life in the t-1 period. Their children are born in the t-1 period and enter their 
economic life in the t period. The periods are denoted by subscripts. 
Assume that a parent only cares about her own consumption 𝐶𝑡−1 and the total wealth 
of her offspring. In addition, the parent only has one child, and that the wealth of that child 
can be expressed by the expected lifetime earnings 𝑦𝑡 . Assuming utility-maximizing 
behaviour, we can write the parent‟s utility function 𝑈𝑡−1  as  
 
 𝑈𝑡−1 = 𝑈 𝐶𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡  (2.1) 
 
or as a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
 
                                                 
1
 In addition to the papers of Becker & Tomes (1979, 1986) I make use of Peters (1992), Solon (1999) and Fertig 
(2004) in the presentation of the model. 
2
 It is possible to accumulate human capital in the second period as well, e.g. on-the-job-training or work 
courses, but the amount is proportional compared to the human capital that is raised during childhood. 
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 𝑈 = (1 − 𝛼) 𝑙𝑛 𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛼 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑡 , (2.2) 
 
where the parameter α, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1, describes the parent‟s preferences for child‟s total wealth 
relative to own consumption.  
The parent is able to affect the child‟s lifetime earnings by investing in its human 
capital 𝐼𝑡−1.
3
 The investment is made during the child‟s adolescence, i.e. in the t-1 period, and 
it affects the child‟s earnings capacity in its working life, i.e. in the t period. Beside the 
investment made by the parent, the child‟s lifetime earnings 𝑦𝑡  is determined by the his 
endowments of capital 𝑒𝑡  and “capital gain” from his market luck 𝑢𝑡 . This leaves us with the 
following equation for the child‟s lifetime earnings: 
 
 𝑦𝑡 =  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 , (2.3) 
 
The parameter 𝑟 is the rate of return on human capital investments and the parameter 𝑤𝑡  
depicts the value of the child‟s endowments and “market luck” on his or her lifetime earnings. 
It is assumed that 𝑟 > 0 and 𝑤 > 0 which implies that both the investment in human capital 
and the endowments of capital are increasing in child‟s earnings.  
Returning to the parent‟s allocation problem, the optimal level of investment in human 
capital is found by maximizing the utility function with regard to a budget constraint. Since 
the parent only cares about own consumption and the wealth of its child, the budget constraint 
equals 
 
 𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1. (2.4) 
 
Performing the utility maximization subject to this budget constraint, which is shown in 
Appendix A, yields first order conditions that imply that the optimal level of investment 
equals 
 
 
𝐼𝑡−1 = α𝑦𝑡−1 −  1 − α 
𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡
 1 + 𝑟 
. 
(2.5) 
 
                                                 
3
 Becker and Tomes (1986) divides between non-human capital and assets. To simplify, I do not make this 
distinction and follow Becker and Tomes (1979) instead. 
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The equation shows that the level of investment is positively correlated to the parent‟s income 
through the preference parameter α. As long as she has some concerns regarding her child‟s 
wealth, i.e. α > 0, she will allocate income towards the child. The second term of the equation 
shows that the level of investment is increasing with the rate of return of the investment, and 
negatively related to the child‟s endowments and market luck. 
Substituting the optimal level of investment in the child‟s lifetime earnings equation 
(2.3) yields: 
 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 + α𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + α𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 , (2.6) 
 
where 𝛽 = α(1 + 𝑟). The parameter 𝛽 measures the marginal propensity to invest. It 
establishes a correlation between lifetime earnings of the parent and the child, and hence, it is 
a fundamental part of the analysis of intergenerational income mobility. We assume that the 
correlation is non-negative, but it is reasonable to expect that it is positive, i.e. 𝛽 > 0, in most 
families. This implies that an exogenous increase in the parents‟ income by 𝛿𝑦𝑡−1 would raise 
the child‟s income by 𝛽𝛿𝑦𝑡−1. Furthermore, the propensity to invest is non-negatively related 
to the rate of the investment r and the parent‟s preferences 𝛼. Finally, the variables and 
parameters are measured as deviations from their means. Considering the association between 
the earnings of a parent and a child, i.e. 𝛽, regression towards the mean implies decreasing 
intergenerational inequality in income over time. This entails that children of parents whom 
earnings deviate greatly from the mean of income, will find themselves above, but closer to 
the mean than their parents. Accordingly, regression away from the mean implies the opposite 
tendency, and hence, the intergenerational inequality in earnings will increase over time. 
Another essential part of the analysis is the concept of endowments 𝑒𝑡 . In the words of 
Becker and Tomes (1979), children‟s endowments are “determined by the reputation and 
„connections‟ of their families, the contribution to the ability, race, and other characteristics of 
children from commodities‟ acquired through belonging to a particular family culture. 
Obviously, endowments depend on many characteristics of parents, grandparents, and other 
family members and may also be culturally influenced by other families” (p. 1158). In other 
words, endowments are not only influenced by the attributes of one‟s parents and other family 
members, but also from the surrounding families, friends, society and culture. This implies 
that endowments of capital are produced through both nature and nurture.  
The child‟s endowments can be decomposed into a simple Markov model: 
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 𝑒𝑡 = γ𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 , (2.7) 
 
where 𝑒𝑡−1 is the endowments of the parent and γ measures the fraction of the parent‟s 
endowments that are transmitted to or inherited by the child. 𝑣𝑡  is the fraction of endowments 
that are exogenous of the parent, and it is described as “endowment luck”. It is assumed that 
endowments are only partially inherited, i.e. 0 < 𝛾 < 1, which implies that endowments 
regress towards the mean.  
The parent‟s endowments influence the child‟s lifetime earnings both directly and 
indirectly. Through the transmission of endowments γ the child directly inherits a portion of 
the parent‟s endowments, which in turn influence the child‟s lifetime earnings. In addition, 
the parent‟s endowments influences her own lifetime earnings 𝑦𝑡−1, and as we have seen, the 
parent invests some of her capital in the child‟s human capital which further influences the 
child‟s lifetime earnings. Thus, through parental investment in human capital, the 
endowments of the parent indirectly affect the child‟s earnings.  
Finally, the fact that the parent to a large extent is able to anticipate her child‟s 
endowments prior to most of the investments can cause alterations in the amount of 
investment. If the parent has more than one child, the direction of a possible adjustment and 
the subsequent effects on earnings mobility depends uttermost on the parent‟s philosophy 
regarding the division of capital between the children. Whether she divides the total 
investment equally between the children or chooses to maximize or minimize the investment 
in one well-endowed child leads to different consequences regarding the earnings mobility 
between each child and the parent.  
 
As a summary, we can recapitulate the essentials of the model regarding the income 
mobility. The intergenerational mobility evidently depends on parents‟ interest to invest in the 
children‟s human capital. The higher the propensity to invest is, i.e. when 𝛽 → 1, the higher 
the earnings of children reflects parents‟ earnings. This implies that the correlation between 
parents‟ and children‟s earning becomes greater, and hence, the income mobility between the 
generations decreases.  
Because the transmission of endowments from generation to generation always takes 
place, i.e. 𝛾 > 0, the intergenerational mobility of earnings depends also on the inheritability 
of endowments. If the degree of inheritability is eminent, i.e. if 𝛾 → 1, children inherit much 
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of parents‟ endowments. This implies, holding the level of investment constant, that human 
capital and lifetime earnings of parents and children are closely related. Accordingly, the 
income mobility between the generations is small.  
 
 
2.2 Statistical model 
When it comes to empirical research, the main problem with Becker and Tomes‟ 
model is to measure a person‟s endowments and to estimate the transmission of endowments 
between generations. So far econometricians have not been able to develop an adequate 
measure of endowments. One possible solution is to obtain one or more proxy variables for 
the omitted variable where commonly used proxies abilities are IQ scores and test scores from 
educational institutes. Since I have neither the data to measure these variables, nor is it certain 
that they satisfy the assumptions for a good proxy, these solutions are not feasible. The 
solution that has evolved in the literature is to analyze the association between the 
socioeconomic status of parents and offspring without any direct measure of endowments. 
Then, the statistical model display the relations between the long-run economic statuses and it 
can be formulated as 
 
 𝑦1𝑖 = 𝛽𝑦0𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , (2.8) 
 
where 𝑦1𝑖  and 𝑦0𝑖  denote the long-run economic status, e.g. log of lifetime earnings or 
permanent income, for a child and a parent in family i, respectively. The regression 
coefficient 𝛽 represents the elasticity of the child‟s long-run economic status with regard to 
the parent‟s long-run economic status. The error term 𝜀𝑖  measures the part of offspring‟s 
income that is not connected to the parent in question, and it is assumed that 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). All 
variables are measured as deviations from their population means.  
Even though this model fails to include a direct measure of endowments, one might 
claim that it to some extent measures the transmission of endowments. As the theoretical 
model outlined, parents‟ endowments work partially through the investment in children. Thus, 
the elasticity between lifetime earnings of parents and children picks up some of the 
inheritability of endowments, but unfortunately, it is not possible to test whether this 
hypothesis holds or not.  
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The amount if intergenerational immobility in the long-run socioeconomic status is 
measured by the earnings elasticity 𝛽. I.e. it depicts the fraction of children‟s lifetime earnings 
that can be attributed to the family background. The fraction of children‟s earnings that is not 
attributed to the earnings of the peers is the extent of earnings mobility between the 
generations. Furthermore, the earnings elasticity is often loosely referred to as the correlation 
between parents‟ and children‟s lifetime earnings. This is, however, not always the case. By 
multiplying the OLS formula for 𝛽 with 1/𝑛, the lifetime earnings elasticity can be 
formulated as 
 
 
𝛽 =
  𝑦0𝑖 − 𝑦 0𝑖 𝑦1𝑖
𝑛
1
  𝑦0𝑖 − 𝑦 0𝑖 2
𝑛
1
∙
1
𝑛
1
𝑛
≈
corr 𝑦1𝑖 , 𝑦0𝑖 ∙  var 𝑦1𝑖 ∙  var 𝑦0𝑖 
var 𝑦0𝑖 
= 𝜌
 var 𝑦1𝑖 
 var 𝑦0𝑖 
, 
(2.9) 
   
where 𝜌 = corr 𝑦1𝑖 , 𝑦0𝑖 . If the variance in lifetime earnings is similar across generations, the 
elasticity equals the correlation coefficient between the long-run economic status of children 
and parents. If the variance in y differs across generations, the correlation coefficient deviates 
from the elasticity measure. The direction and magnitude of the deviation are determined by 
the ratio of variance in lifetime earnings; 
 
 var 𝑦1𝑖 > var 𝑦0𝑖    ⟹    𝛽 > 𝜌 (2.10) 
 
and 
 
 var 𝑦1𝑖 < var 𝑦0𝑖    ⟹    𝛽 < 𝜌. (2.11) 
 
As a result, if the correlation 𝜌 is not weighted by the dispersion in variance between the 
generations when y differs, it would be inaccurate to describe the earnings elasticity as the 
correlation in earnings between parents and children. When the earnings elasticity is 
estimated, the actual correlation coefficient can be easily computed; 
 
 
𝜌 = 𝛽
 var 𝑦0𝑖 
 var 𝑦1𝑖 
. 
(2.12) 
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Note also that the direction of the income mobility between generations is depicted in 
the opposite direction of earnings correlation and earnings elasticity. If the elasticity between 
a child‟s and a parent‟s long run economic status is small, e.g. 𝛽 = 0,1, then the belonging 
correlation in long run status is negligible, and accordingly, the income mobility between the 
generations is high. 
 
2.2.1. Estimation problems 
 Several problems can arise when the elasticity between children‟s and parents‟ lifetime 
earnings is estimated. In the absence of data series on lifetime earnings researchers make use 
of short-run proxies for earnings, where the first studies on the subject used single-year 
income. In addition, scarcity of available data caused earlier researchers to use homogeneous 
samples rather than random samples. The consequences were biased and inconsistent 
estimators, and thus unreliable results. We can explore the different sources of bias, starting 
with short-run proxies. Assume that the available income for a child in family i is his or her 
log earnings in year t, 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 . If the available income serves as a short-run proxy for lifetime 
earnings the following model can be formulated; 
 
 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡  𝑦1𝑖 + 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 , (2.13) 
 
where the error term 𝑣1𝑖𝑡  is transitory fluctuations caused by random measurement error or 
actual deviation from lifetime earnings in period t (Solon, 1989; Solon, 1992). It is assumed 
that 𝑣1𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣1
2 ) and corr(𝜀𝑖 , 𝑣1𝑖𝑡) = 0. For now, let the slope coefficient 𝜆𝑡  in period t be 
equal to 1. By expressing the model through 𝑦1𝑖 , we can write the statistical model as 
 
 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦0𝑖 + (𝜀𝑖 − 𝑣1𝑖𝑡). (2.14) 
 
If the transitory fluctuations are uncorrelated with the permanent income of the parent, then 
 
 cov 𝑦0𝑖 , 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 = 0 (2.15) 
     
which implies that OLS estimation of 𝛽 is unbiased and consistent. Thus, measurement error 
in the proxy for the child‟s long-run economic status, i.e. the dependent variable, causes no 
estimation problems except some loss in efficiency. 
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 On the other hand, when a parent‟s long-run economic status, i.e. the independent 
variable, is proxied by applying single-year earnings in the model, the proxy causes error-in-
variables bias in the coefficient estimate. Similar to the child, the short-run proxy for the 
parent‟s lifetime earnings is her log earnings in year s, 
 
 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 = 𝜆𝑠𝑦0𝑖 + 𝑣0𝑖𝑠 , (2.16) 
 
where the error term 𝑣0𝑖𝑠  is transitory fluctuations. It is assumed that 𝑣0𝑖𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣0
2 ) and 
corr 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , 𝜀𝑖 = 0. Again, let the slope coefficient 𝜆𝑠 in period s equal 1. By expressing the 
equation through 𝑦0𝑖 , we can write the statistic model as 
 
 𝑦1𝑖 = 𝛽𝑦0𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 , (2.17) 
 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑠 = 𝜀𝑖 − 𝛽𝑣0𝑖𝑠 .
4
 Contrary to the case of the child, the new error term 𝜀𝑖𝑠  is correlated 
to the single-year proxy 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , which implies that cov 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ≠ 0, or more specific, 
 
 cov 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠 = −𝛽𝑣0𝑖𝑠 . (2.18) 
 
This correlation entails that the expected value of the error term is not zero given any value of 
𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , i.e. the zero conditional mean assumption is violated. This implies that the estimated 
correlation coefficient 𝛽  becomes biased and inconsistent when the statistical model is 
estimated by OLS regression. Examining the probability limit of the estimate 𝛽 , the error-in-
variables bias causes an underestimating of the true earnings elasticity, i.e. an attenuation bias 
in intergenerational income mobility: 
 
 
plim 𝛽 = 𝛽 +
cov 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠 
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠)
= 𝛽
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠)
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠) + var(𝑣0𝑖𝑠)
< 𝛽 
(2.19) 
 
Solon (1992) reports that the earnings elasticity tends to be underestimated by about 30% in a 
representative sample while Solon (1999) reports a negative bias of 30-50%. 
 
                                                 
4
 I ignore the proxy for the child‟s lifetime earnings in the statistical model since the proxy causes no bias in the 
OLS estimations. 
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 The other source of inconsistency erodes from utilization of homogeneous samples. 
Assume that lifetime earnings of children and parents are known, but that the data sample of 
parents is selected from a homogeneous subpopulation; 
 
 𝑦1𝑖 = 𝛽
∗𝑦0𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , (2.20) 
 
where the sample has lower variance in permanent income than a representative sample of 
parents, i.e.  var(𝑦0𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑖 ) < var(𝑦0𝑖). If OLS regression is applied to this model, the estimated 
correlation coefficient 𝜌 ∗ is consistent. However, if the permanent income of parents is 
proxied by single-year earnings in addition to a homogeneous sample, the sample selection 
causes inconsistency and attenuation bias in the estimated earnings elasticity 𝛽 ∗. 
Consequently, if both of the estimation problems are present in the same model, the 
association between long-run economic status between children and parents are 
underestimated by more than 30-50 %, which implies an even larger attenuation bias in the 
intergenerational earnings mobility (Solon, 1992).  
 
 
2.2.3. Treating the errors-in-variables bias 
Solon (1992) outlines two strategies to reduce the attenuation bias in the estimates. 
The first approach is to expand the parent‟s short-run proxy from single-year earnings to an 
average of several years. If the average is over T years, the statistical model, including the 
short-run proxy of the children, is modified to 
 
 𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 + (𝜀𝑖 − 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑣0𝑖𝑠), (2.21) 
 
where 
 
 
𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 =  
𝑦0𝑖𝑘
𝑇
𝑠+𝑇
𝑘=𝑠
. 
(2.22) 
 
If we assume that the transitory fluctuations 𝑣0𝑖𝑠  is serially uncorrelated over time, the 
probability limit of 𝛽  becomes 
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plim 𝛽 = 𝛽 +
cov 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠 
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠)
= 𝛽
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠)
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠) +
var(𝑣0𝑖𝑠)
𝑇
> 𝛽
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠)
var(𝑦0𝑖𝑠) + var(𝑣0𝑖𝑠)
. 
(2.23) 
 
As we see, the multi-year proxy attenuates the “noise” component, i.e. the variance of the 
measurement error, and consequently, the error-in-variables bias is reduced when the short-
run proxy is expanded over several years. Nevertheless, the downward bias is still present, it 
is merely the magnitude of the bias that is reduced. Now, researchers with a few exceptions 
are aware of the error-in-variables bias. Consequently, most of the studies on the topic attend 
the estimation problem by expanding the short-run proxy over several years.  
 
 The second approach involves the use of instrument variables, e.g. by applying a 
parent‟s education 𝐸0𝑖  as an instrument for the single-year measure of earnings. To be an 
adequate instrument the education of the parent must be correlated with the single-year 
variable and uncorrelated with the error term: 
 
 corr 𝐸0𝑖 , 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 ≠ 0 (2.24) 
     
 corr(𝐸0𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑣0𝑖𝑠) = 0 (2.25) 
 
If these assumptions are satisfied the probability limit of the IV estimator of 𝛽 is  
 
 
plim 𝛽 𝐼𝑉 = 𝛽 +
corr 𝐸0𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖𝑠 
corr 𝐸0𝑖 , 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 
∙
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀𝑖𝑠 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑦0𝑖𝑠 
> 𝛽, 
(2.26) 
 
which implies that 𝛽 𝐼𝑉  becomes inconsistent and biased. The entailed bias is an amplification, 
and hence it causes an overestimation of the true earnings elasticity. From a theoretical point 
of view, if the amplification bias matches the attenuation bias caused by the errors-in-
variables, the estimated earnings elasticity equals the true earnings elasticity. However, from 
an empirical standpoint, this would be considered to be pure luck.  If the earnings elasticity is 
estimated by both OLS and the IV approach, the estimates represents lower and upper bound 
for 𝛽, respectively.  
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2.2.4 Life cycle bias 
A problem of applying current earnings as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings is that 
it assumes a constant relationship between current and lifetime earnings over the life cycle 
(Grawe, 2006; Haider and Solon, 2006; Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006), i.e. that 
 
 𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑠 = 1, (2.27) 
 
in the models that depict the short run proxies for children‟s and parents‟ lifetime earnings in 
equation (2.13) and (2.16), respectively. Haider and Solon (2006) state that the association 
between current and lifetime earnings 𝜆 changes over the lifetime cycle because of 
heterogeneity in lifecycle income profiles. Generally, the slope coefficient is lower than 1 
when a person enters the working life and monotonically increases over the life cycle. 
Eventually, at the end of the carrier, it might again become lower than 1.  
The variation in 𝜆 across the life cycle causes the quoted models to be wrongly 
specified when current earnings are applied as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings, which in 
turn causes bias in the estimated earnings elasticities. This so called life-cycle bias does not 
only arise in the right hand side variable, as in the classical case of errors-in-variables, but 
also on the left hand side. Thus, contrary to the former belief that measurement error in the 
children‟s income causes no distorting effects when applying current earnings as short-run 
proxy for lifetime earnings, life cycle bias applies for both parents‟ and children‟s earnings. 
To treat or minimize the bias that arises, one has to find the age at which the association 
between current and lifetime earnings 𝜆 is close to 1, i.e. the optimal age at time of measure. 
This is however a demanding task as several parameters must be empirically estimated and 
extensively analyzed separately for each generation, each cohort and for each sex. In addition, 
the literature on life cycle bias is still at an early stage so no concluding remarks can be drawn 
at this time.  
 
2.2.5 Extensions of the model 
 As in the case of parents, it is common to proxy child‟s earnings over several years.5 
The expansion reduces the noise from using a short-run proxy, and hence makes the earnings 
measure a better depiction of lifetime earnings. When the short-run proxy of both parent and 
                                                 
5
 Note that expanding the short-run proxy to encompass earnings years does neither eliminate life cycle bias for 
parents or children, nor does it eliminate attenuation bias for parents. 
2. Theoretical framework 
15 
 
child is expanded from single-year earnings to an average of T years, the statistical model 
becomes  
 
  𝑦1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖 − 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑣0𝑖𝑠 , (2.28) 
 
where 
 
𝑦 1𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑦1𝑖𝑘
𝑇
𝑡+𝑇
𝑘=𝑡
, 
(2.29) 
 
and 𝑦 0𝑖𝑠  is defined in equation (2.22). 
During the development of the literature is has become common to add age profiles in 
earnings to adjust for stage-of-life cycle.
6
 For the parent this entails that earnings are 
regressed on age and age squared, and then the constant term and residual from the regression 
are used as the measure of his or her earnings. The performed regression is  
 
 𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 = 𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 + 𝛼 + 𝛿0𝐴 0𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿1𝐴 0𝑖𝑠
2 + 𝑣0𝑖𝑠 , (2.30) 
   
where 
 
𝐴 0𝑖𝑠 =  𝐴0𝑖𝑘
𝑠+𝑇
𝑘=𝑠
. 
(2.31) 
 
The similar can be shown for children where the new short run proxy equals 𝑦 0𝑖𝑡 . 
 
 
2.3 Expanding the statistical model 
 The model outlined by Solon (1992) can be expanded to include different family 
structures which make it possible to explore whether parents and children in different family 
types exhibit dissimilar income mobility. One approach is to encompass binary variables in 
the statistical model where each variable represents one type of family composition. If we 
denote the possible structures that family i can undertake with a vector of binary variables 𝐷  𝑖 , 
𝐷  𝑖  =  0,1 , we can write the statistical model as 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that the age-adjustment does not remove life cycle bias. 
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 𝑦 1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 + 𝛼 𝐷  𝑖 + 𝛿 𝐷  𝑖𝑦 0𝑖𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖 , (2.32) 
 
where 𝑢𝑖 = 𝜀𝑖 − 𝑣1𝑖𝑡 − 𝜌𝑣0𝑖𝑠 .
7
 The parameter 𝛼 describes the difference in interception 
between the included family types while the parameter 𝛿 depicts the difference in earnings 
elasticity between the family types. One limitation regarding the dummy approach is that it 
imposes a common error term over the entire sample. That is, when the subsamples are pooled 
into one model the error terms are not able to fluctuate between the family types but enforced 
into a joint structure.  
 Another way of investigating dissimilarities in earnings elasticity across different 
family types is by estimating over the subsamples rather than the pooled model. Thus, instead 
of encompassing family dummy variables into the statistical model, the model is applied 
separately for each family type; 
 
 𝑦 1𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑎𝑚 _𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
= 𝛽𝑖
𝑓𝑎𝑚 _𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑦 0𝑖𝑠
𝑓𝑎𝑚 _𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
+ 𝑢𝑖
𝑓𝑎𝑚 _𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
. (2.33) 
 
 The main advantage of the group approach is that the error terms can fluctuate over the 
family structure. As the model is divided by the family types, it is only assumed a common 
error term within each family type rather than over the entire sample as in the case of the 
pooled model. In this sense, one can state that the dummy approach is somewhat more 
restrictive that the group approach.  
 
 
2.4 Transition matrices 
 An alternative approach to describe the association between parents‟ and children‟s 
long-run economic status is to compute transition matrices instead of estimating the earnings 
elasticity through regressions on the statistical model. A transition matrix displays the 
probability of observing a child in a specific position in his or her cohort‟s earnings 
distribution, conditional upon a parent‟s position in his or her cohort‟s income distribution. 
Normally, the income distribution of children and parents is divided into q equal-sized 
percentiles, and transition probabilities are computed for the portion of children in the m 
                                                 
7
 Both parent‟s and child‟s short-run proxy is included in the model. 
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percentile of the group‟s income distribution, given that the parents belong to the n percentile 
in their group‟s income distribution. The probabilities are calculated for all (m, n) pairs, and 
the results are displayed in transition matrices. 
 The main advantage of transition matrices is that they display the intergenerational 
income mobility within the income distribution of children and parents. While regressions on 
the statistical model only show the overall earnings elasticity between children and parents, 
transition matrices display associations in income between generations across socioeconomic 
classes. Among others, one is able to study whether the income mobility differs between poor 
and wealthy child-parent pairs, and the probability that a child‟s earnings deviates from the 
parent‟s earnings in either direction. Furthermore, by separating the transition matrices by 
family type one is able to depict whether the mobility patterns over the income distribution is 
different for intact and disrupted families.  
The main problem with the approach is similar to that of the statistical model, i.e. how 
to observe the long-run socioeconomic status of parents and children. Consequently, the 
short-run proxies of lifetime earnings are deployed here as well, and to increase the validness 
of the proxies the earnings are measured over several years. In addition, the parents‟ and 
children‟s measures should be conducted at approximately the same stage in their life cycle to 
reduce life cycle bias in the short run proxies.  
The transition approach normally brings about multiple matrices which can be difficult 
to grasp when comparing the results across family types, across time or between cohorts. In 
that respect, an immobility index is computed for each transition matrix where the index is the 
sum of the diagonal and the adjacent transition probability cells. This technique follows 
Dearden et al. (1997), Blanden et al. (2002) and Bratberg et al. (2005). If the matrices are 
divided into quartiles “perfect” intergenerational income mobility implies that each transition 
probability equals 0,25 which results in a immobility index of 2,5. In this case the position of 
the offspring in the income distribution is independent of the parents‟ position. The other 
extreme point of the scale is when the intergenerational income mobility is “imperfect” in the 
sense that all offspring are situated in the same quartile as their parents. This situation would 
yield transition probabilities of 1 on the diagonal and 0 elsewhere, implying an immobility 
index of 4.  
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2.5 Causation or selection 
A question that arises if one discovers divergence in outcome of offspring and parents 
across family types, and consequently differences in intergenerational income mobility, is 
whether the observed differences are due to causal relations or selection. Causal effects imply 
that the family dissolution itself causes the differences, while selection, in a pure sense, rather 
suggests that there are systematic dissimilarities between intact and disrupted families that 
both affect the probability of disruption and cause the offspring‟s and parents‟ outcome to 
deviate between the family types. If causation is the main source to the observed differences, 
then estimations of (2.32) will provide consistent estimates. But if selection it assumed to 
prevail, then the short run proxy for parents‟ earnings will no longer be exogenous due to the 
systematic selection into divorce. This causes the variable 𝑦 0𝑖𝑠  to be correlated with the error 
term 𝑢𝑖 , which results in biased and inconsistent estimates.  
In the case of parental death, the issue of selection is trivial. Overall, death is 
considered to be an exogenous occurrence even though there are factors that influence the 
probability of death in the long run, e.g. a person‟s life style, diet and health. In the case of 
divorce, selection is an essential issue, and therefore I consider two strategies to investigate 
whether selection may be present; an instrument variable model and a difference-in-difference 
model. The two approaches will be presented separately. 
 
2.5.1 Difference-in-difference model 
This strategy explores the effects of marital dissolution on income mobility by 
attempting to remove the systematic components that cause the selection to occur. The 
components are a part of the offspring‟s family background, or more specific, the individual 
characteristics of the parents that bring about higher probability for divorce and cause the 
income mobility to differ between intact and non-intact families. To accomplish this objective 
two identifying assumptions are made. First, the earnings of siblings are approximately equal 
if the siblings grew up with the same family environment, i.e. the same family structure. This 
allows us to utilize siblings‟ earnings in place of offspring‟s earnings. Secondly, the 
difference in earnings between siblings in intact and disrupted families is equal if the 
disruption was absent. This assumption is presented in equation (2.37).  
The point of departure is the difference  
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 𝐸 𝑦𝑖 𝐷𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑦𝑖 𝐷𝑖 = 0 , (2.34) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖  denotes lifetime earnings to the offspring. The binary variable 𝐷𝑖  denotes parental 
divorce where the variable takes on the value 1 if the parents are divorced and 0 if the parents 
are not divorced during the children‟s adolescence. If there are differences between the terms 
in (2.34), the marital dissolution is believed to impose causal effects on offspring‟s earnings. 
For now, assume that it is possible to observe the income of offspring as expressed in (2.34).  
To improve the preciseness of the difference-measure the expected earnings of 
offspring can be differentiated with the expected earnings of elderly siblings. We would like 
to differentiate the offspring‟s earnings with his or her own earnings before the disruption 
took place, i.e. so the earnings difference becomes a before-after divorce comparison for each 
individual, but this is not achievable. Instead, we make use of siblings‟ earnings where the 
main notion behind is the fact that siblings who grow up together share the same parents, the 
same family, the same neighbourhood and the same society. Of most importance is the fact 
that they are exposed to the same family environment and share the same family background 
that is decisive to ambitions and achievements of educational attainment, occupational 
success and thus the long-run socioeconomic status. If the elderly siblings grew up when the 
family was still intact while the younger siblings experienced the separation during the 
adolescence, a difference in expected earnings between the siblings is only believed to persist 
if the alteration in the family structure from intact to non-intact has causal effects on the 
younger siblings‟ earnings. The expanded model with siblings-differences equals 
 
 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒  𝐷𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒  𝐷𝑖 = 0 , (2.35) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑦  and 𝑦𝑖𝑒  denote the earnings of the younger and elderly sibling, respectively. If the 
divorce has causal effects on the offspring‟s earnings then the difference in the first term will 
differ from the second term in (2.35). 
A problem with the difference-measure is that the second term in (2.35) is counter 
factual, i.e. it is not possible to observe the earnings of younger and elderly siblings in 
divorced families if the parents never got divorced.
8
 One solution is to utilize a group of 
comparison which in this case is younger and elderly siblings in ever-intact families. If we 
                                                 
8
 One can think of marital dissolution as a treatment where the divorced families constitute the treatment group. 
If the parents are divorced and hence participants of the treatment group, then we are not able to observe the 
parents if they did not take part in the treatment, i.e. did not end up with a divorce. That is the counter factual 
element. 
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replace the second term in (2.35) with siblings in intact families the difference-in-difference 
effect we wish to measure becomes 
 
 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑑𝑖𝑣 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑑𝑖𝑣  𝐷𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖 = 0 , (2.36) 
 
where the raised notations div and int describes the family structure of the siblings‟ families. 
The identifying assumption is  
 
 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑑𝑖𝑣 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑑𝑖𝑣  𝐷𝑖 = 0 = 𝐸 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑡  𝐷𝑖 = 0 , (2.37) 
 
i.e. we assume that the expected sibling-difference in disrupted families in absence of 
disruption would be the same as the difference in intact families. To perform the regressions 
on the difference-measure an econometric model must be constructed. The point of departure 
is the statistical model expanded with a divorce dummy variable, i.e. 
 
 𝑦𝑖
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑝𝑎𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 , (2.38) 
 
which applies for all four types of siblings. The children‟s earnings are denoted 𝑦𝑖
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  and the 
parents‟ earnings are denoted 𝑦𝑖
𝑝𝑎𝑟
. Note that the divorce dummy equals zero for the elderly 
siblings of the divorced parents and for both the younger and elderly siblings in the intact 
families. It only equals one for the younger siblings with divorced parents as they are the only 
ones who actually experienced the marital disruption during the childhood. Now, if we 
assume that selection into divorce can be described by the fixed effect 𝛼𝑖 , a transformation 
between the younger and elderly siblings will remove the fixed effect component.
9
 With the 
transformation the model equals 
 
  𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  =  𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 . (2.39) 
 
Finally, since we are interested in the income mobility, i.e. the slope coefficient, we include 
an interaction variable; 
 
                                                 
9
 See chapter A.2 in Appendix A for a detailed deduction of the econometric model. 
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  𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  = 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 . (2.40) 
 
When estimating this regression model the parameter 𝛾𝑖  indicates if the observed deviations in 
intergenerational income mobility between intact and divorced families are due to causal 
relations or results from selection. Stylized, if the marital dissolution is believed to possess 
causal effects on parents‟ and offspring‟s earnings the parameter 𝛾𝑖  should be significant 
different from zero. 
Finally, some notations about the difference-in-difference model and the issue of 
selection should be mentioned. First and foremost, the identifying assumptions are restrictive 
and may be too harsh. Especially, one may call into question the assumed equality between 
siblings. The model also imposes severe requirements on the data material due to the required 
age difference between siblings and siblings‟ parents. Even if one in theory is concerned with 
the issue of selection it can be difficult to assess the issue empirically as the requirements to 
data material can be hard to overcome. Furthermore, chains of actions are normally a mixture 
of both selection and causality, in which the two effects may interfere with each other, work 
through the same channels and influence each other. As a consequence, it is complicated to 
detect and separate both effects. In addition, there are observable and unobservable factors 
that affect both the magnitude of a person‟s income and the probability of marital dissolution. 
Even if the factors are known it can be a problem to quantify them. For instance it is 
reasonable to expect that a person‟s abilities and endowments affect the educational 
attainment and success, but it is problematic to measure a person‟s abilities. 
 
2.5.2 Instrument variable regressions 
 Another approach to investigate the issue of selection is by utilizing instrument 
variables. This entails that the endogenous variable in the regression model, i.e. the binary 
variable which indicates whether or not a family is disrupted by marital dissolution in (2.34), 
is replaced with a linear combination of the exogenous variables along with one or more 
instrumental variables that are correlated with the endogenous variable, but not with the error 
term.  
Two instruments for marital dissolution that have been used in several studies on 
earnings, education and family structure are sex of the first born child and divorce laws. The 
former strategy is based on the fact that the sex of the first child is random and that several 
studies have discovered that married parents face a higher probability for divorce if their first 
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child is a girl. Amongst others Morgan and Pollard (2002), Lundberg and Rose (2003), Dahl 
and Moretti (2004), Ananat and Michaels (2007) and Bedard and Deschenes (2005) confirm 
this notion. The hypotheses that explain the empirical relationship are investigated extensively 
by Dahl and Moretti, of which three are presented; the gender bias, the role model and the 
differential cost hypothesis. The first hypothesis suggests that parents have preferences for 
sons above daughters. Whatever the cause may be they prefer to have sons, and consequently, 
if their first child is a daughter it can create instability in the marriage. Secondly, the parents 
acknowledge that the presence of the father in the household is more important to sons than 
daughters. So, if their first child is a boy it will counteract a decision regard divorce because 
the parents recognize the damage the divorce and the following absence of the father will 
possess on the son. Finally, if the cost of raising a daughter is higher than for raising a boy, 
the expenses which follow the girl may increase the probability of divorce. Dahl and Moretti 
emphasize that the three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive.  
The second strategy is based on the introduction of new laws on marital dissolution. 
Especially, no-fault divorce laws were passed on state by state in the US over the period 
1950-1980. Since the state governments were in charge of the implementation, i.e. as opposed 
to the federal governments, and the laws caused increasing divorce rates in several states, the 
laws serve as an exogenous variation in the parents‟ probability of divorce (Fertig 2004). 
Consequently, the requirements of a satisfactory instrument are fulfilled, and hence, they have 
been used as instruments for divorce in several studies that utilize data samples from the US.  
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3. Consequences of family dissolution  
Motivations for exploring associations between income of parents and offspring across 
family structures stem from the hypothesis stating that family dissolution brings about causal 
changes in lifetime income of parents, children or both of the generations. Alteration in 
parents‟ income is generally a direct consequence of the disruption while changes in lifetime 
earnings of children is associated with changes in parental investment in children‟s human 
capital and in environmental factors that influence the children during the adolescence, i.e. 
“nurture” components. If the hypothesis is not rejected, we would expect the variations in 
earnings to cause divergence in intergenerational income mobility between intact and 
disrupted families. The direction and magnitude of the differences are dependent on several 
relations, where amongst others, the distribution of family types across the income 
distribution will affect the direction of deviation, and the nature of and circumstances around 
the disruption will affect both the direction and the magnitude. In this chapter I present the 
causal consequences of family dissolution on parents and children separately. Finally, I 
investigate the issue of selection.   
 
 
3.1. Consequences of dissolution regarding the parents 
The main socioeconomic distress regarding disruption is the drop in financial 
resources. A divorce or separation entails that one parent leaves the household and that the 
household budget is reduced by the magnitude of that parent‟s income. The parent remaining 
in the household, who becomes the sole provider of the children, is usually the mother. In 
Norway, about 85 % of all single parents in the period of 2005-2007 were mothers (Statistics 
Norway, 2008b). In addition, the non-custodial parent, who is usually the father, is often the 
breadwinner of the family. This implies that the household is not only reduced by the income 
of one parent, but in most cases it is the main contributor to the family economy who leaves 
the household. This pattern is supported by the fact that single Norwegian parents are 
substantially overrepresented in both the lower quartile of the income distribution and beneath 
the poverty line (Statistics Norway, 2008b). In the case of parental death, the remaining parent 
automatically becomes a sole provider. It is obviously not possible to identify whether it is the 
breadwinner of the family who is likely to pass away. The main point is rather that parental 
death also causes a downfall in the household‟s economic resources. 
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A consequence of becoming a sole provider, regardless of the type of disruption, is 
foregone economics of scale in consumption. A two-parent household enjoys advantages on 
grounds of larger family size because the cost per person of attaining a given standard of 
living decreases as the household size increases. Nelson (1988) highlights three important 
sources where the first acknowledges that some goods are to some extent considered public 
within the household, e.g. shelter, household equipment and electric light. Secondly, the 
household experiences an increasing return in production of goods and services. And finally, 
as the family income in general is higher in two-parent households, these families are able to 
enjoy discounts on bulk purchases. 
Another effect of the disruption and the subsequent fall in family resources is that the 
single parent often increases the supply of labour. When he or she increases the hours of 
employment it provides additional capital to the family household and in that way offsets 
some of the downfall in resources caused by the divorce or death. In addition, the total income 
of the one-parent household is supported by other sources of income such as welfare receipts. 
Single providers are entitled to family transition support, increased child benefits and other 
types of payment from the government. In the case of divorce, the income is supported by 
custody transfers and child support from the non-custodial parent. All these benefits and 
contributions boost the household income considerably and may have impact on the labour 
supply decision. 
Finally, a possibility is that the custodial parent remarries or enters into a cohabiting 
union with another partner. The new household will experience an increase in the financial 
resources by the size of the spouse‟s income, and the family will undergo economics of scale 
as any other two-parent family. As a result, in the case of step families the main concern 
regarding the consequences of disruption is not the economic element but rather the 
psychological and emotional impacts the altered family structures may possess on the children 
involved.  
 
 
3.2. Consequences of dissolution regarding the children 
3.2.1. Economic considerations 
From a theoretical point of view in terms of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), a family 
disruption affects the children‟s lifetime earnings 𝑦𝑡  through the parental investment made in 
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their human capital during the adolescence 𝐼𝑡−1.
10
 As noted in the former section, divorce as 
well as parental death leads to a drop in the household‟s economic resources and imposes 
capital restrictions on the custodial parent. In the case of parental death, it is most likely that 
the financial restrictions cause a downfall in the investment in human capital. A complicating 
factor is that the death may change the widow‟s or widower‟s preferences for investment, i.e. 
shifts in α, which will affect the investment positively or negatively. If we explore the human 
capital investment in detail, we expect financial support to educational attainment to be lower 
in the disrupted family since education is the main source of human capital. In addition to 
financial support, the remaining parent must assist his or her children in homework and after-
school activities, and guide and supervise them in their educational aims and ambitions. These 
tasks require time and attention, and might be difficult for the remaining parent to fulfil if he 
or she faces time constraints after increasing the labour supply. Apparently, there is a trade off 
between increasing the labour supply and thereby contributing to the household‟s finances 
and devoting time and attention to the children. Overall, it is likely that children in families 
who have experienced parental death will one way or the other possess lower human capital 
and thus lower educational attainment than children from two-parent families when entering 
the economic life. Furthermore, as the correlation between education and occupation is 
considered to be substantial, the educational disadvantages from the adolescence bring about 
lower occupational attainment and status than children from two-parent families. As a result, 
we can expect a divergence in lifetime earnings between family types where children who 
experienced parental death are worse off than children from two-parent families.  
In the case of divorce, the consequences are less certain. Even though the economic 
resources of the household are diminished when one parent leaves the family, it is not certain 
that the non-custodial parent ends his or her investment in the children‟s human capital. If the 
parent in question chooses to do so, we can expect the children to experience the same 
educational and occupational disadvantages and attain lower lifetime earnings than children 
from intact families, as in the case of children who experience death of one parent. This 
notion is partly supported by several studies on children‟s educational attainment where the 
the common finding is that children who experience divorce are educational inferior to 
children from intact families (e.g. Jonsson and Gähler, 1997; Ginther and Pollak, 2004; 
McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; Bjorklund and Sundstrom, 2006; Bjorklund et al., 2007). 
Amongst others, the discovered disadvantages are a higher rate of dropout from high school, 
                                                 
10
 See chapter 2.1, page 4. 
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lower college attendance and on average lower high school grades. Furthermore, after the 
divorce the custodial parent will face time constraints and must choose between increasing the 
labour supply and spending time with his or her children. Yet, in the case of divorce, the non-
custodial parent may still spend time with the children without investing in their human 
capital, and thus ease the time constraints facing the custodial parent. This would make it 
possible for the sole provider to increase the labour supply without reducing the time spent 
with the children, which would also ease the reduction in the investment. 
In the case where the abandoning parent chooses to maintain the investment in human 
capital, the children may not be worse off at all. Even though the household is dissolved both 
parents keep investing in their children‟s human capital as any intact family. What become 
important to the children‟s outcome are the circumstances around the divorce and the 
psychological and emotional upheaval attached to the disruption. In addition, the alterations in 
the parent‟s earnings with the divorce are important. As described earlier, the single parent 
will no longer benefit from economies of scale, which may increase the expenditures on 
consumption goods and thus lower the investments. If the abandoning parent maintains the 
investment after the disruption, the change in his or her income will also be of influence on 
the total investment. Finally, the divorce might cause changes in the preference parameter α  
or the rate of return on human capital r.  
Children in step families may not experience the same extent of educational and 
occupational disadvantages as children of single parents. As the household is increased with a 
step parent who most likely has a positive income, the investment may increase both in time 
and financially. Evidently, the course of action depends on the preferences of the stepparent 
and his or her wish to contribute to the investment in the spouse‟s children. In addition, the 
time between the disruption of the first relationship and the entering of the other is of 
importance. If the period of single parenthood is extensive and the investment in human 
capital has been reduced during a critical time in the children‟s childhood, their outcome may 
not be any different from offspring with single parents.  
 
3.2.2. Sociological considerations 
In addition to investments in human capital, alterations in environmental factors due to 
the disruption may have great impact on the children‟s outcome. These so called “nurture” 
components of a child‟s adolescence are complex and encompass characteristics of the 
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environment and surroundings that contribute to the shaping of the child.
11
 Examples of such 
factors are family background, school, neighbourhood, friends, parental guidance, parental 
supervision and psychological aspects such as aims, ambitions and expectations for the future. 
It is obvious that these elements possess great influence on the outcome of children 
considering educational attainment, occupational choice and status, and lifetime income. 
Consequently, if family dissolution affects any of the components we would expect the 
outcome of children to deviate between family structures.  
 In the sociological literature, one of the explanations to why family disruption may 
affect the children‟s educational attainment is known as the crises model of divorce or family-
stress hypothesis (McLanahan, 1985; Jonsson and Gähler, 1997). The hypothesis focuses on 
the emotional upheaval and unbalance in family relations that arise during a divorce. Since it 
may not only be disturbing for the parents but the children as well, the disruption can cause 
psychological problems with the offspring. In relation to educational attainment, these 
problems can manifest themselves in behavioural problems at school and create poorer overall 
academic performance. Poorer performance in school may further imply that the children of 
divorced parents are more exposed to lower occupational attainment and status, and hence 
lower socioeconomic status than offspring in intact families. 
 Other hypotheses emphasize the absence of one of the parents during the children‟s 
adolescence. The parent absence perspective states that, ceteris paribus, two parents should be 
better than one parent (Amato and Keith, 1991). This entails that families disrupted due to 
death and divorce should in principle be affected similar by the disruption. Furthermore, the 
father absence hypothesis emphasizes merely the absence of the father. The father is an 
important role-model to the emotional and cognitive development of the children, and has 
great influential force when it comes to educational and occupational attainment. In 
McLahanan‟s (1985) own words, “the hypothesis proposes that the absence of a father 
decreases motivation for achievement and interferes with normal psychosexual development, 
resulting in poorer academic performance and premature termination of schooling” (p. 879). 
Furthermore, because parents are important role-models the children‟s aims and ambitions 
regarding education and occupation may be reduced if the custodial parent is the one with the 
lowest education or occupation. Also, if the sole provider has low academic skills the 
availability and quality of guidance may be lowered when it comes to homework. Since it 
normally is the fathers who leave the household and that they in general possess the highest 
                                                 
11
 Components not considered as “nurture” are a person‟s genetics and innate qualities, i.e. “nature” components.  
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educational and occupational status of the parents, the described relations are commonly 
experienced among disrupted families. Thus, the overall consequences for the children can be 
lower educational attainment and lower occupational status (Jonnson and Gähler, 1997).  
 
 
3.3. Selection  
 With regards to the introduced theoretical framework and the hypotheses stating that 
offspring in divorced families are socioeconomic disadvantaged to offspring in intact families, 
selection implies that it is not the divorce itself that causes the outcome of offspring in 
divorced families to be inferior, but rather that exogenous factors exist that both decrease the 
preferences for parental investment and increase the probability for marital dissolution. A 
possible and highlighted explanation is that parents with lower abilities, low life time earnings 
or low degrees of educational attainment and success are exposed to both of the quoted 
factors.
12
 As we have seen, low preferences for human capital mainly imply that the parents 
invest few amounts of capital and time in their children‟s education. Hence, their children will 
on average receive low degrees of educational attainment and success which bring about 
occupational and socioeconomic disadvantages later in life. For these families the offspring 
would be worse off compared to families with high preferences for human capital, regardless 
of the structure of the family. But as the probability is higher for divorce among these 
families, on average, they tend to be overrepresented among divorced families. As a result, it 
appears as it is the disruption that brings about the differences in children‟s outcome while it 
really is due to underlying differences between the families. 
                                                 
12
 Another possibility is that the parents have high preferences for human capital, but that they face credit 
constraints even as an intact family.  
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4. Literature review 
The main contributions to the literature on intergenerational income mobility and 
parental separation are Couch and Lillard (1997), Peters (1992), Bjorklund and Chadwick 
(2003) and Fertig (2004). Biblarz and Raftery (1993) have also contributed on the topic, but 
their study is more related to intergenerational mobility across occupational categories rather 
than transmission of earnings itself. Yet, their study has been included in the literature review 
because of great association between occupational status and income, and scare amount of 
literature on income mobility and parental separation.  
In this chapter I first present the authors‟ hypotheses and what findings they expect to 
discover. Then, I outline the theoretical framework and methods of regressions utilized in the 
studies. Finally, I present the results and some of the authors‟ interpretations and implications 
of their findings regarding family dissolution and intergenerational mobility.  
 
4.1 Hypotheses and priors 
Fertig (2004) investigates the relationship between intergenerational income mobility 
and parental separation by looking for support for the father-absence hypothesis. The 
hypothesis states that families which experience divorce will undergo weaker transmission of 
capital between generations, which implies higher income mobility in families beneath the 
mean of income and lower income mobility in families above the mean. The non-appearance 
of the father will negatively affect the investment in the child, both through capital restrictions 
in the family income and through restrictions in human capital transmission. In addition, the 
time spent with one parent is reduced, it is less supervision and guidance and the level of 
stress in the child‟s household increases (Popenoe, 1996, and Murray, 1995, in Fertig, 2004). 
The consequences are disadvantages when it comes to educational attainment and 
performance in school, and outcome in long run will be lower occupational attainment, and 
hence, lower socioeconomic status (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan, 2002). The author 
investigates whether the hypothesis holds by first examining whether the intergenerational 
transmission of human capital – proxied by intergenerational income mobility – is weaker in 
divorced households and then addressing the issue of selection.  
 
 Biblarz and Raftery (1993) look for support for the hypothesis that states that the 
association between the socioeconomic origins and destination of sons is stronger for 
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offspring from intact families than from disrupted families, i.e. that the intergenerational 
occupational mobility is higher in disrupted families. The main assumption behind this 
hypothesis is the fact that the mechanisms behind the socioeconomic inheritance between 
fathers and sons are more effective in intact families. The reason is that the absence of the 
father in a disrupted family will diminish his importance both as a role model, socialization 
figure and as a value transmitter to the offspring. The authors also expect the transmission 
process between the remaining custodial household head, i.e. the mother or a stepfather, and 
the offspring to be less effective and more problematic compared with the process in intact 
families. Furthermore, the authors separate between family disruption stemming from 
separation or divorce and from death of a parent. It is believed that a family break-up caused 
by separation or divorce will have stronger effect on the transmission process, i.e. lower 
intergenerational mobility, than family disruption caused by death of a parent. 
 
 Couch and Lillard (1997) investigates the correlation of earnings between sons and 
fathers in intact and disrupted families. The authors examine whether there exist a difference 
in earnings correlation, and if there is, whether it can be explained by differences in 
educational attainment. The empirical background for such a statement is that several studies 
confirm that children from disrupted families attain fewer years of education and receive on 
average lower grades than children from intact families. Theoretically, this implies that 
children from divorced families accumulate lower human capital during their education, and 
hence enters working life with lower human capital. This in turn negatively affects the 
socioeconomic status of the acquired occupations and thereby lowers their lifetime earnings. 
Furthermore, this implies that offspring from disrupted families in lower socioeconomic 
classes would be lower upwardly mobile, i.e. higher income mobility, and offspring from 
disrupted families in upper socioeconomic classes would be more downwardly mobile, i.e. 
lower income mobility, compared to sons from intact families.  
 
 Bjorklund and Chadwick (2003) and Peters (1992) examine intergenerational income 
mobility patterns without any clear hypotheses and without describing what they expect to 
discover. Bjorklund and Chadwick choose to focus on the definition of father, a topic they 
consider is a neglected problem in literature. They are able to diversify the definition of the 
father by examining the extent to which the male offspring lived with their biological or non-
biological father during the adolescence, and the subsequent effect on the intergenerational 
income mobility. Peters examines whether the intergenerational mobility is influenced by 
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family background characteristics. In the study she distinguishes between income and social 
classes and incorporates different characteristics of the parents. One of the included 
characteristics of the parents is whether a family is intact or dissolved.  
 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework and methods of regression 
Peters (1992) and Fertig (2004) utilize the theoretical framework of Becker and Tomes 
(1979) by expanding the model to incorporate divergence in family structure.
13
 Peters moves 
forth by including a vector of dummy variables where the variable “broken home” indicates 
whether the child lived with both parents at the age of 14. The author offers no detailed 
explanation regarding the non-intact families so most probably it is included families 
disrupted due to parental death and divorce. Finally, Peters allows for gender differences in 
offspring by running separate regressions for sons and daughters.  
Fertig does greater modifications to the Becker and Tomes‟ framework than Peters. 
First and foremost, she changes the parents‟ utility function so the investment in human 
capital may differ between family types. Also, a parameter in the child‟s earnings equation is 
included which measures the extent the children are able to inherit non-genetic or social 
endowments from the parents. This allows children from alternative families to differ from 
offspring in intact families in genetic endowments as well as social endowments. 
Furthermore, Fertig separates between single and step families where she allows for non-
linearity by including a variable specifying how many years a family have been a single or 
step family. Finally, as Peters, Fertig runs separate regressions for sons and daughters. Both 
authors apply the method of ordinary least squares to estimate the coefficients. 
 
 Bjorklund and Chadwick (2003) utilize the estimation strategy of Solon in their 
study.
14
 The authors do not offer an explicit review of their contribution to the statistical 
framework regarding the incorporation of different family structures. What they do report, is 
dividing the offspring into six groups according to the extent they have lived with their 
biological father and a non-biological father; (1) always lived with biological father, (2) 
sometimes lived with biological father and never lived with a non-biological father, (3) 
                                                 
13
 It should be stressed that none of the authors have managed to measure endowments and hence failed to 
estimate the transmission of endowments between generations.   
14
 See chapter 2.2, page 8 for a detailed review of the statistical framework outlined by Solon (1992). 
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sometimes lived with biological father and sometimes lived with non-biological father, (4) 
never lived with either biological or non-biological father, (5) never lived with biological 
father and sometimes lived with non-biological father, (6) never lived with biological father 
and always lived with non-biological father. This kind of specification is only deployed for 
sons as the authors are only interested in the son-father income mobility. To test for 
nonlinearities in the income mobility they run separate regressions where the square of 
father‟s income is included. To estimate the coefficients the authors apply ordinary least 
squares.  
  
 Couch and Lillard (1997) also make use of the statistical framework outlined by 
Solon. They include dummy variables describing the family structure in the model and run 
separate regressions for each family type, where the explored family types are intact and 
divorced families. Since education is the focal point in the study, they have also expanded the 
regression model to include sons‟ and parents‟ education. This is a new kind of expansion, 
and the new regressions are run separately for intact and disrupted families and pooled with 
dummy variables. Both sets of regressions, i.e. with and without education, are estimated by 
the use of ordinary least squares. The third way the authors examine differences in income 
mobility is by use of transition matrices. Transition matrices provide insights to whether the 
intergenerational mobility differs across the income distribution, and the authors have divided 
the groups‟ income distributions into thirds. In the study the focus is on male offspring, 
stating that it is too difficult to compare daughters with parents because the income of female 
offspring is measured in a period with high rates of pregnancy. For the male offspring the 
intergenerational income mobility is examined in relations to both fathers and mothers.  
   
 Biblarz and Raftery (1993) choose a completely different method than the other 
studies by making use of a status, autonomy and training (SAT) model by Hout from 1984. 
The SAT model calculates cell frequencies in mobility tables between parents‟ and children‟s 
occupations, and hence, it captures variables that give rise to the association between fathers‟ 
and sons‟ occupations (Biblarz and Raftery, 1993). The procedure is first to measure the 
status, autonomy, training and socioeconomic status for each occupational group by making 
average group scores. Thereafter, the different measures are included as separate variables 
along with father‟s and sons‟ occupations, and interaction variables between the measures and 
occupations, in cell frequency equations. The cell frequency equations are then used to 
display transition matrices or parameters of interest. The authors extend Hout‟s general SAT-
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model to incorporate the effect of family disruption. The incorporation is made by including 
family variables as dummy variables and interactions variables in the cell frequency 
equations. The authors have not been able to split between different types of disrupted 
families, i.e. single family, step family or death of a parent, so the family dummies only 
indicate if a family is intact or non-intact. Furthermore, the regressions have only been 
deployed for male offspring. 
 
Table 4.1 gives a brief overview of some of the characteristics of the main papers. The 
table shows that all papers except Biblarz and Raftery utilize personal earnings as the measure 
of income while Biblarz and Raftery make use of occupational attainment. When it comes to 
measure family composition there is a great deal of divergence among the papers. All authors 
except Peters utilize multiple indicators to measure the family structure, but the periods of 
measurement fluctuate from the children are 0 to 24 years of age. Peters only makes use of 
one measure that occurs when the child‟s age is 14 years. Moreover, surprisingly few of the 
authors apply multiple years as proxy for permanent income. Only Peters and Fertig use more 
than two income years to measure the parents‟ income, and only Peters, Fertig and Bjorklund 
and Chadwick use more than one year to measure the children‟s income. The shortcoming in 
parents‟ earnings measure can cause significant errors-in-variables attenuation bias.15 The 
sixth column in the table summarises the mean age of individuals in the data samples while 
column seven displays the investigated child-parent mobility pairs. All authors have measured 
the mobility between sons and fathers, whereas Bjorklund and Chadwick are the only ones 
who have not measured the income mobility between sons and mothers. Furthermore, only 
Peters and Fertig have been able to distinguish gender and measure the income mobility for 
both male and female offspring. Peters also performs analyses on the family income, and 
Fertig has managed to include the mobility between daughters and mothers. Finally, the last 
column in the table displays the main results of the studies, which will be commentated later 
in the chapter.
                                                 
15
 See chapter 2.2.1, page 10, for a detailed description of estimation problems. 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of main papers on intergenerational income mobility and family dissolution.1 
Authors Origin Measure of    Years of income Mean age Mobility pair Main results 
  of data outcome Observation of family structure observation 
 
of interest   
Peters (1992) USA Family income and 1 measure where the child's age is 14. Children: 5 years Sons: 29 Son-father Non-significant difference  
  
personal earnings 
 
Parents: 5 years Daughters: 30 Son-mother for none of the mobility pairs. 
     
Parents: 46-47 Daughter-father 
 
      
Daughter-mother 
 
        Biblarz and  USA Occupation Did or did not live with both parents Sons: 1 year Sons: 20-64 Son-father Higher  mobility in disrupted  
Raftery (1993) 
  
most of the time up to the age of 16.* Fathers: 1 year Parents: 20-64 
 
families. 
        Couch and  USA Wage and salary 5 measures where the child's age Sons: 1 year Sons: 31 Son-father Lower mobility in divorced families. 
Lillard (1997) 
 
earnings ranges from about 14 to 24. Parents: 1 year Fathers: 49 Son-mother Lower mobility in divorced families. 
     
Mothers: 39 
  
        Bjorklund and  Sweden Total income and 4 measures where the child's age Sons: 1 year Sons: 36 Son-father Non-conclusive results. 
Chadwick (2003) 
 
labour income ranges from 0 to 18 years. Fathers: 2 years Fathers: 40 
  
        Fertig (2004) USA Earnings, Number of years out of  the 18 first Children: 3-9 years Sons: 29 Son-father Higher mobility in divorced families. 
  
hourly wage years in intact, single or step family. Parents: 6-9 years Daughters: 28 Son-mother Non-significant difference. 
  
and education 
  
Parents: 39 Daughter-father Higher mobility in divorced families. 
          
 
Daughter-mother Non-comparable across families. 
Notes: * number of measures not quoted in the study. 
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4.3 Results  
 Peters‟ (1992) estimates regarding the “broken home” variable are not significantly 
different from zero. Consequently, she finds none statistically differences in earnings mobility 
between generations. This result applies for both sons and daughters, and for personal income 
as well as family income.   
 
 In the case of Couch and Lillard (1997), the income mobility estimates between 
fathers and sons show that sons from disrupted families are far less mobile compared to sons 
from intact families. This applies both to the separate and the pooled regressions. The 
estimates between mothers and sons are less significant, but the ones that are significant show 
the same patterns as between father and son, i.e. sons from disrupted families are less mobile 
than sons from intact families. When attained education is added as an explanatory variable, 
the mobility estimates are not significant different from zero. On the basis of these patterns 
the authors claim to provide evidence that reduced educational attainment is an important 
contributor to the high intergenerational mobility between parents and male offspring in 
divorced families. The overall results from the third type of analyses explored in the paper, 
i.e. transition matrices, confirm the theoretical predictions outlined in the paper; sons from 
divorced families whose fathers are from the lower third of the earnings distribution are less 
upwardly mobile than sons from intact families. Furthermore, sons from divorced families 
whose fathers are from the middle and upper third of the earnings distribution are more 
downwardly mobile compared to sons from intact families. Unfortunately these results are 
incomparable since none of the other papers address the issues of transitions matrices.   
 
Fertig (2004) examines the intergenerational mobility with earnings, hourly wage and 
education as proxies for permanent income.
16
 As far as earnings are concerned, the results 
indicate that the son-father and daughter-father income mobility is higher in disrupted than in 
intact families. When it comes to mothers, the estimations are not significantly different from 
zero regarding the son-mother income mobility. For daughters and mothers, the results are 
non-comparable between the family types because the estimates are not significant different 
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 When applying hourly wage as proxy for permanent earnings, there is no statistically difference in income 
mobility between sons and fathers and sons and mothers in disrupted and intact families. Looking at education as 
the proxy, i.e. years of schooling, only a couple of the coefficients are significant. The results from these 
estimations give only some support to the quoted findings regarding the son-father mobility where earnings serve 
as the proxy. 
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from zero in intact families. When Fertig controls for the number of years spent in a disrupted 
family, the estimations reveal that the father-son, father-daughter and mother-daughter 
mobility are non-linear. Again, the mother-son mobility is insignificant. These estimations 
imply that the marginal effect of spending another year in an alternative family is diminishing 
on the mobility between sons and fathers, daughters and fathers, and daughters and mothers. 
In the regressions Fertig also separates between different types of disrupted families children 
grow up in. Estimates from these regressions show that sons with step family background are 
significantly more mobile with respect to both mothers and fathers as opposed to sons with 
single parenthood experience. The father-daughter income mobility increases significantly for 
daughters with step parent background as was the case for sons, but the effect is insignificant 
when it comes to the mother-daughter mobility. 
  
 Moving forward to Bjorklund and Chadwick (2003), they find divergence in the 
intergenerational income mobility when it comes to sons and fathers, but the results are 
overall non-conclusive. Estimations of the earnings elasticity show that the earnings mobility 
between sons and fathers in which the sons always lived with the biological father is slightly 
lower in relation to sons who only sometimes lived with the biological father. However, when 
investigating the differences between these groups, i.e. between (1), (2) and (3), the authors 
discover that the estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other. For 
sons who have never lived with their biological fathers, the estimates are generally 
insignificant. Furthermore, the authors have estimated the income mobility between sons and 
their non-biological fathers. The estimations show that the income mobility in general is much 
lower compared to the mobility between sons and biological fathers. Finally, the authors have 
allowed for non-linearity in the estimations by adding the square of father‟s average log 
earnings as an explanatory variable. The general pattern remains the same with the new 
variable although the sizes of the estimates vary.  
 
 Turning to Biblarz and Raftery (1993) the results from regressions on the extended 
SAT-model show that the socioeconomic status of the son‟s first destination for offspring 
from non-intact families is strongly reduced proportionately to the father‟s current occupation 
in comparison to sons from intact families. Furthermore, the association between the son‟s 
origin and first occupational destination weakens when sons come from disrupted families. 
When it comes to comparing the sons‟ origin and current occupational destination, the trends 
are similar; coming from a broken home reduces the socioeconomic status of the occupational 
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destination and weakens the interaction between the origin and destination. All the regressions 
are performed on sons with different origins and of different races and the results reveal no 
significant divergence between either origins or races. Generally these results imply that the 
intergenerational occupational mobility between fathers and sons is higher in disrupted 
families than in intact families. Consequently, the authors have been able to collect support 
for their hypothesis, i.e. that the association between socioeconomic origins and destination of 
sons is stronger for offspring of intact two-parent families than of disrupted families.  
 
The last column in table 4.1 sums up the main findings of the studies. Considering the 
income mobility between sons and parents, the significant results are ambiguous. Only two of 
the studies have significant estimations regarding the son-mother mobility, whereas one report 
lower income mobility in disrupted families and the other report higher income mobility. 
However, examining the son-father mobility we see a clearer tendency in the results. Only 
Couch and Lillard depict lower income mobility in disrupted families while both Biblarz and 
Raftery, Bjorklund and Chadwick and Fertig uncover higher son-father mobility. When it 
comes to daughters and parents, only Fertig has investigated the income mobility. The results 
depict higher daughter-father mobility while the daughter-mother mobility is incomparable 
between the family types. Considering the mobility between children and parents as one unit, 
Peters‟ estimations are non-significant, and hence, the results regarding the family income are 
non-conclusive.  
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5. Design and methods 
5.1 Design of the data samples 
5.1.1 Information regarding the data material 
The two data samples I have utilized consist of the 1960 and the 1970 birth cohorts 
and their respective mothers, fathers and siblings. The birth cohorts have been identified by 
censuses from 1960 and 1970 while the family compositions have partly been collected from 
the censuses and partly from family and demographics data. Administrative data concerning 
the family members were tracked by annual data series from 1986 to 2005. The amount of 
information available includes earnings, education type and length, labour market interactions 
etc. Information on earnings is based on tax records and is available from 1967 in separate 
annual series. All individuals can be traced across the different databases by a unique personal 
identification number which is encrypted by Statistics Norway. All information has been 
collected by Statistics Norway. 
 
5.1.2 The children observed and their respective families 
 To analyze the effects of family dissolution during the children‟s adolescence on the 
intergenerational income mobility, the families need to be intact when the children are born. 
An intact family is defined as a family unit where the parents and children are recorded with 
the same family identification number, all family members reside in the same household and 
the parents are recorded as the children‟s biological mother and father.  
This definition has both advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage is that 
it does not limit the data to married parents with children, but include cohabiting parents with 
children. The main disadvantage with the definition is that non-biological children are 
excluded from the study. This is a shortcoming, but it is also necessary to apply such strict 
requirements to secure the reliability of the data since it is not possible to detect whether a 
child is adopted or if somebody is the guardian to a child. A child may also be living with 
another family temporarily and mistakenly be recorded as a son or daughter in that family. 
Consequently, including such individuals would deter the reliability of the data.  
After the children‟s birth, the families are observed and their structure is identified at 
when the children are 10 and 20 years of age, respectively. This is mainly due to limitations in 
the data material between 1960 and 1980. More specifically, during this period only censuses 
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from 1960, 1970 and 1980 are available. This implies for the 1960 cohort, that the observation 
of the families is determined by the data material, i.e in the years 1970 and 1980. For the 1970 
cohort, I am able to identify the families in year 1980 and from the year 1987, i.e. when the 
children are 10 years old and from the age of 17. However, in order to perform comparative 
statistics between the cohorts it is suitable to identify the family structure at the same time as 
for the 1960 cohort, i.e. in the years 1980 and 1990, respectively.  
At the time of observation, the families are split into three types: (1) Intact families, 
(2) families disrupted due to divorce or separation and (3) families disrupted due to death of a 
parent. Of primary interest are the relations between intact and divorced families, but the 
disrupted families have been separated by the type of dissolution. The main reason for this is 
that it enables me to highlight the divorced families and reduce “noise” around the mobility 
measure. More specifically, in light of the theoretical framework on transmission of human 
capital, offspring of families which experience parental death may on average be worse off 
than divorced families because they only have one parent who can invest in their human 
capital as opposed to two parents in divorced families. As a consequence, the offspring‟s 
outcome and the intergenerational income mobility may differ between the disrupted families. 
If the family types are not split, the earnings mobility estimates would be an average of all 
disrupted families, and thus, the measure of divorced families would be lower precise. 
However, I do not exclude the families who have experienced parental death. Few economic 
studies have investigated the earnings mobility in these families so they are included to shed 
light on the results from divorced families and on the effect of family dissolution on the 
intergenerational income mobility.   
The non-intact families have been divided further into (1) single parents and (2) step 
families. For the 1960 cohort, the stepfamilies include cohabiting parents when the intact 
families were disrupted due to divorce. When the disruption was caused by parental death the 
step families only include married couples. This applies for both the 1970 and 1980 family 
structure identification. As regards the 1970 cohort, the family structure identification in 1980 
only consists of remarried couples, but when the family structure is observed in 1990 both 
remarried and cohabiting parents are included for both types of disrupted families. The motif 
for the separation between single parents and step families is the fact that offspring in step 
families may experience fewer changes in parental investment in human capital than single 
parent families due to the introduction of a new parent in the household. As a consequence, 
the outcome of the offspring and the income mobility may differ between single parents and 
step families. In addition, it is interesting to study whether the income mobility between the 
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biological parent and the offspring in step families is more equal to the earnings mobility in 
intact families than to single parent families. 
Finally, the divorced families have been split according to the custodial status of the 
parents. The reason for doing so is to investigate whether offspring becomes more attached to 
the custodial parents, i.e. if the associations between offspring and parents deviate between 
custodial and non-custodial parents. 
 
The reported limitations in the available data sets cause two shortcomings in the data 
samples. Firstly, because the family structure is measured late in the children‟s adolescence, 
i.e. when they are 20 years of age, a fraction of the children have most likely left the family 
residence.
17
 Then, if the residence of the children during the dissolution of the family has 
effect on the children‟s outcome, that is, if the disruption of the family affects the offspring 
differently if they have left the family residence or are still living at home, it could create 
noise in the estimations of the intergenerational income mobility.   
Secondly, it is not possible to pinpoint the exact year of dissolution. Wolf et al. (1996) 
find that single-year “window” variables may lead to biases and misleading results. Especially 
short-run proxies are vulnerable when it comes to measuring family structure and disruption. 
Based on these findings, the results of the analyses conducted in this study may to some 
extent be biased and distorted. However, it should be stressed that the family structure in this 
study has been measured three times during the child‟s adolescence. This is a substantial 
improvement compared to studies where the families‟ status is only measured once, and may 
improve the quality of the results.  
 
 
5.2 Earnings 
5.1.1 Information regarding observed earnings 
Personal income is available in annual data series from 1967 to 2002. The income is 
total pensionable income, which is personal income reported in the Norwegian tax register. 
More specific, income that qualifies for pension consists of labour income, earnings from self-
employment, benefits such as sick-leave payments and sickness benefit, rehabilitation 
benefits, benefits from birth and adoption, benefits when children are sick and unemployment 
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 Norwegian children usually leave their family residence when they finish upper secondary school / high 
school at the age of 18 or 19.  
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benefits. Income that is not considered to qualify for pension is life annuity, support received 
after passing on one‟s estate and property to one‟s successor, undeclared labour income and 
capital income (National Insurance Act, 1997). The personal income is measured in log, and 
has been adjusted using the consumer price index with the year 2000 as base year.  
 
 
5.2.1 Short run proxy 
Following Solon (1992) I apply an average of parents‟ log income over several years 
to reduce the errors-in-variables bias which follows from the use of single-year income as 
proxy for lifetime earnings. In addition, I average the log income of the children over several 
years as proxy for their lifetime income to reduce the noise around the proxy and to improve 
the description of lifetime earnings.  
The number of years to include in the short-run proxy is a trade-off between the desire 
to observe income for as many years as possible and the wish to analyze the generations at the 
same stage of their life cycle. Osterberg (2000) suggests that stabilization has elevated at a 
window of three years, but a survey of recent literature on the subject does not show 
convergence to such a universal measure. I follow Bratberg et al. (2005, 2007) and apply 
income from five subsequent years as the short-run proxy to reduce the noise around the 
proxy and make the depiction of lifetime income as superior as possible.  
In all earning averages observations of zero income and missing observations are 
excluded. Some studies have revealed that the variation within estimations on earnings 
elasticity between parents and children are higher when zero income observations are 
included in the data sample (Bjorklund and Chadwick, 2003). Therefore, instead of including 
observation of missing or zero income, the observations are replaced by the average of the 
remaining non-zero observations in the five-year average. This is applied if either one, two or 
three out of the five years are missing or equals zero. If either four or all years of the 
observations are missing or equal zero, the person in question is excluded from the study. 
This approach is the line with previous research containing similar data, e.g. Osterberg (2000) 
and Bratberg et al. (2005). Finally, note that income of parents who have passed away is not 
included in the study. This sounds trivial, but it is in fact possible in some cases to observe 
their income, e.g. parents of the 1970 cohort who died between 1980 and 1990.  
While there is no lower limit on the observation of earnings, the upper limit for parents 
is the age of 65. This implies that individuals older than 56 years for the 1960 cohort and 
older than 68 for the 1970 cohort when their children were born are excluded from the 
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study.
18
 The official retirement age is 67 years, but a significant portion of the total labour 
force has the opportunity to retire earlier. Around the age of 65 there is a significant increase 
in the retirement age, and thus 65 is selected as the upper age limit. 
 
5.2.2 Age at time of earnings observation 
The optimal time to observe current earnings is the years in which current income 
equals lifetime earnings, implying that there is no life-cycle bias in the short run proxies.
19
 
However, the main purpose of this study is to depict intra-cohort and not inter-cohort 
differences in intergenerational income mobility between family types. The main concern is 
not the bias in itself, but rather the divergence in bias between family members across family 
types. Consequently, existing insights into the association between current and lifetime 
earnings and difference between gender and cohorts will only work as guidance when 
choosing the age interval at time of earnings observations for all family members. Table 5.1 
displays the average of the selected age interval.  
For sons and daughters born in 1970, the earnings of both sexes are observed at age 31 
to 35. As the income series in the data samples end in 2005 the chosen years are the latest 
available. For the 1960 cohort, sons‟ earnings are observed at age 34 to 38 while daughters‟ 
earnings are observed at age 39 to 43. These years are selected on grounds of the discovered 
insights in literature on life cycle bias. In the case of sons, both Haider and Solon (2006) and 
Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) suggest on grounds of estimates on the association between 
current and lifetime earnings, that life-cycle bias may not lead to inconsistent estimates of the 
earnings elasticity if sons‟ earnings are measured between the early thirties and mid forties. 
For daughters, analyses conducted by Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) display significant life-
cycle bias in all observed years and across cohorts of women. The main explanation behind 
this is that current income is an insufficient proxy for lifetime income when females are in the 
child-rearing phase of their lives. As a result, it is very complex to suggest any specific year 
interval where the life cycle bias is small for daughters.  
For fathers, the average age in which the earnings are observed is 47.59 for the 1960 
cohort and 47.29 for the 1970 cohort. For mothers, the average year of observation is 45.49 
and 45.73 for the 1960 and 1970 cohort, respectively. 
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 These specific age restrictions are applied since the annual income series starts in 1967.  
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 See chapter 2.2.4, page 14, for a survey of life-cycle bias. 
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Table 5.1: Average age at time of earnings observation.2 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
  
Intact  
families 
Divorced  
families 
Disrupted  
families 
All  
families   
Intact  
families 
Divorced 
families 
Disrupted  
families 
All  
families 
Sons 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00 
 
33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
Daughters 41.00 41.00 41.00 41.00 
 
33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
Fathers 47.32 49.62 53.51 47.59 
 
45.14 47.40 50.97 45.49 
Mothers 47.05 47.04 51.23 47.29 
 
45.59 45.85 49.03 45.73 
Siblings 41.00 41.00 41.00 41.00 
 
38.00 38.00 38.00 38.00 
Fathers* 49.79 47.86 - 48.83 
 
41.24 44.98 - 43.11 
Mothers* 47.15 45.14 - 46.14 
 
43.04 42.55 - 42.79 
Notes: Earnings are observed over five consecutive years. The presented numbers are the averages of the five-
year average for each family member. Offspring and siblings have the same biological parents, but the parents‟ 
earnings are observed at different ages. For parents who are marked with * the earnings observations are for the 
siblings‟ parents. The family structure is observed in 1980 for the 1960 birth cohort and in 1990 for the 1970 
birth cohort for all family members except the siblings‟ parents when the families are divorced. For these 
specific families the family structure is observed in 1970 for the 1960 cohort and in 1980 for the 1970 cohort. 
 
When separating the parents according to the family structure and when the disruption 
occurred, the average age in each family type deviates from 45 to 53 when rounded off. The 
explanation for this is that since the aim of the study is to analyze the effects of family 
dissolution on the intergenerational earnings mobility, the income of parents from disrupted 
families is observed after the dissolution has occurred.  
In the case of parents to brothers and sisters of the 1960 cohort, the average year in 
which earnings is observed is 48.83 for fathers and 46.14 for mothers. For the 1970 cohort, 
the averages are 43.11 for fathers and 42.79 for mothers. Accordingly, the average age of 
earnings‟ observation is not that different from the averages from the observation belonging to 
the sons and daughters born in 1960 and 1970. Furthermore, studies by Böhlmark and 
Lindquist (2006) have investigated life cycle bias among women and men born approximately 
the same years as in my study. Their results suggest that life cycle bias for men are minimal at 
least up to the age of 55 years of age, and that for women the life cycle bias is minimized 
between the ages of 45 to 50 for all examined cohorts. Accordingly, it appears as the age of 
earnings observation is somewhat in line with the suggestions by Böhlmark and Lindquist.
 Finally, for brothers and sisters of the 1960 cohort the age interval in which earnings 
are observed is 39 to 43. For siblings of the 1970 cohort the earnings are observed at age 36 to 
40. These years are selected to ensure that the earnings of siblings, who are sisters and 
brothers to offspring which have experienced parental divorce, are observed before the year 
which the divorce took place.   
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5.3 Utilized methods 
5.3.1 OLS regressions 
 To assess the intergenerational income mobility offspring‟s earnings are regressed on 
the parents‟ earnings as described by the statistical model pioneered by Solon (1992) and 
Zimmerman (1992).
20
 Since lifetime earnings of either of the generations are available short 
run proxies equal to current income are utilized. The proxies are averaged over five 
consecutive years to reduce the amount of noise around the proxies, which apply to both 
offspring and parents. Furthermore, for parents, age profiles are added in the mobility 
equations because there are large age variations within each group, i.e. the parents‟ ages at 
time of income observation vary. In the case of children, there are no age variations within the 
cohorts as they are all born in the same year.  
Both offspring and parents are separated by gender, which entails that there are four 
mobility “pairs” that are investigated in this study; the son-father income mobility, the son-
mother income mobility, the daughter-father income mobility and the daughter-mother 
income mobility. For each mobility pair the earnings elasticity is estimated and the correlation 
coefficients are computed from the elasticities. To separate between the different families 
types the regressions are estimated over subsamples rather than pooling the model and using 
binary variables. The samples are divided into three groups; intact families, families disrupted 
due to divorce or separation and families disrupted due to death of one parent. Furthermore, 
both types of non-intact families have been split into single parents and step families, and the 
divorced families have been separated according to the custodial of the parents. The 
regressions are estimated over subsamples for these as well.  
 
5.3.2 Transition matrices 
 In addition to the OLS regressions transition probabilities are computed and assembled 
in matrices to explore the intergenerational income mobility within the distribution of income. 
The income distribution of parents and offspring are divided into quartiles following Bratberg 
et al. (2005). Furthermore, the matrices are divided after child-parent mobility pair, family 
type, birth cohort and after time of family structure observation. For intact families this 
implies that that there are two transition matrices for each mobility pair per birth cohort; (1) 
families intact when the children are 0 to 10 years of age and (2) families intact when the 
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 See chapter 2.2, page 8 for a detailed review of the statistical model. 
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children are 0 to 20 years of age. For disrupted families, there are three matrices for each 
mobility pair per birth cohort; (1) families are disrupted when the children are 0 to 10 years of 
age, (2) families are disrupted when the children are 10 to 20 years of age and (3) families are 
disrupted when the children are 0 to 20 years of age. For the divorced families, transition 
matrices are also computed when the households are separated between single and step 
families. Also here, three matrices per mobility pair are presented.  
This form of splitting up the data samples lead to a large amount of matrices. In that 
respect an immobility index is calculated for each matrix to illustrate the amount of 
immobility or mobility. The index is merely a number that equals the sum of the diagonal and 
the adjutant transitions cells where a low number indicates a high degree of income mobility 
and vice versa.  
 
5.3.3 Difference-in-difference regressions 
 If estimations on the statistical model indicate deviations in the intergenerational 
income mobility across family structure, estimations of the difference-in-difference model 
described in (2.42) will be performed. As in the case of OLS regressions, current earnings off 
all family members are utilized as short run proxy for lifetime earnings where the proxies are 
averaged over several consecutive years. In addition, the earnings of parents are age adjusted. 
Finally, the regressions are only performed between siblings and fathers and siblings and 
mothers because of the low number of siblings. Splitting the siblings into brothers and sisters 
may cause the samples to be excessively small.  
An essential assessment is how many years the age difference between the siblings 
should encompass. The primary aspect is that the elderly sibling has moved out of the family 
residence and in principle made up his or her academic or occupational aims and ambitions. 
This is necessary to ensure that the elderly sibling is not affected by the divorce in the same 
manner as the younger sibling. It is reasonable to assume that if we observe the elderly sibling 
when he or she is in the18
th
 year the requirements should be met. To illustrate, this means that 
if a divorce occurs when the younger sibling is 1 years of age the age difference should be 17 
years while if the younger sibling is 15 years of age an age difference of 3 years should be 
enough. However, in the data samples utilized in this study we are not able to observe the 
specific years in which the separations take place. We are only able to observe the family 
structure when the children are born, when they are 10 years of age and when they are 20 
years of age. If one is to be curtain that the elderly sibling has moved out of the family 
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residence or made up his aims and ambitions for academic or occupational attainment the age 
difference should be 17 years if the separation is observed when the younger sibling is 10 
years of age and 7 years when the separation is observed when the younger sibling is 20 years 
of age.
21
 In relation to the year of birth, the elderly sibling of offspring born in 1960 must be 
born in 1943 when the divorce occurred between 1960 and 1970, and in 1953 when the 
divorce took place between 1970 and 1980. For siblings of offspring born in 1970, the figures 
are 1953 an 1963, respectively. These age restrictions will be utilized in the approach 
conditioned upon the number of siblings who satisfy the age restrictions.  
It is possible to relax the requirements to some extent. In light of the human capital 
investment model the vital difference between the siblings is the fact that the younger sibling 
experience a downfall in human capital investment as a result of the divorce while the elderly 
sibling enjoys no downfall as the family is intact when he or she grows up. Hence, the elderly 
sibling may still be living at home at the time of divorce as long as the investment in his or 
her human capital has to a large extent been completed. In relations to the Norwegian school 
system, this entails when the children are enrolled in upper secondary school at the age of 15 
or 16 years. When enrolled the children have already taken important decisions regarding 
their future as well as they in principal do not face any financial restrictions as they are in title 
of student loan from the government. On the basis of these arguments, the age difference 
could be relaxed to 15 years if the younger sibling is 10 years of age when the divorce is 
observed and 5 years if the divorce is observed when the younger sibling is 20 years of age. In 
relation to the year of birth, elderly siblings of offspring born in 1960 the year of birth must 
be 1945 when the divorce occurred between 1960 and 1970, and 1955 when the divorce took 
place between 1970 and 1980. For the siblings of offspring born in 1970, the figures equal 
1955 and 1965, respectively. To assess whether or not the age difference has effect on the 
estimates the relaxation will be employed in addition to the strict requirements. Also here, the 
estimations are condition upon the number of siblings fulfilling the requirements. 
 
5.3.4 Instrumental variables 
The instrumental variables approach will not be utilized in this study because of 
unsatisfactory instruments.  Regarding divorce laws, there are not recorded any regional law 
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 For instance, if a divorce occurs when the younger sibling is 1 year of age the family structure is not observed 
before when the sibling is 10 years of age. At the time of observation one naturally thinks that an age difference 
of 8 years should be enough so the elder sibling is 18 years of age at time of observation. However, since the 
divorce took place 9 years before the time of observation, the elder sibling is only 11 years at the time of divorce. 
This leaves us with sever noise, and hence, the difference-measure may be imprecise.  
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implementations on marital dissolution in the post-war period in Norway as in the US. As this 
study utilize data samples from Norway this instrument is not possible to implement. For the 
sex of the first child, the data samples in my study display the opposite pattern to the 
discovered relationship in other studies, i.e. married parents face a higher probability for 
divorce if their first child is a boy. The results from the regressions of both cohorts are shown 
in table B.1 in Appendix B. In accordance with the hypothesis outlaid by Dahl and Moretti 
(2004), (1) Norwegian parents must either possess higher preferences for daughters than sons, 
which are the opposite to parents in other countries, (2) there must be more expensive to raise 
sons than daughters in Norway than in other countries or (3) fathers are more important to 
daughters than to sons during the childhood to the offspring relative to other countries to 
explain the prevailed results. However, I find no good arguments for either of the hypothesis. 
On an intuitive level, it is most unlikely that it is more expensive to raise sons than daughters 
in Norway. On average, it is most likely that the costs are dependent upon each individual and 
not the sex of the children itself. Furthermore, to suspect that fathers are more important to 
daughters than sons during the childhood would be pure speculative, and is therefore not of 
interest. Finally, there are no cultural or religious patterns in the Norwegian culture or society 
that indicates that Norwegian parents prefer daughters to sons. If we look upon the issue 
historically, we find that sons were preferred to daughters because of their high status in the 
society. However, in the postmodern society, Norway is a country with high degrees of equal 
opportunities for both sexes where it is more likely that the preferences are equally distributed 
and at least not in favour of daughters. As a result, I do not find on a scientific or intuitive 
level any satisfactory explanations to the discovered pattern, and the sex of the first child 
cannot serve as an instrument. 
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6. Description of data 
The main variables in this study are individual earnings to all family members, age 
variables and variables depicting the family structure during the children‟s adolescence. In 
this chapter they will be presented by first exploring the families observed. I will scrutinize 
the offspring, the identification and observation of their families and at last the sex of the 
mothers‟ first born child. Then, I explain how the earnings are observed and display earnings 
averages of all family members. For a complete description of utilized variables in the 
analyses for both birth cohorts, see table B.2 in the Appendix B. 
 
6.1 Observation of families 
6.1.1 Children  
 The 1960 cohort consists of 50 633 children and the 1970 cohort consist of 53 773 
children. Nearly 40 % and 30 % of the children were excluded during the preparation of the 
data samples, and thus the final size of the cohorts is 28 023 and 38 691 children, 
respectively. Table 6.1 sums up the sources of exclusion. As the table displays, the main 
reason for exclusion from the data sets is caused by missing income of the children or either 
of their parents. Problems during the identification of family structure also caused a large 
reduction in the size of the cohorts. Regarding differences between sons and daughters, we 
see that the number of offspring missing personal income is largest among daughters.  
 
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of the birth cohorts' size.3 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
  Sons Daughters   Sons Daughters 
Total cohort size 25 939 24 694 
 
27 777 25 996 
      Excluded due to missing vital information 821 748 
 
342 352 
      Excluded due to problems with family 2 167 2 186 
 
3 560 3 237 
structure identification 
     
      Excluded due to missing personal income 818 1 488 
 
954 1 103 
      Excluded due to missing income of 7 523 6 859 
 
2 820 2 714 
mothers and fathers 
     
      Final cohort size 14 579 13 497 
 
20 101 18 590 
      Total cohort size  28 076   38 691 
Notes: Vital information includes variables such as personal identification number, mothers and 
fathers personal ID, birth date etc.  
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6.1.2 Families 
  After the children‟s birth, the families are observed and their structure is identified 
when the children are 10 and 20 years of age. The families of the 1960 birth cohort are 
identified using the 1970 and 1980 censuses while the families of the 1970 birth cohort is 
identified using the 1980 census and family and demographics data from 1990. At the times 
of observation the families are split into intact families, divorced families and families 
disrupted to death of one parent. Table 6.2 and 6.3 depict the distribution of the families at the 
time of observations after family type. We see that for both cohorts the family dissolution 
increase over time, which applies to both types of dissolution, and that the number of 
disrupted families is relatively larger for the 1970 cohort than for the 1960 cohort. Also, the 
number of disrupted families due to divorce or separation is larger than the number of families 
disrupted due to parental death. This is however most prominent for the 1970 cohort. Finally, 
the fraction of single parents is substantially higher than the fraction of step families, which 
applies for both cohorts at every point of family structure identification. 
 
 
Table 6.2: 1960 birth cohort. Distribution of families during children's adolescence.4 
    
Family structure 
observed in 1960 
Family structure 
observed in 1970 
Family structure 
observed in 1980 
Intact families 27 847 26 690 23 924 
     Families disrupted due to divorce or separation 
 
585 1 886 
 
Single parents 
 
441 1 505 
 
Step families 
 
144 381 
     Families disrupted due to death of a parent 
 
572 2 037 
 
Single parents 
 
572 1 965 
 
Step families 
 
- 72 
     Total number of families 27 847 27 847 27 847 
Notes: The displayed number of disrupted families includes parents that are cohabiting with the children. Parents 
that are not cohabiting with the children are not included in the table.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Description of data 
50 
 
Table 6.3: 1970 birth cohort. Distribution of families during children's adolescence.5 
    
Family structure 
observed in 1970 
Family structure 
observed in 1980 
Family structure 
observed in 1990 
Intact families 38 373 35 474 31 851 
     Families disrupted due to divorce or separation 
 
2 386 4 978 
 
Single parents 
 
1 949 3 902 
 
Step families 
 
437 1 076 
     Families disrupted due to death of a parent 
 
513 1 544 
 
Single parents 
 
513 1 517 
 
Step families 
 
- 27 
     Total number of families 38 373 38 373 38 373 
Notes: The displayed number of disrupted families includes custodial parents. Non-custodial parents are not 
included in the table.  
  
Parents who have experienced marital dissolution are also separated by their custodial 
status. The distribution of custody is displayed in table 6.4 and 6.5 where the custody of all 
divorced families is identified except for the observation in 1980 of the 1960 cohort. The 
tables show that mothers are overrepresented as the custodial parent, and that this is most 
striking for the 1960 cohort. For both cohorts it appears as fathers in families where the 
divorce occurred when the children was between 10 and 20 years are more frequently the 
custodial parent than in families where the divorce took place when the children were 
between 0 and 10 years.  
 
 
Table 6.4: 1960 birth cohort. Distribution of custodial parents.6 
  
  
Family structure  
observed in 1970 
 
Family structure  
observed in 1980 
   Fathers Mothers N 
 
Fathers Mothers N 
Families disrupted due to divorce or separation 
       
 
Single parents 36 405 441 
 
323 892 1 215 
 
Step families 11 133 144 
 
83 262 345 
         Families disrupted due to divorce or separation 
       
 
Single parents 0.08 0.92 441 
 
0.27 0.73 1 215 
 
Step families 0.08 0.92 144 
 
0.24 0.76 345 
Notes: The distribution is displayed both in absolute size and in percent. 
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Table 6.5: 1970 birth cohort. Distribution of custodial parents.7 
  
Family structure  
observed in 1980 
 
Family structure  
observed in 1990 
   Fathers Mothers N 
 
Fathers Mothers N 
Families disrupted due to divorce or 
separation 
       
 
Single parents 209 1 740 1 949 
 
978 2 924 3 902 
 
Step families 49 388 437 
 
221 855 1 076 
         Families disrupted due to divorce or 
separation 
       
 
Single parents 0.11 0.89 1 949 
 
0.25 0.75 3 902 
 
Step families 0.11 0.89 437 
 
0.21 0.79 1 076 
Notes: The distribution is displayed both in total size and in percent. 
 
The process of identifying the family types resulted in delimitations in the number of 
observed families because of limitations in the data material. The main problem is that it is 
only in the censuses from 1960 and 1970 that there exist a unique family number. The 
numbers are comprehensive to identify intact families at time of birth, i.e. in 1960 for the 
1960 cohort and 1970 for the 1970 cohort, but they are too imprecise to follow the 
development of the family structure unaccompanied by other variables. Therefore, to identify 
the family structure in 1970 for the 1960 cohort variables such as marital status and marital 
length of the parents were utilized. In the other years of observation, i.e. 1980 and 1990, only 
a household identification number exist so even more variables were necessary. Variables 
utilized to assemble families in 1980 were the number of individuals in a family, the 
municipality of residence, a variable indicating whether the residence was in an urban or rural 
community, the contact person in family, the marital status of the parents, a personal status 
code, a variable indicating the type of family and two self constructed variables indicating if a 
person was dead by 1980 and a cohabit variable indicating if a child in a disrupted family was 
living with the mother or the father. The variables used in 1990 were a personal identification 
number of spouse, a personal status code, the marital status of the parents, a personal 
identification number of reference person in the family, a couple identification number and 
the equivalent self constructed variables for 1990. Consequently, the high amount of variables 
used to sort the families, lead to delimitations in the data sample. If the information regarding 
one of the family members was too insufficient related to the listed variables, i.e. information 
that made it impossible to determine the development of the family structure, not only the 
family member with the inadequate information was excluded from the study, but the entire 
family. This is necessary since the intergenerational mobility analysis is based on pairs across 
the two generations. There is one exception; if not all children or siblings in one family are 
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missing vital information, it is still possible to perform the analysis between the remaining 
family pairs.   
 
6.1.3 Siblings to birth cohorts 
 The number of elderly siblings that fulfil the age requirements imposed by the 
difference-in-difference model is considerable low in the divorced families.
22
 When the 
families were divorced during the first ten years of the offspring‟s lives, the total number of 
siblings for the 1960 cohort equals 1 when the strict constraint is applied and 0 when the 
relaxed constraint is applied. For the 1970 cohort the numbers are 10 and 24, respectively. 
When the divorce occurred between the age of 10 and 20, the number of siblings to offspring 
born in 1960 is 119 with the strict constraint and 263 with the relaxed constraint, and 285 and 
564 for the 1970 cohort, respectively. In percentage, approximately only 4 % of the siblings 
are not situated in the always-intact families, which apply to both sets of constraints. Table 
B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B display the total amounts according to the siblings‟ birth year. 
 
 
6.2 Earnings 
6.2.1 Observed earnings 
 Statistics of the short run proxy for lifetime earnings, i.e. the average earnings of five 
consecutive years, are displayed in table 6.6. The table shows that sons have the highest mean 
of average followed by fathers, daughters and mothers in that order. Across the cohorts, the 
mean is approximately similar for all family members where the deviation between the 
cohorts is most prominent for mothers. There are also some gender differences where mothers 
have considerably lower mean of earnings average than fathers. This applies also for sons and 
daughters, but it is less prominent among the offspring. Furthermore, there are some 
differences between the generations within the same sexes. Most noteworthy is the fact that 
sons earn more than their fathers, while daughters‟ earnings are even more superior to the 
mothers‟ earnings. Finally, we note that the earnings of mothers are considerable more 
scattered across the earnings distribution than the other family members.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 See chapter 5.3.3, page 45 for the discussion around the age difference between siblings.  
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Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics of earnings. All observed families.8 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
         Five-year earnings average 12.44 0.67 6.22 15.80 
 
12.57 0.61 7.21 15.17 
Age interval 36.00 1.41 34.00 38.00 
 
33.00 1.41 31.00 35.00 
N 14 579 
 
20 101 
          Daughters 
         Five-year earnings average 12.15 0.74 6.69 15.34 
 
12.10 0.73 3.56 14.56 
Age interval 42.00 1.41 40.00 44.00 
 
33.00 1.41 31.00 35.00 
N 13 497 
 
18 590 
          Fathers 
         Five-year earnings average 12.30 0.56 6.11 14.24 
 
12.39 0.62 5.57 14.88 
Average age interval 47.59 2.12 40.00 63.00 
 
45.49 1.89 33.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1929.56 5.66 1912 1943 
 
1940.90 5.93 1912 1953 
N 26 235 
 
37 781 
          Mothers 
         Five-year earnings average 11.20 1.09 5.30 13.41 
 
11.61 0.94 5.32 13.85 
Average age interval 47.29 2.26 35.00 63.00 
 
45.73 1.67 38.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1932.90 5.19 1914 1944 
 
1943.77 4.96 1922 1954 
N 27 422 
 
38 643 
Notes: All earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five  
years in which the income is measured. 
 
 
6.2.2 Earnings across family types 
Table 6.7 displays the five-year earnings average divided into quartiles and after 
family type. Table B.5 to B.10 in Appendix B display statistics of sons‟ and daughters‟ five-
year earnings average for both cohorts along with their fathers‟ and mothers‟ five-year 
average of log earnings, average age interval and year of birth separated by family type. 
Regarding the divorced families, the tables show that for all members except the mothers 
possess on average lower earnings than members of intact families. The pattern is most 
prominent for the 1970 cohort when the mean of the five-year earnings average are compared 
between the family types. The quartile earnings table also depict that sons, daughters and 
fathers seem to cluster in the lower quartile in divorced families as opposed to the highly 
equal distribution of family members in intact families. In the case of mothers, divorced 
women earn on average noticeable more than married women. The difference is exceptionally 
prominent when the earnings are observed within the distribution of income where divorced 
women tend to cluster substantially more in the upper quartile than married women. Contrary 
to the other family members this tendency is stronger for the 1960 cohort. Finally, it seems as 
6. Description of data 
54 
 
the time of disruption has some effect on the earnings of all family members. The differences 
are most striking for parents, in which of the five-year earnings average is lowest when the 
marital dissolution occurred before the offspring where 10 years of age. This applies to both 
birth cohorts. 
Exploring the families disrupted due to parental death we see the same tendencies as 
for the divorced families; family members who have experienced death of one parent earn on 
average less than member of intact families. This does not only apply for sons, daughters and 
fathers, but mothers as well. The quartile earnings table shows that all family members seem 
to cluster in the lower quartile compared to members of intact family where the pattern is 
most prominent for mothers. This is a significant divergence to divorced mothers who are 
overrepresented in the other end of the distribution, i.e. in the upper quartile. Furthermore, 
when separating the time of death to before or after the offspring are 10 years of age, the 
earnings average of mothers and fathers is substantially lower if the time of death occurred 
before the age of 10. For offspring, the earnings average seems to be independent to the time 
of death. This is the same trend as we discovered for divorced families. Finally, when 
compared the mean of the earnings average and the movements along the earnings 
distribution between the two disrupted families there does not seem to be any unambiguous 
pattern.  
 
6.2.3 Earnings of siblings and their parents 
 In general, we do not observe the same difference in earnings between siblings in 
intact and divorced families as for the other family members. The deviation between the 
family types alters with the constraints and the birth cohorts. Furthermore, for both cohorts, 
the earnings average of sibling lies between those of sons and daughters, which is to expect as 
the sexes of the siblings are pooled into one group. Finally, for the parents, the earnings 
average lies close to those of offspring‟s parents.23 Statistics of five-year earnings average, 
average of age interval and year of birth for full siblings and parents are displayed in tables 
B.11-B.14 in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 We note that the siblings‟ parents are the same ones as the offspring‟s parents.   
6. Description of data 
55 
 
Table 6.7: Summary statistics of five-year earnings average across family types.9 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
 
Intact 
families 
Disrupted  
due to divorce 
Disrupted  
due to death  
Intact 
families  
Disrupted  
due to divorce 
Disrupted 
due to death     
Sons 
       Lower quartile 0.24 0.33 0.29 
 
0.23 0.34 0.31 
Lower middle quartile 0.25 0.24 0.24 
 
0.25 0.24 0.26 
Upper middle quartile 0.25 0.23 0.24 
 
0.26 0.21 0.25 
Upper quartile 0.26 0.20 0.23 
 
0.26 0.21 0.18 
N 12 489 996 1 039 
 
16 668 2 645 788 
        Daughters 
       Lower quartile 0.25 0.28 0.27 
 
0.24 0.29 0.25 
Lower middle quartile 0.25 0.25 0.27 
 
0.25 0.26 0.20 
Upper middle quartile 0.25 0.21 0.24 
 
0.25 0.23 0.16 
Upper quartile 0.25 0.25 0.22 
 
0.26 0.21 0.16 
N 11 628 905 912 
 
15 445 2 375 770 
        Fathers 
       Lower quartile 0.24 0.32 0.31 
 
0.24 0.33 0.38 
Lower middle quartile 0.25 0.22 0.32 
 
0.26 0.21 0.25 
Upper middle quartile 0.25 0.23 0.20 
 
0.26 0.22 0.17 
Upper quartile 0.25 0.24 0.16 
 
0.25 0.24 0.21 
N 11 466 1 877 318 
 
32 113 4 954 345 
        Mothers 
       Lower quartile 0.25 0.11 0.35 
 
0.26 0.17 0.41 
Lower middle quartile 0.26 0.14 0.22 
 
0.27 0.15 0.23 
Upper middle quartile 0.26 0.23 0.19 
 
0.25 0.27 0.18 
Upper quartile 0.23 0.52 0.24 
 
0.23 0.41 0.17 
N 11 466 1 877 1 603 
 
15 445 4 954 1 213 
Notes: Earnings are level earnings. Family structure is observed when the children are 20 years of age, 
which is in 1980 for the 1960 cohort and in 1990 for the 1970 cohort.  
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7. Results 
 The presentation of the results and the following discussion and interpretation of the 
results are divided into two chapters. In this chapter the results are presented while the next 
chapter contains the discussion.  
 
7.1 Results from OLS regressions 
7.1.1 Intact families 
 Table 7.1 presents estimations of the income elasticity between parents and offspring 
in intact families. All estimates are highly significant, and they indicate that the elasticity 
between fathers‟ and children‟s earnings is substantially higher than the elasticity between 
mothers‟ and children‟s earnings. This implies that there is considerable lower income 
mobility between fathers and children than between mothers and children. Furthermore, 
comparing the estimates at different stages in the children‟s adolescence, the small deviations 
that exist suggest that the earnings mobility is somewhat smaller when the family structure is 
observed when the offspring are 20 years of age and not 10. Comparing the birth cohorts, we 
see that the elasticities with respect to fathers are higher for the 1960 cohort than for the 1970 
cohort while it is opposite for the estimates concerning the mothers. This applies to both sons 
and daughters. 
Finally, the computed correlation coefficient deviates noticeably from the estimated 
mobility elasticities.
24
 The pattern is similar across the cohorts where the correlation 
coefficients are smaller than the estimated elasticities regarding offspring and fathers and 
larger regarding offspring and mothers. This arises because the variance of fathers‟ earnings is 
larger than the variance of offspring‟s earnings, i.e. var(𝑦1𝑖) < var(y0i), which implies that 
𝜌 > 𝛽, and the opposite in the case of mothers and offspring; var(𝑦1𝑖) > var(y0i), implying 
that 𝜌 < 𝛽.25  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 In the further presentation of the results I will merely account for the estimated elasticities. If the correlation 
coefficients are commented it is on grounds of large and systematic deviations between the measures.  
25
 See chapter 2.2, page 8 for a detailed review of the relationship between β and . 
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Table 7.1: Results from OLS regressions for intact families.10 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
 
Families intact Families intact  
 
Families intact Families intact 
  1960-1970 1960-1980   1970-1980 1970-1990 
Son-father mobility 
     β 0.195*** 0.202*** 
 
0.125*** 0.130*** 
 0.159 0.160 
 
0.125 0.126 
sd(β) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
N 13 341 12 489 
 
18 138 16 668 
      Son-mother mobility 
     β 0.035*** 0.032*** 
 
0.046*** 0.051*** 
 0.057 0.053 
 
0.073 0.081 
sd(β) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
N 13 786 12 489 
 
16 854 16 668 
      Daughter-father mobility 
     β 0.130*** 0.138*** 
 
0.119*** 0.129*** 
 0.096 0.097 
 
0.098 0.103 
sd(β) (0.012) (0.013) 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
N 12 411 11 628 
 
18 406 15 445 
      Daughter-mother mobility 
     β 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
0.079*** 0.080*** 
 0.060 0.059 
 
0.103 0.105 
sd(β) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
N 12 798 11 628 
 
17 102 15 445 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The correlation coefficient 
is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is a five-year average of log earnings. For 
the 1960 cohort the average of the age at time of the earnings observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters, 47.59 
for fathers and 47.29 for mothers.  For the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for 
fathers and 45.73 for mothers. 
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Table 7.2: Results from OLS regressions for disrupted families due to divorce and separation.11 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
 
Families divorced in Families divorced in All divorced 
 
Families divorced in Families divorced in All divorced 
  the period 1960-1970 the period 1970-1980 families   the period 1970-1980 the period 1980-1990 families 
Son-father mobility 
       β 0.045 0.145*** 0.123*** 
 
0.051** 0.098*** 0.080*** 
 0.042 0.161 0.130 
 
0.060 0.130 0.100 
sd(β) (0.060) (0.034) (0.030) 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.016) 
N 312 684 996 
 
1 296 1 349 2 645 
        Son-mother mobility 
       β -0.032 0.114*** 0.064*** 
 
0.028 0.024 0.029** 
 -0.040 0.134 0.077 
 
0.037 0.034 0.039 
sd(β) (0.044) (0.031) (0.025) 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.014) 
N 312 684 996 
 
1 296 1 349 2 645 
        Daughter-father 
       mobility 
       β 0.081 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 
0.060** 0.056** 0.063*** 
 0.078 0.095 0.090 
 
0.064 0.064 0.070 
sd(β) (0.063) (0.034) (0.030) 
 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.018) 
N 278 627 905 
 
1 107 1 268 2 375 
        Daughter-mother 
       mobility 
       β 0.183*** 0.049 0.098*** 
 
0.086*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 
 0.233 0.060 0.122 
 
0.101 0.121 0.116 
sd(β) (0.048) (0.034) (0.028) 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.017) 
N 278 627 905 
 
1 107 1 268 2 375 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The mobility elasticity β is estimated by running separate   
regressions for each family type, and the correlation coefficient is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is  
five-year average of log earnings. For the 1960 cohort the average of the age at the time of earnings observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters 
47.59 for fathers and 47.29 for mothers. For the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for fathers and 45.73  
for mothers. 
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7.1.2 Families disrupted due to divorce and separation 
 Regressions show considerable divergence in the intergenerational income mobility 
when the family structure is disrupted. Estimated elasticities between parents and offspring in 
divorced families are depicted in table 7.2 for both cohorts. Regarding fathers and offspring 
the tendency is clear; when parents separate or get divorced before the children are 20 years 
of age, the estimated elasticities between fathers and children indicate that the son-father and 
daughter-father earnings mobility are higher in divorced families than in intact families. 
Furthermore, the income mobility between mothers and sons deviates in the opposite 
direction, i.e., the displayed results indicate lower son-mother earnings mobility in divorced 
families than in intact families. This pattern is most obvious for the 1960 cohort while for the 
1970 cohort the estimates are only significant when all divorced families are observed 
together, i.e. the families are not split according to the time of divorce. Finally, for mothers 
and daughters all estimates are highly significant and display lower daughter-mother income 
mobility in divorced families compared to intact families. This applies for both birth cohorts. 
Deviations in the size of the estimates are ambiguous as they differ between the family 
pairs and with the time of the family structure observation. However, on average, it seems that 
the differences are smaller for mothers and offspring than for fathers and offspring born in 
1960. For the 1970 cohort it is opposite, that is, the differences in elasticity between intact and 
divorced families are smaller for mothers and offspring than for fathers and offspring. 
 
7.1.2.3 Separating between single parents and step families 
 The divorced families have been split into single parents and step families, and the 
results from the estimations are displayed in table C.1.1 in Appendix C. For the few 
significant estimates regarding the 1960 cohort, the son-father and daughter-father income 
mobility is higher and the son-mother and daughter-mother mobility is lower in both single 
parent and step families compared to intact families. Furthermore, when comparing single 
parent families to step families, the earnings mobility is lower in step families than in single 
parent families in all significant cases. This pattern is partly supported by the estimations 
from the 1970 cohort; when the divorce occurred between 1980 and 1990 then sons are less 
mobile with respect to fathers in step families than in single parent families. However, when 
the families are not split according to time, i.e. when the divorce occurred between 1970 and 
1990, the tendency is reversed, i.e. higher son-father mobility in step families than in single 
parent families. 
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7.1.2.4 Separating according to the custody 
When the divorced families are separated according to which parent who has the 
custody of the children, the estimated mobility elasticities deviate substantially within the 
divorced families. The results are displayed in table C.1.2 in Appendix C. When fathers have 
the custody of the children the only significant estimates are between sons and fathers where 
the estimations show that the son-father income mobility is higher when the male offspring 
are living with their fathers than with their mothers.
26
 This result applies for both cohorts, but 
the pattern is most prominent for the 1970 cohort. When mothers are in custody of the 
children, the son-father income mobility is higher and the daughter-father mobility is lower in 
disrupted than in intact families for both cohorts, while the son-mother and daughter-father 
income mobility deviates between the cohorts when the family types are compared.  
 
7.1.2.5 Families disrupted due to parental death 
Results from regressions regarding families who experienced death of one parent 
during the children‟s adolescence are displayed in table 7.3. For the earnings elasticity 
between fathers‟ and sons‟ earnings, the findings are ambiguous for the 1960 cohort. When 
exploring all cases of parental death between 1960 and 1980 the mobility is marginal higher 
in disrupted families, but when the time intervals are split according to time the earnings 
mobility deviates between the family types. For the rest of the mobility pairs, i.e. son-mother, 
daughter-mother and daughter-father, all significant estimates indicate that the earnings 
mobility is lower in disrupted families than in intact families.  
For the 1970 cohort, the income mobility between sons and fathers, sons and mothers 
and daughter and mothers are not significant different between intact families and families 
disrupted due to parental death. As regards the daughter-father mobility, the estimations 
depict ambiguous results according to the time of death, but when all disrupted families are 
observed the estimates indicate higher daughter-father mobility.  
 When the disrupted families are separated between single parents and step families, 
few of the estimates are significant different from zero. The estimates that are significant are 
fairly similar to the estimates when the disrupted families are not separated. Finally, the 
number of step families is severely low, especially for the 1970 cohort. The results are 
displayed in table C.1.3 in Appendix C. 
                                                 
26
 The low number of significant estimates can be attributed to the small samples of father-headed households 
among divorced families. 
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Table 7.3: Results from OLS regressions for disrupted families due to parental death.12 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
 
Families disrupted in Families disrupted in All disrupted 
 
Families disrupted in Families disrupted in All disrupted 
  the period 1960-1970 the period 1970-1980 families   the period 1970-1980 the period 1980-1990 families 
Son-father mobility 
       β 0.404** 0.177** 0.201*** 
 
-0.103 0.053 0.002 
 0.421 0.194 0.228 
 
-0.149 0.066 0.003 
sd(β) (0.174) (0.084) (0.074) 
 
(0.098) (0.064) (0.052) 
N 55 168 223 
 
41 121 162 
        Son-mother mobility 
       β 0.112*** 0.081*** 0.092*** 
 
0.054 0.022 0.032 
 0.194 0.127 0.152 
 
0.081 0.037 0.053 
sd(β) (0.035) (0.024) (0.019) 
 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.024) 
N 258 613 871 
 
237 389 626 
        Daughter-father 
       mobility 
       β 0.266** 0.110 0.168*** 
 
0.021 0.140** 0.102* 
 0.267 0.113 0.173 
 
0.031 0.144 0.117 
sd(β) (0.127) (0.079) (0.067) 
 
(0.096) (0.068) (0.056) 
N 52 156 208 
 
42 141 183 
        Daughter-mother 
       mobility 
       β 0.033 0.077*** 0.058*** 
 
0.083* 0.041 0.047 
 0.056 0.112 0.091 
 
0.127 0.057 0.069 
sd(β) (0.039) (0.029) (0.023) 
 
(0.049) (0.039) (0.030) 
N 213 543 756 
 
198 389 587 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The mobility elasticity β is estimated by running separate   
regressions for each family type, and the correlation coefficient is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is   
five-year average of log earnings. For the 1960 cohort the average of the age at the time of earnings observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters 
47.59 for fathers and 47.29 for mothers. For the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for fathers and 45.73 for 
mothers. 
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7.2 Results from transition matrices 
7.2.1 Intact families 
 The results show that the earnings mobility between offspring and parents in intact 
families varies over the income distribution. The main tendency is that when parents are 
located in either of the two middle quartiles of their group‟s income distribution the offspring 
are highly mobile with respect to both mothers and fathers. When the parents are situated in 
either the lower or upper quartile of the income distribution, the offspring are far lower 
mobile with regard to their parents, especially for the wealthiest families. Finally, the 
transition matrices regarding the 1970 cohort show that the income mobility patterns are by 
far equal to those of the 1960 cohort. All of the transition matrices for intact families are 
displayed in tables C.2.1.1-C.2.1.16 in Appendix C.  
 
7.2.2 Families disrupted due to divorce 
 The results indicate that offspring of divorced parents tend to end up lower in the 
income distribution than their parents compared to offspring in intact families. This implies 
that the income mobility between parents and offspring is higher for all divorced families not 
situated in the lowest quartile compared to intact families. For the families located in the 
lower quartile, the income mobility is lower in divorced families. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the downward tendency is in most cases quite substantial. The offspring of the 
disrupted families do not only tend to move downwards through the income distribution, but 
cluster in the lowest quartile regardless of the parents‟ position in the distribution. 
If we scrutinize the different mobility pairs, the downward pattern is most prominent 
for fathers and offspring. This applies to both birth cohorts. When it comes to the mothers, the 
son-mother income mobility follows the same trend, but in addition, we observe large 
deviations according to the time of divorce. Finally, for daughters and fathers, the differences 
between the family types are small, but when the families are split according to when the 
divorce occurred, i.e. before or after the offspring are 10 years of age, then there are large and 
unsystematic deviations between the family types. The transition matrices for the divorced 
families are located in Appendix C in tables C.2.2.1-2.2.24. 
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7.2.2.3 Separating single parents and step families  
 When the divorced families are separated into single parents and step families the 
computed transition probabilities display no decisive pattern for any of the child-parent 
mobility pairs across cohorts or time. However, when the two cohorts are viewed collectively 
there is a vague tendency for offspring in step families to be less downward mobile through 
the income distribution than offspring in intact families. In addition, it appears as offspring in 
step families are somewhat less disadvantaged than offspring in single parent families. The 
transition matrices are displayed in tables C.2.2.25-C.2.2.40 in Appendix C. 
 
7.2.3 Families disrupted due to death of one parent 
 In general, the results regarding the 1960 cohort indicate that offspring tend to end up 
lower in the income distribution conditioned upon their parents‟ location compared to 
offspring of intact families, i.e. downward mobility. The pattern is prominent for all but the 
son-father mobility pair and when the parents are situated in all but the higher middle quartile. 
In the two quoted cases the results are ambiguous, and hence, no pattern can be stated. For the 
1970 cohort, the results are more uniform where the main tendency is that offspring are 
situated lower than their parents in the income distribution. In addition, the results deviate 
substantially when the families are split according to whether the death occurred before or 
after 1980. 
As regards the income mobility, the matrices indicate that the mobility between the 
generations is lower than in intact families whenever the parents are located in the lower 
quartile and higher when the parents are positioned in the upper quartile. When parents are 
situated in any of the middle quartiles the mobility pattern deviates substantially between the 
mobility pairs and between the cohorts. The transition matrices are displayed in tables 
C.2.3.1-C.2.3.20 in Appendix C. 
 
 
7.2.4 Immobility index 
 The immobility indexes indicate that the average income mobility in the transition 
matrices is higher in divorced families than in intact families. This applies to all mobility pairs 
and for both birth cohorts. For families disrupted due to parental, the trend is opposite, i.e. 
lower income mobility than in intact families. This applies to all of the family pairs across the 
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cohorts, except the daughter-mother mobility for the 1960 cohort and the son-mother mobility 
for the 1970 cohort. Table 7.4 displays the immobility indexes for both birth cohorts. 
 
Table 7.4: Computed immobility indexes.13 
 
1960 birth cohort   1970 birth cohort 
 
Intact Divorced Families disrupted 
 
Intact Divorced Families disrupted 
  families families due to death   families families due to death 
Son-father 2.87 2.69 2.58 
 
2.82 2.70 2.86 
Daughter-father 2.75 2.67 2.99 
 
2.78 2.73 2.96 
Son-mother 2.60 2.54 2.69 
 
2.64 2.58 2.63 
Daughter-mother 2.66 2.63 2.76 
 
2.72 2.69 2.75 
Notes: The family structure is observed in 1980. An index of 2.5 implies perfect mobility while an index of 4 
implies perfect immobility. 
  
7.3 Results from difference-in-difference regressions 
 Estimates of the siblings-father income mobility and the siblings-mother income 
mobility for intact and divorced families are displayed in table 7.5. For intact families, only 
three of the elasticity estimates are significant different from zero; the siblings-father mobility 
for the 1970 cohort for both sets of constraints and the siblings-mother mobility for the 1960 
cohort when the relaxed constraint is applied.
27
 All of the significant elasticity estimates are 
negative. Per definition, negative child-parent income mobility implies that if the parent is 
situated above the mean of income the child are situated somewhere beneath the mean, and 
vice verse. This observed pattern is not as expected nor does it make any sense. It may be a 
result of the identifying assumptions in the model, which will be discussed in length in 
chapter 8.3. The interaction terms for the divorced families are not different from zero when 
either of the constraints is applied for either of the cohorts. This implies that the earnings 
mobility of divorced families is not different from intact families. We note that the number of 
divorced families is substantially small compared to the number of intact families. 
  
                                                 
27
 For a description of the difference-in-difference model and the specific constraints see chapter 2.5.1, page 18. 
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Table 7.5: Results from difference-in-difference regressions.14 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
  Strict constraint Relaxed constraint   Strict constraint Relaxed constraint 
Siblings-father mobility 
     Intact families (β) 0.036 -0.004 
 
-0.051*** -0.026** 
sd (β) (0.027) (0.020) 
 
(0.017) (0.013) 
Divorced families (γ) 0.067 0.071 
 
0.066 -0.000 
sd (γ) (0.099) (0.066) 
 
(0.056) (0.043) 
N 7 154 12 624 
 
16 230 26 286 
      Siblings-mother mobility 
     Intact families (β) -0.019 -0.022** 
 
-0.000 -0.004 
sd (β) (0.014) (0.022) 
 
(0.008) (0.006) 
Divorced families (γ) -0.051 0.066 
 
0.088 0.057 
sd (γ) (0.208) (0.058) 
 
(0.074) (0.049) 
N 7 154 12 624 
 
16 230 26 286 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The regressions are estimated with 
OLS and with the use of dummy variables for divorced families. The intact families are observed between 
1960 and 1980 while the disrupted families are reported to be divorced between 1970 and 1980. The strict 
constraint implies that the siblings are born before 1953 for the 1960 cohort and before 1963 for the 1970 
cohort. The relaxed constraint implies that the siblings are born before 1955 for the 1960 cohort and before 
1965 for the1970 cohort. The numbers of divorced families that fulfil the strict restriction are 119 and 185 
for the 1960 and 1970 cohort, respectively. When the relaxed constraint is applied 263 and 564 divorced 
families are included for the cohorts, respectively.  
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8. Discussion 
In this chapter I discuss the results by family structure; intact families, divorced 
families and finally families disrupted due to death. The main interest is the divorced families, 
but the family types are separated to maintain a certain level of perspective and organization. 
Finally, I discuss whether the results can be driven by selection. 
 
8.1 Intact families 
8.1.1 OLS regressions 
In general, the regressions show that the income mobility between children and fathers 
is lower than between children and mothers. This applies to both cohorts. In addition, sons are 
less mobile with respect to fathers than daughters while the opposite apply for mothers, i.e. 
higher son-mother income mobility than daughter-mother mobility.  
Of the studies on intergenerational income mobility Bratberg et al. (2005) is one in a 
few that utilizes the framework adapted by Solon (1992) to assess son-father and daughter-
father mobility patterns in Norway. They use the same data material collected by Statistics 
Norway and partly the same cohorts as in my regressions, thus the earnings characteristics are 
approximately similar across the studies. The main difference between the studies is the fact 
that Bratberg et al. do not differ between family structures, but as the size of their cohorts is 
most similar to those of the intact families it is most relevant to compare their results to those 
of the intact families. In general, the results are very similar. The estimated mobility 
elasticities for the 1960 cohort between daughters and fathers are almost identical. Regarding 
sons, my estimations reveal higher mobility than Bratberg et al. Interestingly, their elasticities 
do not differ between the sexes of offspring as my regressions reveal. Finally, they find the 
same decline in son-father and daughter-father income mobility over time as I observe. They 
uncover the pattern for the 1950 and 1960 cohorts while I find it for the 1960 and 1970 
cohorts.  
  
8.1.2 Transition matrices 
Transmission matrices concerning intact families show that the income mobility 
between offspring and parents varies across the income distribution for both cohorts. The 
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earnings mobility appears to be lowest in each end of the distribution, i.e. in the lower and 
upper quartile, while it is considerably higher in the two middle quartiles.  
Bratberg et el. (2005) have investigated transition probabilities between fathers and 
offspring. If we compare their matrices with my results we see that on the diagonal, i.e. when 
offspring are situated in the same quartile in the income distribution as their fathers, the 
studies are remarkably similar. Outside the diagonal, the transition probabilities are quite 
similar between sons and fathers, but deviate somewhat between daughters and fathers. For 
both studies the transition matrices seem to confirm the results of the OLS regressions. 
Finally, changes between the observed cohorts, i.e. the 1950 and 1960 cohorts for Bratberg et 
al. (2005) and the 1960 and 1970 cohorts in my study, follow the same patterns. That implies 
that for sons and fathers there is a decrease in the income mobility from the former to the 
latter cohort while the daughter-father income mobility strengthens slightly from the former to 
the latter cohort. 
 
8.2 Disruption due to divorce 
8.2.1 OLS regressions 
8.2.1.1 Sons and fathers 
The regressions concerning sons and fathers for both cohorts show that the estimated 
earnings elasticities display higher income mobility when the families are disrupted due to 
divorce than for intact families. This pattern is discovered for both male-headed and female-
headed households when the divorced families are split according to the custody status of the 
parents.  
The overall results are in accordance with earlier findings by Fertig (2004) and Biblarz 
and Raftery (1993). Fertig‟s estimations indicate a larger difference between the family types 
where the earnings mobility in divorced families is far higher than my elasticities indicate. 
The divergence between the studies are interesting as it suggests the opposite pattern to the 
well-known insight that the Scandinavian countries possess far higher income mobility than 
countries in the Anglo-American region (e.g. Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997; Solon, 1999; Solon, 
2002). The divorced families are only a subgroup of all observed families and the estimates 
for intact families indicate high income mobility in Norway, which is in line with the well-
known pattern, but still, it is noteworthy that the observed pattern for divorced families 
suggests the opposite tendency.  
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Furthermore, Fertig discovers a non-linear pattern where an additional year in a 
disrupted family decreases the son-father mobility, implying that the difference in income 
mobility between divorced and intact families decreases with the number of years spent in a 
disrupted family. This finding is not in accordance with my estimations. While the estimates 
for the 1960 cohort are incomparable according to the time of divorce, the regressions for the 
1970 cohort indicate the opposite pattern to Fertig, i.e. the son-father earnings mobility is 
higher when the families were separated before rather than after 1980.  
 
8.2.1.2 Daughters and fathers 
In the case of daughters and fathers the estimations in general display higher income 
mobility in divorced families than in intact families for both cohorts. The tendency is 
somewhat weaker than for sons due to large differences according to when the family 
structure was observed. Of the studies on the subject it is only Fertig (2004) who addresses 
female offspring, and her findings suggest the same, but much stronger pattern between the 
family types. Furthermore, the OLS regressions are in line with Fertig‟s discovered decrease 
in daughter-father mobility over time. She finds that spending an additional year in a divorced 
family decreases the daughter-father mobility. This is the same result as for the 1970 cohort 
where the income mobility is lower when the divorce occurred before rather than after 1980. 
The estimations for the 1960 cohort are incomparable over time.  
 If we compare the results of daughters with those of sons, the estimates show that the 
overall income mobility with respect to divorced fathers is similar, i.e. higher 
intergenerational income mobility. This tendency can be explained by the fact that it is 
normally the father that leaves the household after a divorce and becomes the non-custodial 
parent. The subsequent daily absence of the father may over time cause great interference in 
the children‟s relations to the father and reduce the importance of the male role model 
(McLanahan 1985). As a result, we could expect fathers‟ earnings to become less 
determinative for the income of children, i.e. that children‟s earnings become more mobile 
with respect to non-custodial fathers than earnings of offspring that grow up with the fathers 
in the household.  
Furthermore, at which age the divorce occurred seems to affect daughters differently 
than sons. While sons‟ earnings are more mobile with respect to fathers‟ earnings when the 
divorce occurred before rather than after the children were 10 years old, the daughters‟ 
earnings are less mobile to fathers‟ earnings. Finally, in both intact and divorced families, 
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sons‟ earnings appear to be less mobile with respect to the fathers‟ earnings than daughters‟ 
earnings. This trend is supported by the results from the 1970 cohort when the regressions are 
performed for merely female-headed divorced households. 
 
8.2.1.3 Sons and mothers 
 The estimated elasticities of son‟s earnings with respect to mother‟s earnings are 
different across the cohorts. Sons born in 1960 appear to be less mobile with respect to 
mothers in divorced families than in intact families while sons born in 1970 appear to more 
mobile. This difference between cohorts is interesting. Since it is mothers who in general 
become the custodial parent it is reasonable to predict that sons get more attached to their 
mothers after the divorce. The mother is the main role model for the children and thus her 
importance in the children‟s lives increases considerably. If she maintains her position 
towards the children during the adolescence it could be an explanation to why the income 
mobility would be lower in divorced families. However, as shown, this trend applies only for 
the 1960 cohort and not the 1970 cohort. There are several factors that can interfere and drive 
the observed results that may explain the deviation between the cohorts. Later in the chapter 
we will investigate these various mechanisms.  
In the literature on intergenerational income mobility and family dissolution it is only 
Couch and Lillard (1997) and Fertig (2004) who address the mobility between sons and 
mothers. Of the two works, Couch and Lillard‟s estimates are the only significant ones, in 
which the results vaguely indicate that the son-mother mobility is lower in divorced families. 
This is consistent with the results from the 1960 cohort. However, the absolute numbers of the 
estimated elasticities deviate substantially between the studies where Couch and Lillard find, 
regardless of family type, considerably lower income mobility between sons and mothers 
compared to my estimates. 
 
8.2.1.4 Daughters and mothers 
The estimated mobility elasticities concerning daughters and mothers indicate for both 
cohorts that daughters are less mobile with respect to divorced mothers than non-divorced 
mothers. This is in line with the hypothesis introduced in the chapter above, i.e. that after the 
divorce mothers become the main role model for the children the association between mothers 
and offspring increases. Different from sons, this pattern is equal for both cohorts. 
Furthermore, the daughter-mother income mobility deviates from the daughter-father income 
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mobility. While the earnings of daughters are more mobile with respect to fathers‟ earnings in 
disrupted families, the daughter-mother mobility is lower. 
Fertig (2004) is the only researcher who has investigated the mobility between 
daughters and sons, but her results are non-comparable between intact and divorced families. 
Hence, no cross-study assessment can be made. On the other hand, Fertig discovers a non-
linear pattern among divorced families where the marginal effect of another year in a 
separated household reduces the income mobility. This finding is not in line with the results 
from the 1970 cohort as the daughter-mother mobility is higher when the families were 
disrupted before rather than after the year 1980. Interestingly, this is the same pattern that we 
discovered for sons and fathers, but opposite to that of daughters and fathers. The results here 
and for sons and fathers may suggest that the type of family structure after the divorce has 
impact on the earnings mobility. If daughters experience large fluctuations between single 
parenthood and step families after the divorce, the turbulence attached to the transformations 
and the involvement of other parent figures might diminish the importance of the mother and 
cause higher earnings mobility over time (Fertig, 2004).  
When comparing the size of the estimated elasticities between daughters and sons, 
daughters are less mobile to mothers than sons, regardless of cohort and family type. This 
pattern is supported by the estimates from regressions on female-headed households when the 
divorced families are split according to the custody status of the parents. Interestingly, the 
result is partly the opposite of what we discovered with respect to fathers; sons appear to be 
less mobile to fathers than daughters in both intact and disrupted families. This highlights the 
significance of the male role model to male offspring and the female role model to female 
offspring. Especially, even if a divorce reduces the importance of the father and increases the 
importance of the mother, the tendency is still present.  
 
8.2.1.5 In relation to other studies 
While my results are in accordance with findings of other studies on intergenerational 
income mobility and family dissolution, differences in results on the subject are extensive. 
This may be due to causal differences, but it should be noted that the studies differs 
substantially when it comes to methods utilized, type of outcome observation, time of income 
observation and time of family structure observation.
28
 In addition, bias in the estimates may 
be a problem in the studies which have utilized the framework of Becker and Tomes (1979, 
                                                 
28
 See chapter 4.2, page 31 for a comprehensive table with characteristics of the different studies. 
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1986) or the model explored by Solon (1992).
 29
 Of the studies that coincide most with my 
results, i.e. Couch and Lillard (1997) and Fertig (2004), we note that Couch and Lillard do not 
average sons‟ or parents‟ earnings over several years, but use current earnings from one year 
as proxy for lifetime earnings. In additon, Fertig measures daughters‟ current income at the 
age of 28. This age is around the peak of women‟s fertility and child-rearing years which 
implies that the current income of daughters‟ may deviate substantially from their lifetime 
earnings, and hence, cause life-cycle bias in the estimates (Haider and Solon, 2006; Böhlmark 
and Lindquist, 2006).  
 
8.2.2 Transition matrices 
The transition matrices display the similar pattern for all child-parent mobility pairs 
across the cohorts. Children of divorced parents tend to end up lower in the income 
distribution with respect to parents‟ position compared to offspring in intact families. That is, 
male and female offspring in divorced families are socioeconomic disadvantaged compared to 
offspring in intact families. This downward tendency is present for all quartiles, but it is most 
obvious when parents are located above the mean of income. Subsequently, for these families 
the income mobility between offspring and parents is higher in divorced families. When 
parents are situated in the lower middle quartile children tend to end up in the same or in the 
lower quartile, i.e. lower or higher income mobility, and when parents are situated in the 
lower quartile the income mobility between children and parents are lower in divorced 
families.  
The downward tendency is stronger for male offspring. Sons seem to cluster in the 
lower quartile when either of the divorced parents is situated above the mean of income. 
Daughters in general do not cluster in the low end to the same extent, but scatters more 
equally across the income distribution. If we compare the cohorts rather than the genders, it 
appears as offspring born in 1960 are worse off than offspring born in 1970. This is indicated 
by the computed immobility indexes which show that the average for the cohorts are 2,63 and 
2,68, respectively.
30
 As a lower index number implies that a transition matrix exhibits a 
higher degree of income mobility between the observed generations and that the discovered 
tendency is downward mobility in divorced families, the offspring born in 1960 are on 
average situated lower in the income distribution with respect to the parents‟ position than 
                                                 
29
 See chapter 2, page 4 for a review of the different models and sources of bias in the estimates. 
30
 See chapter 2.4, page 16 for a review of immobility indexes.  
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offspring born in 1970. However, it should be noted that the number of divorced families 
observed for the 1960 cohort is substantial smaller than the number of families observed for 
the 1970 cohort. Few observations tend to increase the actual transition probabilities, which 
imply that the low number of families can be a source to the observed difference between the 
cohorts. 
 It appears as the time of divorce has an impact on the mobility across the earnings 
distribution. When the average of the immobility indexes for all family pairs are computed it 
appears that the income mobility is higher when the parents split up when the offspring were 
between 0 and 10 years of age rather than between 10 and 20. This applies for both cohorts, 
and the trends are supported by the OLS regressions from all but the son-mother mobility. As 
a result, the observations suggest that the earlier the disruption took place the more 
disadvantaged the children are.  
Of the studies on intergenerational income mobility it is only Couch and Lillard 
(1997) who utilize transition matrices. My results are in accordance with their findings where 
sons of divorced parents are more disadvantaged than sons in intact families. More 
specifically, Couch and Lillard discover that sons of divorced fathers who are situated in the 
lower third of the income distribution are lower upwardly mobile, and sons of divorced 
fathers located in either of the upper two thirds of the income distribution are more 
downwardly mobile, compared to sons of intact families. The number of observations is 
considerably small as it only includes 66 divorced fathers. As a result, one should be careful 
to conclude any general patterns based on this low number of observations.  
 
8.2.3 Interpretation  
8.2.3.1 With regard to the theoretical framework 
The discovered disadvantage in outcome of sons and daughters in divorced families 
compared to offspring in intact families may partly be explained by the theoretical model of 
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986).
31
 First and foremost, if we look at a household it is clear that 
the financial resources are diminished as one parent leaves the household after a divorce. 
Ceteris paribus, this implies that the household‟s capital investment in the children is nearly 
                                                 
31
 This model is extensively reviewed in chapter 2.1, page 4 and the model‟s implications when diversifying the 
family structure are described in chapter 3, page 23. 
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reduced by the share invested by the non-custodial parent.
32
 After the divorce the custodial 
parent, who normally is the mother, faces a time allocation problem; increase her labour 
supply to boost the family economy, and implicit have the opportunity to increase the capital 
investment in the children, or devote the available hours to support, help and guide the 
children. The earnings statistics over the five-year earnings average suggest that divorced 
mothers tend to increase the labour supply as they cluster in the upper quartile of the earnings 
distribution while mother in intact families to a large extent are equally scattered across the 
quartiles. Then, an important issue is to what extent the observed increment in the divorced 
household‟s income is directed towards the children in form of higher human capital 
investment. If we assume that the mothers‟ preferences do not decrease as a result of the 
divorce and that the preferences are approximately similar across the cohorts it would imply 
that the children are better off with the financial boost. On the other hand, the increase in 
labour supply implies that the children to a larger extent are left without supervision and 
support, and this may counter some or all of the gains from the enhancement in capital 
investment. There is no way of observing the trade-off between the consequences of the 
labour supply decision, but in general, the transition matrices show that offspring of divorced 
parents are disadvantaged in outcome compared to intact families. The relations described in 
the model may thus add to the understanding of the divergence across family structure.  
Another essential aspect of the model is the investment decision made by the non-
custodial parent. If the custodial parent does not decrease her share of the capital investment, 
which is to be expected based on the described observations, the model suggests that that the 
non-custodial parent reduces his capital investment after the divorce. This notion is supported 
by the earnings statistics which show that divorced fathers tend to earn lower than fathers in 
intact families. In addition, it is a common finding that non-custodial parents do not spend the 
same amount of time with their children after the divorce (Amato and Keith, 1991). This 
reduction in non-capital investment, i.e. supervision, help and guidance, also supports the 
quoted notion.  
Finally, the model is in line whit the results when suggesting that offspring who 
experience parental divorce early in the childhood tend to be worse off than offspring 
experiencing the divorce later in the adolescence. This is explained by the fact that the earlier 
the divorce takes place, the lower the total investment in the children becomes, and hence, the 
more disadvantaged the children turn out to be.   
                                                 
32
 The non-custodial parent is obligated to pay child support so the reduction in the household‟s finances with the 
divorce is countered by this amount. 
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The model has shortcomings when it comes to explaining the discovered sex bias 
within the divorced families. The OLS regressions show that sons born in 1960 and 1970 are 
worse off than daughters born in the same years, which implies that divorced parents favour 
female offspring before sons. In the context of the model, this means that the parents have 
preferences for daughters when investing in their children. In Norway no such favouritism is 
discovered. If we were to expect a tendency it would rather be directed towards male 
offspring which historically have been the preferred sex. Another shortcoming of the model is 
that we would expect children born in 1960 to be better off than those born in 1970 on 
grounds of the discovered difference in post-divorce earnings. The immobility index suggests 
rather that offspring born in 1960 are somewhat worse off than offspring born in 1970. Why 
the difference between the results and the model emerges is not certain. The preferences may 
differ between the cohorts, which can explain some of the difference, but such a fact is not 
observable. 
 
8.2.3.2 Other considerations 
 The parental absence hypothesis, which states that the absence of one parent is 
detrimental to children‟s outcome, is in line with the observed disadvantaged outcome of 
children in disrupted families. The results from the transition matrices are also in accordance 
with the father absence hypothesis since we observe that sons are disadvantaged to daughters. 
The hypothesis suggests that the sex difference is caused by the importance of fathers as role 
model for the offspring during the childhood where sons are evidently more attached to their 
fathers than daughters. The divorce followed by the absence of the father is then more 
damaging for sons‟ outcome than daughters‟ outcome. Finally, it should be noted that even 
though the results coincide with the predictions of both hypotheses, it is not proven that the 
mechanisms behind the observed differences between family types and the sex of the 
offspring are the result of the absence of one parent or the father.  
 
8.2.4 Separating single parents and step families 
OLS regressions weakly show that the income mobility for sons and daughters are 
lower in relations to parents in step families compared to offspring in single parent families. 
Computed transition probabilities show a vague tendency that children of step families are 
less disadvantaged than children of single parents. The tendency is weak because the 
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differences in income mobility between the two family types deviate notably between the 
parent-child pairs, the cohorts and the positions of the parents in the income distribution. In 
addition, the number of observations is low, especially for the step families of the 1960 
cohort, which causes the estimates to be imprecise. If we compare the transition matrices from 
step families with those of intact families, offspring of step families in general seem to end up 
lower in the income distribution in relation to the parents‟ location in the income distribution. 
The results deviate substantially between the cohorts where the 1970 cohort displays the most 
apparent pattern. 
According to the theoretical model, the new parent in step families can contribute to 
the investment in the spouse‟s children with both time and capital. How large the investment 
becomes obviously depends on the step parent‟s preferences towards the step children. 
However, as long as it is larger than zero children in step families will benefit from the new 
parent. Furthermore, as the family economy is substantially improved, the custodial parent is 
not in the need of supplying extra hours of labour to boost the family economy. She will 
instead have more time to supervise, guide and assist her children, which they can benefit 
from. Both of these notions are in line with the difference discovered between single and step 
parents. 
The time and length of the period between the divorce and the introduction of the new 
spouse, i.e. the single parent period, is also of relevance. If the time period is extensive and 
encompasses years which are important for the children‟s educational choice and aims for the 
future, the financial increment with the new parent may not cause great influence on the 
children after all. In addition, as the family stress hypothesis emphasizes, a divorce may cause 
an emotional upheaval for the children and unbalance in the family relations. This may cause 
the children to be disadvantaged in form of poorer academic performance compared to 
children not experiencing a divorce (McLanahan, 1985; Amato and Keith, 1991). These 
notions support the fact that offspring in step families are worse off than offspring in intact 
families. 
 
8.3 Disruption due to parental death 
8.3.1 OLS regressions 
Offspring in disrupted families seem to be affected differently by the family 
dissolution than offspring in divorced families. For all child-parent pairs except the daughter-
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mother mobility the findings indicate that offspring who have experienced parental death are 
less mobile in relation to their parents than offspring who have experienced parental divorce. 
This implies that the family background is more decisive for the socioeconomic outcome of 
children who lose one parent during the adolescence.  
If we compare the findings between sons and daughters an interesting pattern emerges. 
For the 1960 cohort, sons appear to be less mobile with respect to both fathers and mothers 
than daughters in disrupted families. For divorced families it is the opposite, i.e. daughters are 
less mobile in relation to mothers than sons. What drives this finding is not certain, but it 
highlights the role mothers play to sons when fathers pass away as opposed to divorce since 
sons get more attached to the mothers than daughters in the case of death. 
When we explore the elasticities according to the time of divorce only the son-father 
and son-mother mobility for the 1960 cohort are examinable. The findings suggest that the 
same pattern as we discovered between daughters and fathers in divorced families, namely 
that the mobility is lower when the time of death occurred before rather than after 1970. This 
finding strengthens the notion that the family background is more important for offspring 
experienced the disruption early in the childhood. 
Other studies who have explored earnings mobility and parental death are Peter (1992) 
and Biblarz and Raftery (1993). While Peter‟s estimates are not significant different from zero 
Biblarz and Raftery find that the son-father income mobility are higher in disrupted families 
than in intact families. However, they have not separated the divorced families with the ones 
suffering from parental death, and as a result, it is not appropriate to evaluate their results to 
my findings.    
  
8.3.2 Transition matrices 
 The overall tendency is that offspring in disrupted families tend to end up lower in the 
income distribution with respect to their parents‟ location compared to offspring in intact 
families. This downward mobility is most prominent for the 1970 cohort, but present for all 
but the son-father mobility pair for the 1960 cohort. Interestingly, the trend is similar to the 
predictions from the divorced families. This implies that regardless of the type of disruption, 
the offspring who have experiences family dissolution during the adolescence are 
socioeconomic disadvantaged to offspring who grew up with ever-married parents. This 
notion is supported by Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan (2002). They have examined the rich 
sociology literature on offspring and parental death where the findings suggest that children 
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who experience death during the childhood attain lower education, receive on average lower 
grades and suffer more from behavioural and psychological problem than offspring from 
intact families. 
If we compare the two types of non-intact families with each other, the immobility 
indexes suggest that the earnings mobility is higher in divorced families than in disrupted 
families. This applies for both cohorts except the son-father income mobility for sons born in 
1960. The outline is supported by the average of all significant elasticity estimates from OLS 
regressions. As we observe the same downward mobility in all non-intact families the fact that 
the earnings mobility is higher in divorced families suggests that the offspring of divorced 
parents tend on average to be worse off than offspring that have experienced parental death 
during the adolescence.  
Parental death seems to affect sons and daughters different than parental divorce. 
Daughters in disrupted families are more disadvantages than sons compared to offspring in 
intact families while it is the opposite when the disruption is caused by divorce. In addition, 
when the families are separated according to the time of death, the transition probabilities 
suggest that the income mobility is higher in families where the death occurred before rather 
than after the children are 10 years of age. This implies that earlier the divorced took place the 
less disadvantages are the children. This is the opposite of what we detected for divorced 
families. 
 Finally, it should be taken into consideration the low number of disrupted families. 
When the families are divided into mobility pairs and separated by time of death the amounts 
become severely small, in which may cause estimates from OLS regressions to be imprecise 
and transition probabilities to be enlarged.   
 
8.3.3 Interpretation  
 The theoretical model is short in explaining the divergence in outcome of offspring 
between the two types of non-intact families. The earnings statistics of the five-year earnings 
average show that widows and widowers are situated lower in the income distribution than 
both the custodial and non-custodial parents in divorced families. This implies that divorced 
parents are capable of investing more capital in their children‟s human capital, which 
indicates that offspring of divorced parents could be better off than offspring that experienced 
death, i.e. the opposite of what is discovered. Beside capital assets, a factor that also is 
important for the children‟s outcome and partly can explain the difference in investment is the 
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amount of time directed towards the children, i.e. supervision and guidance. However, if the 
non-custodial parent in divorced families direct some attention and supervision towards the 
children it would again suggest that children in divorced families could be better off than 
children in disrupted families who have lost one parent. Another factor which can be of great 
importance is the involvement of another parent figure after the family dissolution. If widows 
or widowers are more likely to remarry or enter cohabiting unions than divorced parents, 
children of disrupted families could be better off. However, the statistics favour the offspring 
of the divorced families also here; on average remarriages and cohabitation unions are 
proportionally far more common when the parents are divorced, which suggest than children 
of divorced parents could be better off. Finally, the last factor that can explain the observed 
differences is the parents‟ preferences for human capital investement. The preferences are not 
possible to measure, but we can state that the difference between the family types must be 
substantial to satisfactorily explain the observed divergence in children‟s socioeconomic 
outcome. 
 
 
8.4 Selection 
8.4.1 Difference-in-difference regressions 
The estimates from the difference-in-difference regressions are overall non-conclusive. 
For divorced families, none of the estimates are significantly different from zero, which 
suggest that the observed differences in intergenerational income mobility between intact and 
divorced families are mainly due to selection. That is, it is not the divorce itself that drives the 
deviation in earnings between the family types, but rather that the parents who possess a 
higher probability of ending up with a divorce also possess earnings that systematically 
deviate from earnings of ever-married parents. On the other hand, the estimated earnings 
elasticities for intact families, which also apply for divorced families as their estimates are not 
significant different from zero, are negative when significant different from zero. This pattern 
is not logical as it implies that if the parents are situated above the mean of income the 
children are systematically situated somewhere beneath the mean, and vice verse. One can 
therefore question the specifics of the model and the observed results that indicate selection.  
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In reference to the model, the identifying assumptions should be considered, especially 
the assumed equality between siblings.
33
 Bjorklund et al. (2002) study earnings correlations 
between siblings and their results show that the correlation in earnings between Norwegian 
brothers is quite low. This implies that the share of the variance in siblings‟ earnings that can 
be attributed to family background and other common sources is small, and that the earnings 
between siblings may deviate even if they possess the same family background. This entails 
that utilizing sibling‟s earnings as proxy for offspring‟s earnings if the divorce was absent, 
may not be a good indicator of the offspring‟s earnings. However, the equality assumption is 
somewhat strengthened by the fact that the earnings of siblings in intact families are also 
differentiated. Sources of variation in earnings that can be attributed to general patterns in the 
society or to the age difference between the siblings will to a certain extent be controlled for, 
and thus, the depiction of offspring‟s earnings in absence of the divorce will be enhanced. 
In reference to the estimates that suggest that selection prevails, the small proportion 
of divorced families to the number of intact families may party explain the results. When the 
strict constraint is applied only 119 and 285 siblings in divorced families fulfil the restrictions 
for the 1960 and 1970 cohort, respectively. When the relaxed constraint is applied the 
numbers increase to 263 and 564 siblings for the cohorts, respectively. If we compare these 
numbers with those of intact families about 4 % of all the families are disrupted, which is 
considerable low. The consequence of these small samples is increased probability for non-
significant estimates, which implies that if causal effects are present they may not to be 
detected. As a result, the low number of divorced families reduces the robustness of the 
estimates indicating spurious effects. 
Even though the problem of small samples is mainly related to limitations in the data 
samples, it can also be associated with the identifying assumptions of the model. The model 
imposes severe requirements on the data material due to the required age difference between 
siblings. The strict constraint imposes an age difference of at least 7 years between the 
observed siblings. This implies that if the divorce took place when the younger sibling was 11 
years of age the elderly sibling would be 18 years of age. As the requirements of the model 
states that the educational decisions and future aspirations of the elderly sibling should mainly 
be unaltered with the divorce of the parents, this age differences should be satisfactory. 
Furthermore, the relaxed constraint requires only a difference of 5 years. This implies that if 
the parental divorce occurred when the younger sibling was 11 years of age the elderly sibling 
                                                 
33
 Earnings of elderly siblings are used because we cannot observe the earnings of offspring in divorced families 
if the divorce was absent. See more on the identifying assumption chapter 2.5, page 18.  
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would only be 16 years of age. In this case, it is not obvious that the elderly sibling‟s 
aspirations and aims for the future are unaffected by the divorce. Even if the sibling has 
chosen the type of upper secondary school, in which is detrimental to the occupational and 
socioeconomic outcome, he or she is still in an age where important decisions are yet to come. 
In addition, a divorce among the parents may well have similar effect on offspring who are 11 
years of age as offspring who are 16 years of age. In that respect, the relaxed constraint could 
be too comfortable in depicting the sought deviation between the siblings. If the age 
difference is not large enough and the siblings are affected by the divorce in a similar and 
negative fashion this could diminish the earnings difference, and hence, fail to observe causal 
effects that may be present.  
 The time of earnings observation of the parents may also affect the results of the 
regressions. Preferably we would like to observe the earnings in the same way as between the 
siblings, i.e. before and after the divorce, but this is not possible because of limitations in the 
administrative data on earnings streams. The age interval at which the short run proxies are 
observed is close in time, primarily a distance of one to three years, which causes the 
difference between the earnings of parents to be small in size. This will in turn affect the 
significance of the estimates from the regressions, in which the probability for non-significant 
results increases. As a result, if causal effects of the divorce are present they may not to be 
detected and the estimates indicate that the effects are due to selection.  
   
8.4.3 Other studies  
In the literature on intergenerational income mobility and marital dissolution no 
studies have explored the difference-in-difference strategy when investigating the presence of 
selection. Fertig (2004) utilize siblings to assess her results by incorporating a sibling fixed 
effect variable in the regression model. The variable should capture time-invariant 
unobservable features of a family in the sense that if a family is selected into disruption based 
on any of these features it should be accounted for (Fertig, 2004). The sibling-difference 
measure deviates from that of my study as the fixed effect variable only assesses differences 
in year spent in disrupted families across siblings, i.e. only siblings who have experienced 
disruption are included in the fixed effect model. In addition to this strategy, Fertig (2004) 
applies children‟s exposure to no-fault divorce laws as instrument for the number of years a 
child spends in a single or step parent family during the adolescence. The results from both 
strategies regarding the father-child mobility, confirm weakly that the income mobility in 
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alternative families is higher than in intact families because of selection. I.e. the results 
indicate that the difference in income mobility between the family types is not attributable to 
the disruption itself, but rather to systematic differences between the family types. For the 
mother-child mobility the estimations show the opposite results, i.e. that the income mobility 
between children and mothers falls with each additional year in an alternative family because 
of causation. In other words, the results indicate that the divorce is determinative for the 
income mobility between mothers and children. 
In the literature on children‟s educational attainment and marital dissolution among 
parents, studies show diverging results. Earlier studies like Jonsson and Gähler (1997) 
recognize the discovered negative cross-sectional relationship as partly causal, while recent 
studies conducted acknowledge selection as the primary explanatory cause (e.g. Ginther and 
Pollak, 2004; Winkelmann, 2006; Piketty, 2003; Bjorklund and Sundstrom, 2006; Bjorklund 
et al. 2007). In the light of these quoted studies, selection could be an important factor when 
investigating parental divorce and offspring‟s outcome. 
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9. Concluding remarks 
 In this study the child-parent earnings mobility is examined across family types. The 
data samples utilized consist of sons and daughters born in 1960 and 1970 and their biological 
mothers and fathers. The structure of the families is identified when the children are 10 and 20 
years of age, and at time of observation the families are divided into intact, disrupted due to 
divorce and disrupted due to parental death. The income mobility is measured between all 
combinations of children and parents. 
 The earnings mobility in intact families is found to be high for all child-parent 
mobility pairs when OLS regressions are performed. This result is in line with results of other 
studies with Norwegian data, e.g. Bratberg et al. (2005). When the findings are compared to 
those of divorced families, we observe differences in income mobility for all the mobility 
pairs. The son-father and daughter-mother mobility is higher in divorced families, the 
daughter-mother mobility is lower in divorced families and the son-mother mobility deviates 
between the cohorts. This indicates that the outcome of the children in divorced families is 
more attached to the earnings of the mothers, which is to be expected as they are 
overrepresented as the custodial parents. The results are also is in line with findings by 
previous studies on the subject, e.g. Biblarz and Raftery (1993), Couch & Lillard (1997) and 
Fertig (2004). However, there are large differences between these studies because utilized 
methods and design differ in addition to potential problems with biased estimates. Finally, it 
appears that the type of disruption has impact on the income mobility. The estimates differ 
between the families who have experienced divorce and parental death where the children on 
average are less mobile to the parents when one of the peers has passed away than in the case 
of divorce. 
 When the earnings of children and parents are separated over the income distribution, 
computed transition matrices suggest that offspring in divorced families are more downwardly 
mobile through the income distribution than offspring in intact families. This implies that 
children who experience marital dissolution during the adolescence become socioeconomic 
disadvantaged later in life to children who grew up with ever-married parents. This also 
applies for children who have lost one parent, but is seems as these children are not that 
disadvantaged compared to children of married parents as the ones that experience divorce.  
Sons and daughters are according to the findings not equally affected by the divorce of 
the parents. Daughters are less mobile to mothers than sons while it is opposite with respect to 
fathers. These patterns highlight the significance of the male role model to male offspring and 
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the female role model to female offspring. Sons also appear to be inferior to daughters in 
divorced families, but this fact is not supported by the families who are disrupted due to 
death.  
When the divorced families are split into single parent families and step families the 
results indicate weakly that the income mobility is lower in step families than in single parent 
families for all child-parent mobility pairs. The offspring of step families are also less 
disadvantaged than the offspring of single parent families, but no matter what structure the 
divorced families undertake the offspring are still inferior to children with ever-married 
parents.  
An important issue that emerges with the findings is whether they are due to causal 
connections or selection. This is investigated with a difference-in-difference model, but the 
results are non-conclusive. While some of the results give support to selection, the estimates 
overall are not logically and do not make sense. For further research the difference-in-
difference model should be explored in detail with data samples that are better suited to 
answer the imposed questions. 
Finally, it should be noted the mobility patterns and the results may in some cases be 
affected by the magnitude of the data samples. When the families are split into single parents 
and step families and after different types of disruption, the number of observed families is 
somewhat low. This implies that the estimates may be imprecise and that the transition 
probabilities may be enhanced.   
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Appendix A  
A.1 Optimal level of investment in children 
Maximization problem: 
 
max   𝑈    subject to    𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 
 
max   (1 − α) ln 𝐶𝑡−1 + α ln 𝑦𝑡    subject to    𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 
 
 
Lagrange expression: 
 
ℒ =  1 − α ln 𝐶𝑡−1 + α ln 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜆(𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 −   𝑦𝑡−1) 
 
Substituting 𝑦𝑡  with the equation for the child‟s lifetime earnings yields: 
 
ℒ =  1 − α ln 𝐶𝑡−1 + α ln  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 − 𝜆(𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 −   𝑦𝑡−1) 
 
Solving the maximization problem yields the following first order conditions: 
 
𝜕(∙)
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
= 0 ⟺   1 − 𝛼 
1
𝐶𝑡−1
− 𝜆 = 0 ⟺   1 − 𝛼 
1
𝐶𝑡−1
= 𝜆 
 
𝜕(∙)
𝜕𝐼𝑡−1
= 0 ⟺  
𝜕(∙)
𝜕𝑦𝑡
∙
𝑑𝑦𝑡
𝑑𝐼𝑡−1
− 𝜆 = 0 ⟺  𝛼 1 + 𝑟 
1
  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
− 𝜆 = 0        
 
⟺  𝛼 1 + 𝑟 
1
  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
= 𝜆 
 
𝜕(∙)
𝜕𝜆
= 0 ⟺  𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 −   𝑦𝑡−1 = 0 ⟺  𝐶𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝐼𝑡−1 
 
Substituting 𝜆 in the first of the first order conditions with the second of the first order 
conditions yields: 
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 1 − 𝛼 
1
𝐶𝑡−1
= 𝛼 1 + 𝑟 
1
  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
   
 
 1 − 𝛼   1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼 1 + 𝑟 𝐶𝑡−1   
 
Substituting 𝐶𝑡−1 with the third of the first order conditions yields: 
 
 1 − 𝛼   1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼 1 + 𝑟  𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝐼𝑡−1  
 
 1 − 𝛼  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 +  1 − 𝛼  𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼 1 + 𝑟 𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛼 1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 
 
 1 − 𝛼 𝐼𝑡−1 +  1 − 𝛼 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
(1 + 𝑟)
= 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛼𝐼𝑡−1 
 
Rearranging the terms yields the optimal level of investment: 
 
 1 − 𝛼 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 −  1 − 𝛼 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
(1 + 𝑟)
 
 
𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 −  1 − 𝛼 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
(1 + 𝑟)
 
 
 
The optimizing problem is a maximum problem. This can be proven. Optimizing the utility 
function yields the following first order conditions: 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
=  1 − 𝛼 
1
𝐶𝑡−1
≥ 0   if   𝛼 ≤ 1 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐼𝑡−1
=  𝛼 1 + 𝑟 
1
  1 + 𝑟 𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑢𝑡 
≥ 0   if   𝛼 ≥ 0 
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Second order conditions: 
 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝐶𝑡−1
2 = 0 ⟺  − 1 − 𝛼 
1
𝐶𝑡−1
2 ≤ 0   if   𝛼 ≤ 1 
 
𝜕2𝑈
𝜕𝐼𝑡−1
2 =  − 𝛼
1
𝑦2
≤ 0   if   𝛼 ≥ 0       
 
As long as 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 the constraints show that the utility function is concave. Then, if the 
budget constraint is linear the Lagrange function is concave, and the first order conditions 
yield the maximum point.   
 
 
A.2 Deducting the econometrical difference-in-difference model 
 
The econometric model equals 
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑝𝑎𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . 
 
With the difference-transformation it becomes 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  =  𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖 𝐷𝑖𝑦 − 𝐷𝑖𝑒  +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 , 
 
but since the elderly sibling with divorced parents did not experience the divorce during his or 
her adolescence, then  𝐷𝑖𝑒 = 0, and the model equals 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  = 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 . 
 
If we expand the model with an interaction dummy variable the model equals 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  = 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 , 
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or 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  = 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 . 
 
However, since 𝐷𝑖 = 0 for the “divorced” parents of the elderly sibling, i.e. the parents are 
not divorced when the elderly sibling grows up, but only when the younger grows up, 
𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟 = 0, and the econometrical model equals 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑  = 𝛽𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 − 𝑦𝑖𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑟  + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑦
𝑝𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖𝑦 − 𝜀𝑖𝑒 . 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1: Child gender and the probability of divorce. 
  1960 birth cohort 1970 birth cohort 
Sex of 1st child 
  Girl -0.0064*** -0.0048 
sd (0.0023) (0.0034) 
N 51 614 38 324 
   Sex order of 1st two children 
  Girl and girl 0.0009 -0.0870** 
sd (0.0027) (0.0425) 
N 49 362 29 144 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 
%. The reported coefficients are the marginal effect on the probability 
of divorce and separation. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
equal to zero if the child is a boy and one if it is a girl. The 
independent variable is also a binary variable equal to zero if the 
family is intact and one if it is disrupted due to divorce. The 
estimations of the model are performed by running logistic 
regressions. 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Description of utilized variables. 
Name Definition 
Pid Personal id. 
Yr Year of observation. 
Foedselsaar Year of birth. 
Deadby80 Recorded dead in 1980. 
Deadby90** Recorded dead in 1990. 
Age Age in the year of question. 
Sex Sex. 
Fstatus Position within the family; father, mother, child, sibling, stepfather or stepmother. 
Twin Twins. 
Famtwin** Families with twins. 
Trill Triplets. 
Fpid Biological father's personal id. 
Mpid Biological mother's personal id. 
Spid60* Id of spouse in 1960. 
Spid70** Id of spouse in 1970. 
Spid90** Id of spouse in 1990. 
Tspid90** True id of spouse in 1990. 
Cplid90** Id which combines unique personal id and tspid. 
Fid90** Family id in 1990. 
Kom60* Municipality in 1960. 
Kom70 Municipality in 1970. 
Kom80 Municipality in 1980. 
Urban70 Urban or rural residence in 1960. 
Urban80 Urban or rural residence in 1970. 
Mstat60* Marital status in 1960. 
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Mstat70 Marital status in 1970. 
Mstat80 Marital status in 1980. 
Mstat90** Marital status in 1990. 
Mlength60* Number of years married in 1960. 
Mlength70 Number of years married in 1970. 
Nchild60* Number of children in current marriage in 1960. 
Nchild70 Number of children in current marriage in 1970. 
Nkids90** Number of children in current marriage in 1990. 
Hhid60* Unique household id in 1960. 
Hhid70 Unique household id in 1970. 
Hhid80 Unique household id in 1980. 
Famid60* Unique family id in 1960. 
Famid70 Unique family id in 1970. 
Famid90** Unique family id in 1990. 
Famstatus70* Family type in 1970. 
Famstatus80 Family type in 1980. 
Famstatus90** Family type in 1990. 
Famtype70 Family type in 1970. 
Famtype80 Family type in 1980. 
Cohabit70* Cohabiting parents in 1970. 
Cohabit80 Cohabiting parents in 1980. 
Cohabit90** Cohabiting parents in 1990. 
Cohabit80_mis Missing information on cohabiting status in 1980. 
Cohabit_changed** Cohabit value changed between 1980 and 1990. 
Contacth60* Contact person in household in 1960. 
Contacth70 Contact person in household in 1970. 
Contacth80 Contact person in household in 1980. 
Contactf60* Contact person in family in 1960. 
Contactf70 Contact person in family in 1970. 
Contactf80 Contact person in family in 1980. 
Nindh70 Number of individuals in the household in 1970. 
Nindh80 Number of individuals in the household in 1980. 
Nindf60* Number of individuals in the family in 1960. 
Nindf70 Number of individuals in the family in 1970. 
Nindf80 Number of individuals in the family in 1980. 
Indfam60* Number of individuals in the family in 1960. 
Indfam70 Number of individuals in the family in 1970. 
Ffam60* Number of parents in the family in 1960. 
Ffam70 Number of parents in the family in 1970. 
Ffam90** Number of parents in the family in 1990. 
Bfam60* Number of children in the family in 1960. 
Bfam70 Number of children in the family in 1970. 
Bfam90** Number of children in the family in 1990. 
Intact70 Observed in a intact family in the 1970 family structure identification. 
Intact80 Observed in a intact family in the 1980 family structure identification. 
Intact90** Observed in a intact family in the 1990 family structure identification. 
Divorce70 Observed in a disrupted family due to divorce in the 1970 family structure identification. 
Divorce80 Observed in a disrupted family due to divorce in the 1980 family structure identification. 
Divorce90** Observed in a disrupted family due to divorce in the 1990 family structure identification. 
Intact_div Observed in a intact family and disrupted family due to divorce in the 1970 and 1980 family  
 
structure identification, respectively. 
Death70* Observed in a disrupted family due to parental death in the 1970 family structure identification. 
Death80 Observed in a disrupted family due to parental death in the 1980 family structure measure. 
Death90** Observed in a disrupted family due to parental death in the 1990 family structure measure. 
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Intact_death Observed in a intact family and disrupted family due to parental death in the 1970 and 1980 
 
family structure identifications, respectively. 
Div_single70* Observed as divorced and single parent in the 1970 family structure identification. 
Div_single80 Observed as divorced and single parent in the 1980 family structure identification. 
Div_single90** Observed as divorced and single parent in the 1990 family structure identification. 
Div_step70* Observed as divorced and in a step family in the 1970 family structure identification. 
Div_step80 Observed as divorced and in a step family in the 1980 family structure identification. 
Div_step90** Observed as divorced and in a step family in the 1990 family structure identification. 
Dd_single70* Observed as single parent in the 1970 family structure identification where the disrupted was 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Dd_single80 Observed as single parent due to parental death in the 1980 family structure identification. 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Dd_single90** Observed as single parent due to parental death in the 1990 family structure identification. 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Dd_step70* Observed in a step family in the 1970 family structure identification where the disrupted was 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Dd_step80 Observed in a step family in the 1980 family structure identification where the disrupted was 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Dd_step90** Observed in a step family in the 1990 family structure identification where the disrupted was 
 
caused by death of one parent / spouse. 
Pearn Total pension-qualifying earnings. 
Inc_missing Missing earnings value in the year of question. 
Cpi Consumer price index. 
Income00 Total pension-qualifying earnings with 2000 as base year. 
Ln_income00 Log of total pension-qualifying earnings with 2000 as base year. 
Ln_cinc5 Ln_income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the children. 
Ln_finc5 Ln_income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the fathers. 
Ln_minc5 Ln_income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the mothers. 
Ln_cinc5_sum Sum of ln_cinc5. 
Ln_finc5_sum Sum of ln_finc5. 
Ln_minc5_sum Sum of ln_minc5. 
Ln_cinc_avg_son Five-year average of ln_income00 to the son in question. 
Ln_cinc_avg_dau Five-year average of ln_income00 to the daughter in question. 
Ln_finc_avg Five-year average of ln_income00 to the father in question. 
Ln_minc_avg Five-year average of ln_income00 to the mother in question. 
Cinc5 Income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the children. 
Finc5 Income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the fathers. 
Minc5 Income00 in the years chosen as short-run proxy for lifetime earnings for the mothers. 
Cinc5_sum Sum of cinc5. 
Finc5_sum Sum of finc5. 
Minc5_sum Sum of minc5. 
Sinc_avg Five-year average of income00 to the son in question. 
Dinc_avg Five-year average of income00 to the daughter in question. 
Finc_avg Five-year average of income00 to the father in question. 
Minc_avg Five-year average of income00 to the mother in question. 
Cage_avg Average of children's age interval at which the five-year average of ln_income00 is measured. 
Fage_avg Average of father‟s age interval at which the five-year average of ln_income00 is measured. 
Mage_avg Average of mother's age interval at which the five-year average of ln_income00 is measured. 
Fage_avg2 Squared of fage_avg. 
Mage_avg2 Squared of mage_avg. 
Cfcode Unique father-child couple id. 
Cmcode Unique mother-child couple id. 
S_pctile25 Sons situated in the first quartile of the group's income distribution. 
S_pctile50 Sons situated in the second quartile of the group's income distribution. 
Appendix B 
94 
 
S_pctile75 Sons situated in the third quartile of the group's income distribution. 
D_pctile25 Daughters situated in the first quartile of the group's income distribution. 
D_pctile50 Daughters situated in the second quartile of the group's income distribution. 
D_pctile75 Daughters situated in the third quartile of the group's income distribution. 
F_pctile25 Fathers situated in the first quartile of the group's income distribution. 
F_pctile50 Fathers situated in the second quartile of the group's income distribution. 
F_pctile75 Fathers situated in the third quartile of the group's income distribution. 
M_pctile25 Mothers situated in the first quartile of the group's income distribution. 
M_pctile50 Mothers situated in the second quartile of the group's income distribution. 
M_pctile75 Mothers situated in the third quartile of the group's income distribution. 
Fs_trans Identifies father-son couples to be included in transition matrices. 
Ms_trans Identifies mother-son couples to be included in transition matrices. 
Fd_trans Identifies father-daughter couples to be included in transition matrices. 
Md_trans Identifies mother-daughter couples to be included in transition matrices. 
Notes: * indicate that the variable is only utilized in the data sample for the 1960 cohort. ** indicate that the variable 
is only utilized in the data sample for the 1970 cohort. 
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Table B.3: 1960 birth cohort. Distribution of elderly siblings according to birth year. 
 
Intact families   Families divorced in   Families divorced in 
 
1960-1980 
 
the period 1960-1970 
 
the period 1970-1980 
 Strict Relaxed   Strict Relaxed   Strict Relaxed 
Birth year of elderly sibling 
        1938-1942 27 27 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
1943 23 23 
 
0 0 
 
0 0 
1944 27 26 
 
0 - 
 
0 0 
1945 57 57 
 
1 - 
 
0 0 
1946 83 81 
 
- - 
 
1 1 
1947 132 131 
 
- - 
 
1 1 
1948 209 204 
 
- - 
 
9 7 
1949 293 297 
 
- - 
 
4 4 
1950 402 398 
 
- - 
 
11 10 
1951 544 545 
 
- - 
 
16 16 
1952 701 715 
 
- - 
 
30 30 
1953 863 899 
 
- - 
 
47 45 
1954 - 1 177 
 
- - 
 
68 68 
1955 - 1 469 
 
- - 
 
81 81 
         N 3 361 6 049 
 
1 0 
 
119 263 
Notes: When the divorce occurred between 1960 and 1970 the strict constraint equals 1943 and the relaxed 
constraint equals 1945. When the divorce took place between 1970 and 1980 the strict and relaxed  
constraints equal 1953 and 1955, respectively. 
 
 
Table B.4: 1970 birth cohort. Distribution of elderly siblings according to birth year. 
 
Intact families   Families divorced in   Families divorced in 
 
1970-1990   the period 1970-1980   the period 1980-1990 
 Strict Relaxed   Strict Relaxed   Strict Relaxed 
Birth year of elderly sibling 
        1948-1952 110 110 
 
5 5 
 
0 0 
1953 111 110 
 
5 5 
 
3 3 
1954 167 166 
 
- 5 
 
2 2 
1955 224 219 
 
- 9 
 
3 3 
1956 329 326 
 
- - 
 
9 8 
1957 424 416 
 
- - 
 
9 9 
1958 564 553 
 
- - 
 
14 13 
1959 749 743 
 
- - 
 
20 19 
1960 871 847 
 
- - 
 
42 41 
1961 1 122 1 090 
 
- - 
 
41 39 
1962 1 437 1 397 
 
- - 
 
62 60 
1963 1 722 1 694 
 
- - 
 
80 80 
1964 - 2 253 
 
- - 
 
- 131 
1965 - 2 655 
 
- - 
 
- 156 
         N 7 830 12 579 
 
10 24 
 
285 564 
Notes: When the divorce occurred between 1970 and 1980 the strict constraint equals 1953 and the relaxed 
constraint equals 1955. When the divorce took place between 1980 and 1990 the strict and relaxed 
constraints equal 1963 and 1965, respectively. 
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Table B.5: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1960 birth cohort. Intact families.  
 
Families intact in 1960 
 
Families intact in the period 1960-1970 
 
Families intact in the period 1960-1980 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average 12.44 0.67 6.22 15.80 
 
12.45 0.66 6.22 15.80 
 
12.46 0.65 6.22 15.80 
N 14 579 
 
13 954 
 
12 489 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 12.15 0.74 6.69 15.34 
 
12.16 0.74 6.69 15.34 
 
12.16 0.73 6.69 15.34 
N 13 497 
 
12 954 
 
11 628 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 12.30 0.56 6.11 14.24 
 
12.31 0.55 6.11 14.05 
 
12.32 0.52 6.11 14.05 
Average of age interval 47.59 2.12 40.00 63.00 
 
47.60 2.70 41.00 63.00 
 
47.32 1.26 47.00 57.00 
Year of birth 1929.56 5.66 1912.00 1943.00 
 
1929.53 5.63 1912.00 1943.00 
 
1929.41 5.62 1912.00 1943.00 
N 26 235 
 
25 545 
 
23 924 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.20 1.09 5.30 13.41 
 
11.20 1.08 5.49 13.41 
 
11.18 1.07 5.49 13.41 
Average age interval 47.29 2.26 35.00 63.00 
 
47.34 2.02 39.00 63.00 
 
47.05 0.41 47.00 55.00 
Year of birth 1932.90 5.19 1914.00 1944.00 
 
1932.94 5.12 1914.00 1944.00 
 
1933.00 5.01 1914.00 1944.00 
N 27 422   26 370   23 924 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years that income is observed. 
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Table B.6: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1960 birth cohort. Families disrupted due to divorce and separation.  
 
Families divorced in the period 1960-1970 
 
Families divorced in the period 1970-1980 
 
All divorced families 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean     SD     Min Max 
 
Mean SD     Min   Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average 12.21 0.84 7.58 14.01 
 
12.34  0.77     6.82 13.86 
 
12.30 0.79 6.82  14.01 
N 312 
 
684 
 
996 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 12.07 0.81 8.48 13.88 
 
12.10 0.74 7.39 13.67 
 
12.09 0.76 7.39 13.88 
N 278 
 
627 
 
905 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 12.13 0.79 7.73 14.24 
 
12.15 0.85 6.54 13.89 
 
12.14 0.83 6.54 14.24 
Average of age interval 47.32 2.90 46.00 63.00 
 
50.65 4.76 41.00 63.00 
 
49.62 4.54 41.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1932.05 5.90 1912.00 1943.00 
 
1932.34 4.77 1919.00 1942.00 
 
1932.25 5.15 1912.00 1943.00 
N 585 
 
1 301 
 
1 886 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.55 1.03 5.30 13.39 
 
11.71 0.91 6.42 13.16 
 
11.66 0.95 5.30 13.39 
Average age interval 45.70 4.79 37.00 62.00 
 
47.64 4.62 39.00 63.00 
 
47.04 4.76 37.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1934.96 5.43 1916.00 1944.00 
 
1935.36 4.63 1919.00 1944.00 
 
1935.24 4.89 1916.00 1944.00 
N 585   1 301   1 886 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years in which the income is observed. The first column identifies 
disruptions occurred between 1960 and 1970, the second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980, and the third and last column identifies all 
disruptions taken place between 1960 and 1980. 
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Table B.7: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1960 birth cohort. Families disrupted due to death of a parent. 
 
Families disrupted in the period 1960-1970 
 
Families disrupted in the period 1970-1980 
 
All disrupted families 
   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average   12.34 0.79 7.49 13.79 
 
12.38 0.75 7.45 14.46 
 
12.37 0.76 7.45 14.46 
N 313 
 
781 
 
1 094 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 12.09 0.82 7.68 13.84 
 
12.08 0.81 7.45 13.93 
 
12.08 0.81 7.45 13.93 
N 265 
 
699 
 
964 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 12.01 0.85 7.02 13.02 
 
12.09 0.84 7.58 13.57 
 
12.07 0.85 7.02 13.57 
Average of age interval 47.49 5.82 40.00 60.00 
 
55.48 5.26 43.00 63.00 
 
53.51 6.41 40.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1924.91 6.43 1912.00 1938.00 
 
1926.52 5.26 1919.00 1939.00 
 
1926.12 5.60 1912.00 1939.00 
N 105 
 
320 
 
425 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 10.66 1.36 5.93 12.65 
 
11.02 1.21 5.81 13.04 
 
10.91 1.27 5.81 13.04 
Average age interval 46.89 6.13 35.00 61.00 
 
53.00 5.72 39.00 63.00 
 
51.23 6.46 35.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1928.12 6.14 1914.00 1942.00 
 
1929.00 5.72 1919.00 1943.00 
 
1928.74 5.85 1914.00 1943.00 
N 467   1 145   1 612 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years in which the income is observed. The first column identifies 
disruptions occurred between 1960 and 1970, the second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980, and the third and last column identifies all 
disruptions taken place between 1960 and 1980. 
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Table B.8: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1970 birth cohort. Intact families.  
 
Families intact in 1970 
 
Families intact in the period 1970-1980 
 
Families intact in the period 1970-1990 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average 12.57 0.61 7.21 15.17 
 
12.59 0.60 7.21 15.17 
 
12.60 0.59 7.21 15.17 
N 20 101 
 
18 527 
 
16 668 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 12.10 0.73 3.56 14.56 
 
12.11 0.72 3.56 14.56 
 
12.12 0.71 3.56 14.56 
N 18 590 
 
17 243 
 
15 445 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 12.39 0.62 5.57 14.88 
 
12.40 0.60 5.57 14.88 
 
12.42 0.57 5.57 14.88 
Average of age interval 45.49 1.89 33.00 63.00 
 
45.48 1.85 40.00 63.00 
 
45.14 0.51 45.00 57.00 
Year of birth 1940.90 5.93 1912.00 1953.00 
 
1940.76 5.93 1912.00 1953.00 
 
1940.60 6.00 1912.00 1953.00 
N 37 478 
 
34 992 
 
32 113 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.61 0.94 5.32 13.85 
 
11.61 0.94 5.32 13.85 
 
11.60 0.93 5.32 13.85 
Average age interval 45.73 1.67 38.00 63.00 
 
45.78 1.67 38.00 63.00 
 
45.59 0.49 45.00 47.00 
Year of birth 1943.77 4.96 1922.00 1954.00 
 
1943.68 4.93 1922.00 1954.00 
 
1943.60 4.93 1922.00 1954.00 
N 38 643   35 508   32 113 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years in which the income is observed. The first column identifies 
disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980, the second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1980 and 1990, and the third and last column identifies all 
disruptions taken place between 1970 and 1990. 
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Table B.9: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1970 birth cohort. Families disrupted due to divorce and separation.  
 
Families divorced in the period 1970-1980 
 
Families divorced in the period 1980-1990 
 
All divorced families 
     Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average    12.42 0.72 8.19 14.98 
 
12.50 0.65 7.74 14.01 
 
12.46 0.69 7.74 14.98 
N 1 296 
 
1 349 
 
2 645 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 11.96 0.79 7.66 13.71 
 
12.06 0.76 7.52 13.93 
 
12.02 0.77 7.52 13.93 
N 1 107 
 
1 268 
 
2 375 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 12.19 0.85 6.08 14.18 
 
12.26 0.87 6.17 14.35 
 
12.23 0.86 6.08 14.35 
Average of age interval 45.58 2.09 45.00 63.00 
 
49.08 4.55 40.00 63.00 
 
47.40 3.99 40.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1943.02 5.39 1919.00 1953.00 
 
1942.92 4.55 1929.00 1952.00 
 
1942.97 4.97 1919.00 1953.00 
N 2 386 
 
2 592 
 
4 978 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.77 0.93 6.06 13.25 
 
11.89 0.89 6.36 13.57 
 
11.83 0.91 6.06 13.57 
Average age interval 45.13 0.81 45.00 58.00 
 
46.51 3.98 38.00 63.00 
 
45.85 3.00 38.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1945.82 4.31 1924.00 1953.00 
 
1945.49 3.98 1929.00 1954.00 
 
1945.65 4.14 1924.00 1954.00 
N 2 386   2 592   4 978 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years in which the income is observed. The first column identifies 
disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980, the second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1980 and 1990, and the third and last column identifies all 
disruptions taken place between 1970 and 1990. 
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Table B.10: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average. 1970 birth cohort. Families disrupted due to death of a parent.  
 
Families disrupted in the period 1970-1980 
 
Families disrupted in the period 1980-1990 
 
All disrupted families 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Sons 
              Five-year earnings average 12.43 0.75 8.05 13.72 
 
12.45 0.72 7.46 13.88 
 
12.44 0.73 7.46 13.88 
N 278 
 
510 
 
788 
               Daughters 
              Five-year earnings average 12.01 0.74 9.05 13.64 
 
11.95 0.87 7.48 13.34 
 
11.97 0.83 7.48 13.64 
N 240 
 
530 
 
770 
               Fathers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.98 1.07 7.08 14.13 
 
12.18 0.90 7.07 14.21 
 
12.13 0.94 7.07 14.21 
Average of age interval 45.49 7.69 33.00 63.00 
 
52.71 5.40 41.00 63.00 
 
50.97 6.76 33.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1936.51 7.69 1919.00 1949.00 
 
1939.29 5.40 1929.00 1951.00 
 
1938.62 6.13 1919.00 1951.00 
N 82 
 
259 
 
341 
               Mothers 
              Five-year earnings average 11.06 1.17 6.17 12.94 
 
11.28 1.23 6.03 13.16 
 
11.20 1.21 6.03 13.16 
Average age interval 45.30 3.65 43.00 58.00 
 
51.12 5.82 40.00 63.00 
 
49.03 5.86 40.00 63.00 
Year of birth 1939.87 6.48 1924.00 1952.00 
 
1940.88 5.82 1929.00 1952.00 
 
1940.52 6.08 1924.00 1952.00 
N 431   772   1 203 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable of parents is the age average of the five years in which the income is observed. The first column identifies 
disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980, the second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1980 and 1990, and the third and last column identifies all 
disruptions taken place between 1970 and 1990. 
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Table B.11: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average for siblings. 
1960 birth cohort. Strict constraint. 
 
Families intact in the period 1960-1980 
 
Families divorced in the period 1970-1980 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Elderly siblings 
         Five-year earnings average 12.14 0.82 4.86 14.63 
 
12.17 0.87 8.09 13.90 
Average of age interval 41.00 0.00 41.00 41.00 
 
41.00 0.00 41.00 41.00 
Year of birth 1950.71 2.36 1938.00 1953.00 
 
1951.58 1.66 1946.00 1953.00 
N 3 458 
 
119 
          Fathers 
         Five-year earnings average 12.22 0.59 7.17 13.54 
 
12.31 0.49 10.36 13.14 
Average of age interval 50.93 5.86 35.00 62.00 
 
48.61 3.35 41.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1923.33 4.44 1912.00 1937.00 
 
1926.39 3.35 1919.00 1934.00 
N 2 415 
 
92 
          Mothers 
         Five-year earnings average 11.14 0.92 5.93 13.34 
 
11.23 1.05 6.85 12.61 
Average age interval 48.18 6.69 39.00 59.00 
 
46.07 3.49 40.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1926.60 4.04 1915.00 1937.00 
 
1928.94 3.49 1919.00 1935.00 
N 2 415 
 
92 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable is the age average of the five years in which the income 
is measured. The first column identifies always-intact families, i.e. intact between 1970 and 1980 and the second 
column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980. The strict constraint implies that siblings are born 
before 1953. 
 
 
Table B.12: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average for siblings. 
1960 birth cohort. Relaxed constraint. 
 
Families intact in the period 1960-1980 
 
Families divorced in the period 1970-1980 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Elderly siblings 
         Five-year earnings average 12.19 0.80 4.86 15.28 
 
12.12 0.94 5.88 13.90 
Average of age interval 41.00 0.00 41.00 41.00 
 
41.00 0.00 41.00 41.00 
Year of birth 1952.39 2.63 1938.00 1955.00 
 
1953.28 1.83 1946.00 1955.00 
N 6 049 
 
263 
          Fathers 
         Five-year earnings average 12.23 0.56 6.31 13.54 
 
12.30 0.54 9.72 13.14 
Average of age interval 48.65 7.12 35.00 62.00 
 
47.11 3.91 37.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1924.89 4.89 1912.00 1938.00 
 
1927.90 3.91 1919.00 1938.00 
N 4 023 
 
198 
          Mothers 
         Five-year earnings average 11.10 0.94 5.58 13.34 
 
11.26 0.98 6.85 12.65 
Average age interval 46.12 6.98 39.00 59.00 
 
44.20 4.16 36.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1928.20 4.59 1915.00 1940.00 
 
1930.80 4.16 1919.00 1939.00 
N 4 023   198 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable is the age average of the five years in which the 
income is measured. The first column identifies always-intact families, i.e. intact between 1970 and 1980 and the 
second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980. The relaxed constraint implies that siblings are 
born before 1955. 
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Table B.13: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average for full siblings. 
1970 birth cohort. Strict constraint. 
 
Families intact in the period 1970-1990 
 
Families divorced in the period 1980-1990 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Elderly siblings 
         Five-year earnings average 12.23 0.79 6.30 14.61 
 
12.19 0.80 8.62 13.53 
Average of age interval 38.00 0.00 38.00 38.00 
 
38.00 0.00 38.00 38.00 
Year of birth 1960.10 2.78 1945.00 1963.00 
 
1960.86 2.21 1953.00 1963.00 
N 7 830 
 
285 
          Fathers 
         Five-year earnings average 12.29 0.49 7.75 13.73 
 
12.42 0.61 8.21 13.57 
Average of age interval 41.97 5.40 40.00 61.00 
 
47.99 3.65 39.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1933.72 5.13 1913.00 1949.00 
 
1937.01 3.65 1929.00 1946.00 
N 4 564 
 
190 
          Mothers 
         Five-year earnings average 11.17 1.03 5.76 13.29 
 
11.80 0.75 6.26 13.09 
Average age interval 45.50 6.66 39.00 55.00 
 
45.67 3.44 38.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1937.34 4.03 1922.00 1950.00 
 
1939.33 3.44 1929.00 1947.00 
N 4 564   190 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable is the age average of the five years in which the 
income is measured. The first column identifies always-intact families, i.e. intact between 1970 and 1980 and the 
second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980. The strict constraint implies that siblings are 
born before 1963. 
 
 
Table B.14: Descriptive statistics of five-year earnings average for siblings. 
1970 birth cohort. Relaxed constraint. 
 
Families intact in the period 1960-1980 
 
Families divorced in the period 1970-1980 
  Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Elderly siblings 
         Five-year earnings average 12.30 0.77 6.30 15.00 
 
12.35 0.72 8.62 14.53 
Average of age interval 38.00 0.00 38.00 38.00 
 
38.00 0.00 38.00 38.00 
Year of birth 1961.83 3.09 1945.00 1965.00 
 
1962.75 2.42 1953.00 1965.00 
N 12 579 
 
564 
          Fathers 
         Five-year earnings average 12.39 0.48 6.97 14.35 
 
12.41 0.56 7.94 14.08 
Average of age interval 40.51 2.88 40.00 61.00 
 
41.96 4.50 33.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1940.87 5.91 1913.00 1953.00 
 
1943.04 4.50 1929.00 1952.00 
N 29 354 
 
2 417 
          Mothers 
         Five-year earnings average 11.34 0.95 5.64 13.50 
 
11.71 0.77 6.26 13.33 
Average age interval 40.57 4.29 39 55.00 
 
39.42 3.93 31.00 56.00 
Year of birth 1943.85 4.87 1922.00 1954.00 
 
1945.58 3.93 1929.00 1954.00 
N 29 354   2 417 
Notes: Earnings are measured in log. The reported age variable is the age average of the five years in which the 
income is measured. The first column identifies always-intact families, i.e. intact between 1970 and 1980 and the 
second column identifies disruptions occurred between 1970 and 1980. The strict constraint implies that siblings are 
born before 1965. 
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Table C.1.1: Results from OLS regressions for families disrupted due to divorce and separation. The families are split into single parents and step 
families. 
 
1960 birth cohort 
  
1970 birth cohort 
 
Families divorced in 
the period 1960-1970 
Families divorced in 
the period  1970-1980 
All divorced  
families 
Families divorced in 
the period  1970-1980 
Families divorced in 
the period  1980-1990 
All divorced 
 families 
Mobility pair Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family 
Son-father 
            β 0.017 0.135 0.149*** 0.121 0.114*** 0.159** 0.047* 0.068 0.083*** 0.200*** 0.082*** 0.076** 
 0.015 0.145 0.168 0.123 0.124 0.148 0.056 0.076 0.111 0.268 0.102 0.095 
sd(β) (0.073) (0.098) (0.037) (0.094) (0.033) (0.071) (0.026) (0.063) (0.021) (0.061) (0.018) (0.033) 
N 229 83 587 97 786 210 1062 234 1213 136 2063 582 
             Son-mother  
            β 0.010 -0.090 0.097*** 0.276*** 0.071*** 0.037 0.042* -0.015 0.007 0.135*** 0.015 0.074*** 
 0.011 -0.167 0.116 0.289 0.085 0.045 0.053 -0.020 0.011 0.184 0.020 0.106 
sd(β) (0.059) (0.057) (0.032) (0.105) (0.028) (0.060) (0.025) (0.047) (0.019) (0.054) (0.016) (0.028) 
N 229 83 587 97 786 210 1062 234 1213 136 2063 582 
             Daughter-father 
            β 0.044 0.224** 0.083** 0.048 0.073** 0.124* 0.062** 0.048 0.065*** -0.008 0.074*** 0.018 
 0.041 0.293 0.096 0.056 0.080 0.135 0.067 0.052 0.073 -0.010 0.083 0.019 
sd(β) (0.073) (0.103) (0.036) (0.109) (0.033) (0.074) (0.030) (0.060) (0.026) (0.073) (0.020) (0.041) 
N 217 61 551 76 731 174 899 208 1133 135 1873 502 
             Daughter-mother 
            β 0.184*** 0.233*** 0.040 0.119*** 0.065** 0.220*** 0.088*** 0.058 0.102*** 0.064 0.117*** 0.020 
 0.208 0.524 0.049 0.142 0.079 0.311 0.102 0.076 0.124 0.078 0.139 0.025 
sd(β) (0.061) (0.054) (0.037) (0.086) (0.033) (0.048) (0.028) (0.055) (0.026) (0.086) (0.020) (0.038) 
N 217 61 551 76 731 174 899 208 1133 135 1873 502 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %. The mobility elasticity β is estimated by running separate regressions for each family type, and the correlation 
coefficient  is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is a five-year average of log earnings. For the 1960 cohort the average of the age at time of earnings 
observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters, 47.59 for fathers and 47.29 for mothers. For the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for fathers and 45.73 for 
mothers. 
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Table C.1.2: Results from OLS regressions for divorced families. The 
families are separated according to which parent who has the custody of the 
children. 
 
1960 birth cohort 
 
1970 birth cohort 
 
All divorced families 
 
All divorced families 
 Mobility pair Father custody Mother custody   Father custody Mother custody 
Son-father 
     β 0.196*** 0.085** 
 
0.090*** 0.077*** 
 0.191 0.087 
 
0.106 0.096 
sd(β) (0.065) (0.040) 
 
(0.031) (0.018) 
N 268 642 
 
732 1913 
      Son-mother  
     β 0.035 0.073*** 
 
0.027 0.031* 
 0.035 0.093 
 
0.041 0.040 
sd(β) (0.060) (0.030) 
 
(0.024) (0.017) 
N 268 642 
 
732 1913 
      Daughter-father  
     β 0.006 0.169*** 
 
-0.007 0.075*** 
 0.006 0.173 
 
-0.009 0.085 
sd(β) (0.070) (0.041) 
 
(0.045) (0.020) 
N 141 520 
 
474 1901 
      Daughter-mother   
     β 0.050 0.154*** 
 
0.042 0.114*** 
 0.057 0.194 
 
0.055 0.133 
sd(β) (0.079) (0.036) 
 
(0.036) (0.020) 
N 141 520 
 
474 1901 
            
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %. The correlation 
coefficient is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is a five- 
year average of log earnings. For the 1960 cohort the average of the age at time of earnings 
observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters, 47.59 for fathers and 47.29 for mothers.  For 
the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for fathers and 45.73 
for mothers. 
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Table C.1.3: Results from OLS regressions for families disrupted due to death of one parent. The families are split into single parents and step 
families. 
 
1960 birth cohort 
  
1970 birth cohort 
 
Families disrupted in 
the period 1960-1970 
Families disrupted in 
the period 1970-1980 
All disrupted  
families 
Families disrupted in 
the period 1970-1980 
Families disrupted in 
the period 1980-1990 
All disrupted 
 families 
Mobility pair Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family Single parent Step family 
Son-father 
            β 0.404** - 0.177** 1.190 0.193*** 1.190 -0.103 - 0.053 0.017 0.002 0.017 
 0.421 
 
0.194 0.433 0.220 0.433 -0.149 
 
0.065 0.038 0.003 0.038 
sd(β) (0.174) - (0.084) (0.742) (0.074) (0.742) (0.097) - (0.064) (0.324) (0.053) (0.324) 
N 55 0 168 17 206 17 41 0 120 3 159 3 
             Son-mother  
            β 0.112*** - 0.081*** 0.195* 0.089*** 0.195* 0.054 - 0.022 -0.050 0.032 -0.050 
 0.194 
 
0.127 0.298 0.148 0.298 0.081 
 
0.036 -0.127 0.052 -0.127 
sd(β) (0.035) - (0.024) (0.111) (0.020) (0.111) (0.043) - (0.031) (0.159) (0.025) (0.159) 
N 258 0 613 25 846 25 237 0 385 12 614 12 
             Daughter-father 
            β 0.266** - 0.110 -0.093 0.170*** -0.093 0.021 - 0.132* 0.236 0.094* 0.236 
 0.267 
 
0.113 0.065 0.178 0.065 0.031 
 
0.134 0.752 0.107 0.752 
sd(β) (0.127) - (0.079) (0.558) (0.067) (0.558) (0.096) - (0.070) (0.118) (0.058) (0.118) 
N 52 0 156 13 195 13 42 0 139 4 179 4 
             Daughter-mother 
            β 0.033 - 0.077*** 0.042 0.061*** 0.042 0.083* - 0.044 0.059 0.050* 0.059 
 0.056 
 
0.112 0.122 0.093 0.122 0.127 
 
0.061 0.216 0.072 0.216 
sd(β) (0.039) - (0.029) (0.055) (0.024) (0.055) (0.049) - (0.039) (0.068) (0.031) (0.068) 
N 213 0 543 20 736 20 198 0 385 8 579 8 
Notes: *** significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The mobility elasticity β is estimated by running separate regressions for each family type, and the correlation 
coefficient  is computed from the mobility elasticity. The measure of earnings is a five-year average of log earnings. For the 1960 cohort the average of the age at time of earnings 
observation is 36 for sons, 42 for daughters, 47.59 for fathers and 47.29 for mothers. For the 1970 cohort the age averages are 33 for sons and daughters, 45.49 for fathers and 45.73 for 
mothers. 
Appendix C 
108 
 
C.2 Results from transition matrices 
C.2.1 Intact families 
Table C.2.1.1: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.86 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.34 0.27 0.23 0.16 3 312 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.30 0.25 0.19 3 330 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.27 0.26 3 354 
Upper quartile 
 
0.17 0.18 0.25 0.40 3 345 
N   3 260 3 343 3 356 3 382 13 341 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
Table C.2.1.2: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.87   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.33 0.28 0.23 0.16 3 048 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.31 0.25 0.19 3 134 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.27 0.26 3 158 
Upper quartile 
 
0.16 0.17 0.25 0.41 3 149 
N   2 998 3 135 3 153 3 203 12 489 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 Table C.2.1.3: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.75 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.29 0.29 0.24 0.18 3 072 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.20 3 129 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26 3 108 
Upper quartile 
 
0.20 0.19 0.24 0.37 3 102 
N   3 073 3 083 3 139 3 116 12 411 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.1.4: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.75 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.29 0.29 0.24 0.18 2 832 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.27 0.27 0.20 2 930 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 2 933 
Upper quartile 
 
0.20 0.19 0.24 0.37 2 933 
N   2 854 2 888 2 954 2 932 11 628 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.5: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.60   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.28 0.27 0.24 0.22 3 410 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 3 510 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 531 
Upper quartile 
 
0.22 0.23 0.26 0.29 3 335 
N   3 388 3 452 3 468 3 478 13 786 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.6: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.60   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.27 0.27 0.24 0.22 3 159 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 3 286 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 238 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.23 0.26 0.30 2 806 
N   2 998 3 135 3 153 3 203 12 489 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.1.7: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.66 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.29 0.27 0.25 0.20 3 217 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.27 0.25 0.23 3 209 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 3 161 
Upper quartile 
 
0.22 0.21 0.25 0.32 3 211 
N   3 173 3 204 3 210 3 211 12 798 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.8: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.66 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.28 0.26 0.25 0.21 2 965 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.27 0.26 0.23 3 005 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 2 925 
Upper quartile 
 
0.22 0.21 0.25 0.32 2 733 
N   2 854 2 888 2 954 2 932 11 628 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.9: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.82 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.31 0.28 0.23 0.17 4 441 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.28 0.27 0.19 4 536 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.27 0.26 4 549 
Upper quartile 
  
0.17 0.19 0.25 0.39 4 612 
N 
  
4 344 4 543 4 604 4 647 18 138 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.1.10: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.82 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.31 0.28 0.24 0.17 3 978 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.28 0.27 0.20 4 239 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.27 0.27 4 229 
Upper quartile 
  
0.16 0.19 0.25 0.40 4 222 
N 
  
3 885 4 185 4 272 4 326 16 668 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.11: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.78 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.30 0.28 0.25 0.18 4 050 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.27 0.26 0.19 4 274 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 4 294 
Upper quartile 
  
0.18 0.20 0.24 0.38 4 236 
N 
  
4 086 4 204 4 254 4 310 16 854 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.12: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.78 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.30 0.27 0.25 0.18 3 612 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.28 0.26 0.19 3 972 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 3 972 
Upper quartile 
  
0.18 0.20 0.24 0.38 3 889 
N 
  
3 710 3 827 3 932 3 976 15 445 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.1.13: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.63 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.27 0.27 0.25 0.22 4 702 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.26 0.26 0.24 4 664 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 582 
Upper quartile 
  
0.20 0.23 0.25 0.32 4 458 
N 
  
4 433 4 620 4 657 4 696 18 406 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.14: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.64 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.26 0.27 0.25 0.22 4 347 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.26 0.26 0.24 4 404 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 4 139 
Upper quartile 
  
0.19 0.23 0.26 0.33 3 778 
N 
  
3 885 4 185 4 272 4 326 16 668 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.1.15: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.71 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.30 0.26 0.23 0.21 4 206 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.27 0.25 0.23 4 403 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25 4 313 
Upper quartile 
  
0.18 0.21 0.27 0.34 4 180 
N 
  
4 165 4 264 4 321 4 352 17 102 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.1.16: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.72 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 3 887 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.26 0.25 0.23 4 127 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 3 887 
Upper quartile 
  
0.18 0.20 0.27 0.35 3 544 
N 
  
3 710 3 827 3 932 3 976 feil 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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C.2.2 Disrupted families due to divorce and separation 
 
Table C.2.2.1: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.55 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.18 0.21 0.22 119 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.42 0.32 0.16 0.10 73 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.42 0.12 0.30 0.16 57 
Upper quartile 
 
0.24 0.27 0.22 0.27 63 
N   116 69 68 59 312 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
Table C.2.2.2: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.74   Sons 
Married (1970) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1980) fathers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.40 0.23 0.20 0.17 210 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.37 0.26 0.21 0.16 140 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.21 0.23 0.31 0.24 166 
Upper quartile 
 
0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 168 
N   214 169 164 137 684 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
Table C.2.2.3: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.69   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.22 0.21 0.19 329 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.39 0.28 0.19 0.14 213 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.21 0.31 0.22 223 
Upper quartile 
 
0.26 0.26 0.23 0.25 231 
N   330 238 232 196 996 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.4: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.37 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.30 0.29 0.20 0.20 83 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.19 0.25 0.30 53 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.37 0.19 0.16 0.27 67 
Upper quartile 
 
0.23 0.32 0.13 0.32 75 
N   81 71 51 75 278 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.5: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.81 
 
Daughters 
Married (1970) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1980) fathers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.33 0.28 0.21 0.18 190 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.24 0.25 0.17 151 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.21 0.28 0.22 0.29 141 
Upper quartile 
 
0.22 0.21 0.21 0.37 145 
N   176 159 138 154 627 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.6: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.67 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.32 0.28 0.21 0.19 273 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.23 0.25 0.21 204 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.25 0.20 0.28 208 
Upper quartile 
 
0.22 0.25 0.18 0.35 220 
N   257 230 189 229 905 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.7: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.29   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.29 0.22 0.10 49 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.20 0.20 0.32 0.27 44 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.52 0.13 0.17 0.18 77 
Upper quartile 
 
0.34 0.25 0.21 0.20 142 
N   116 69 68 59 312 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.8: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.66 
 
Sons 
Married (1970) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1980) mothers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.28 0.16 0.17 69 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.31 0.18 0.17 89 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.26 0.23 0.15 168 
Upper quartile 
 
0.27 0.22 0.27 0.23 358 
N   214 169 164 137 684 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.9: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.54   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.28 0.19 0.14 118 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.29 0.28 0.23 0.20 133 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.40 0.22 0.21 0.16 245 
Upper quartile 
 
0.29 0.23 0.26 0.22 500 
N   330 238 232 196 996 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.10: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.74 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.56 0.21 0.12 0.12 34 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.32 0.18 0.20 50 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.13 0.29 0.27 62 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.30 0.15 0.33 132 
N   81 71 51 75 278 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.11: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.57 
 
Daughters 
Married (1970) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1980) mothers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.31 0.25 0.23 0.21 61 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.39 0.23 0.19 0.20 75 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.30 0.17 0.22 138 
Upper quartile 
 
0.24 0.24 0.25 0.27 353 
N   176 159 138 154 627 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.12: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.63 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.40 0.23 0.19 0.18 95 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.26 0.18 0.20 125 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.25 0.21 0.24 200 
Upper quartile 
 
0.24 0.26 0.22 0.29 485 
N   257 230 189 229 905 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.13: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.62 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.40 0.26 0.19 0.16 458 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.27 0.22 0.16 273 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.36 0.22 0.23 0.20 286 
Upper quartile 
  
0.33 0.20 0.17 0.31 279 
N 
  
469 309 259 259 1 296 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.14: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2,76 
 
Sons 
Married (1980) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1990) fathers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.37 0.27 0.19 0.18 426 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.30 0.23 0.15 264 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.29 0.24 0.25 0.22 299 
Upper quartile 
  
0.27 0.17 0.23 0.33 360 
N 
  
425 328 299 297 1 349 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.15: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.70 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.38 0.26 0.19 0.17 884 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.29 0.23 0.15 537 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.23 0.24 0.21 585 
Upper quartile 
  
0.29 0.18 0.21 0.32 639 
N 
  
894 637 558 556 2 645 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.16: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.65 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.36 0.25 0.24 0.15 382 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.31 0.23 0.15 262 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.23 0.25 0.21 229 
Upper quartile 
  
0.29 0.22 0.21 0.29 234 
N 
  
356 282 259 210 1 107 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
 
Table C.2.2.17: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.78 
 
Daughters 
Married (1980) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1990) fathers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.27 0.34 0.23 0.16 382 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.25 0.25 0.17 274 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.25 0.28 0.24 0.23 298 
Upper quartile 
  
0.19 0.21 0.22 0.38 314 
N 
  
327 345 296 300 1 268 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
Table C.2.2.18: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.73 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.31 0.30 0.23 0.16 764 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.28 0.24 0.16 536 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 527 
Upper quartile 
  
0.23 0.21 0.22 0.34 548 
N 
  
683 627 555 510 2 375 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.19: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.53 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.43 0.23 0.19 0.15 250 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.27 0.20 0.19 221 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.38 0.24 0.19 0.19 349 
Upper quartile 
  
0.32 0.23 0.21 0.24 476 
N 
  
469 309 259 259 1 296 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.20: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.62 
 
Sons 
Married (1980) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1990) mothers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.38 0.29 0.18 0.16 213 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.28 0.18 0.22 165 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.24 0.24 0.20 374 
Upper quartile 
  
0.29 0.22 0.24 0.25 597 
N 
  
425 328 299 297 1 349 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.21: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.58 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.40 0.26 0.18 0.16 463 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.27 0.19 0.20 386 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.24 0.21 0.20 723 
Upper quartile 
  
0.31 0.22 0.23 0.25 1 073 
N 
  
894 637 558 556 2 645 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.22: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.66 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.40 0.23 0.18 0.19 210 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.37 0.31 0.19 0.13 207 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.23 0.28 0.17 270 
Upper quartile 
  
0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 420 
N 
  
356 282 259 210 1 107 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.23: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.70 
 
Daughters 
Married (1980) and 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
divorced (1990) mothers   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.34 0.27 0.18 0.21 181 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.26 0.20 0.20 182 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.32 0.23 0.18 345 
Upper quartile 
  
0.20 0.24 0.26 0.29 560 
N 
  
327 345 296 300 1 268 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.24: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.69 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.37 0.25 0.18 0.20 391 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.29 0.20 0.16 389 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.29 0.28 0.25 0.18 615 
Upper quartile 
  
0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 980 
N 
  
683 627 555 510 2 375 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.25: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Single parent families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.70 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.38 0.23 0.21 0.18 254 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.41 0.28 0.18 0.13 165 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.23 0.31 0.21 190 
Upper quartile 
 
0.27 0.25 0.23 0.25 177 
N   260 192 183 151 786 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.26: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Step families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.62 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.44 0.17 0.19 0.20 75 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.27 0.23 0.17 48 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.09 0.33 0.27 33 
Upper quartile 
 
0.20 0.31 0.24 0.24 54 
N   70 46 49 45 210 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.27: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Single parent families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.72 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.32 0.29 0.22 0.17 226 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.24 0.24 0.18 171 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.28 0.21 0.28 170 
Upper quartile 
 
0.24 0.23 0.18 0.34 164 
N   213 191 155 172 731 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.28: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Step families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.42 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.32 0.26 0.17 0.26 47 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.21 0.15 0.27 0.36 33 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.16 0.18 0.32 38 
Upper quartile 
 
0.16 0.29 0.18 0.38 56 
N   44 39 34 57 174 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.29: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Single parent families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.65   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.42 0.28 0.16 0.13 92 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.28 0.24 0.16 83 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.39 0.24 0.22 0.16 194 
Upper quartile 
 
0.29 0.23 0.25 0.23 417 
N   260 192 183 151 786 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.30: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Step families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.26   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.19 26 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.28 0.20 0.28 50 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.47 0.16 0.20 0.18 51 
Upper quartile 
 
0.33 0.20 0.27 0.20 83 
N   70 46 49 45 210 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.31: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Single parent families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.75 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.32 0.29 0.23 0.16 273 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.30 0.17 0.23 165 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.21 0.28 0.21 0.29 131 
Upper quartile 
 
0.19 0.23 0.28 0.31 167 
N   198 203 165 170 736 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.32: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Step families observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 3.12 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.27 0.55 0.18 0.00 11 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 2 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 2 
Upper quartile 
 
0.20 0.00 0.40 0.40 5 
N   4 7 6 3 20 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.33: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Single parent families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.73 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.38 0.28 0.18 0.16 678 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.29 0.23 0.14 426 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.23 0.24 0.21 455 
Upper quartile 
 
0.30 0.17 0.22 0.32 504 
N   697 502 441 423 2 063 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.34: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Step families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.58 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.22 0.19 0.20 206 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.26 0.21 0.19 111 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.22 0.25 0.20 130 
Upper quartile 
 
0.27 0.24 0.16 0.33 135 
N   197 135 117 133 582 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.35: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Single parent families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.78 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.31 0.30 0.23 0.15 601 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.29 0.24 0.15 417 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24 416 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.22 0.22 0.35 439 
N   522 507 437 407 1 873 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.36: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Step families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.55 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced fathers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.31 0.28 0.23 0.18 163 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.24 0.24 0.20 119 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.33 0.23 0.28 0.15 111 
Upper quartile 
 
0.32 0.18 0.19 0.30 109 
N   161 120 118 103 502 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.37: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Single parent families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.57   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.41 0.27 0.18 0.15 330 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.28 0.19 0.21 275 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.36 0.24 0.22 0.18 589 
Upper quartile 
 
0.30 0.23 0.23 0.24 869 
N   697 502 441 423 2 063 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.38: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Step families. 
Immobility index: 2.62   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.40 0.23 0.20 0.18 133 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.25 0.22 0.18 111 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.26 0.18 0.25 134 
Upper quartile 
 
0.31 0.21 0.21 0.27 204 
N   197 135 117 133 582 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.2.39: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Single parent families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.72 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Married mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.24 0.18 0.19 276 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.37 0.30 0.17 0.16 280 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.29 0.25 0.18 504 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.26 0.27 0.27 813 
N   522 507 437 407 1 873 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.2.40: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Step families observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.60 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Divorced mothers (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.34 0.25 0.19 0.22 115 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.26 0.27 0.16 109 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.24 0.29 0.16 111 
Upper quartile 
 
0.32 0.22 0.21 0.26 167 
N   161 120 118 103 502 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is measured is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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C.2.3 Disrupted families due to death of one parent 
 
Table C.2.3.1: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.58   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.33 0.22 0.20 0.24 54 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.30 0.21 0.21 56 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.40 0.10 0.17 0.33 30 
Upper quartile 
 
0.11 0.25 0.39 0.25 28 
N   48 39 39 42 168 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.2: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.99 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.44 0.14 0.20 0.22 50 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.29 0.31 0.13 48 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.09 0.32 0.44 0.15 34 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.17 0.29 0.33 24 
N   43 36 47 30 156 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.3: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2,67   Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.39 0.27 0.22 0.12 109 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.20 0.30 0.25 0.25 60 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.29 0.24 0.18 0.29 45 
Upper quartile 
 
0.25 0.20 0.23 0.32 44 
N   79 67 57 55 258 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.4: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.70 
 
Sons 
Married mothers (1970) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widows (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.34 0.25 0.24 0.18 182 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.36 0.27 0.20 0.18 135 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.26 0.20 0.26 0.28 125 
Upper quartile 
 
0.20 0.25 0.28 0.27 171 
N   176 148 151 138 613 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.5: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.69 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.36 0.25 0.23 0.15 291 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.28 0.22 0.20 195 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.21 0.24 0.28 170 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.24 0.27 0.28 215 
N   255 215 208 193 871 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.6: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970. 
Immobility index: 2.75 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1970)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.30 0.30 0.25 0.15 93 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.39 0.16 0.21 0.24 38 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.17 0.23 0.23 0.37 35 
Upper quartile 
 
0.21 0.23 0.30 0.26 47 
N   59 53 53 48 213 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.7: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1970 and 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.77 
 
Daughters 
Married mothers (1970) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widows (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.33 0.30 0.22 0.15 191 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.27 0.33 0.16 0.23 129 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.31 0.21 0.26 98 
Upper quartile 
 
0.18 0.22 0.27 0.33 125 
N   143 157 118 125 543 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.8: 1960 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.76 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1980)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
 
0.32 0.30 0.23 0.15 284 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.29 0.17 0.23 167 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.21 0.29 0.22 0.29 133 
Upper quartile 
 
0.19 0.22 0.28 0.31 172 
N   202 210 171 173 756 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
Table C.2.3.9: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.54 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1980)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.24 0.35 0.35 0.06 17 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.20 0.40 0.30 0.10 10 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 10 
Upper quartile 
  
0.25 0.50 0.00 0.25 4 
N 
  
9 14 12 6 41 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.10: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.90 
 
Sons 
Married fathers (1980) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widowers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.43 0.22 0.22 0.14 37 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.30 0.21 0.27 0.21 33 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.43 0.24 0.10 21 
Upper quartile 
  
0.10 0.20 0.37 0.33 30 
N 
  
34 30 33 24 121 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.11: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.86 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1990)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.37 0.26 0.26 0.11 54 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.26 0.28 0.19 43 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.23 0.35 0.26 0.16 31 
Upper quartile 
  
0.12 0.24 0.32 0.32 34 
N 
  
43 44 45 30 162 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.12: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.22 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1980)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.36 0.32 0.23 0.09 22 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.43 0.14 0.21 0.21 14 
Upper middle quartile 
 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 
Upper quartile 
  
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 4 
N 
  
16 10 10 6 42 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.13: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 3.05 
 
Daughters 
Married fathers (1980) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widowers (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.45 0.20 0.18 0.18 56 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.50 0.25 0.18 0.07 28 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.13 0.33 0.21 0.33 24 
Upper quartile 
  
0.21 0.18 0.18 0.42 33 
N 
  
49 32 26 34 141 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.14: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between fathers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.96 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widowers (1990)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.42 0.23 0.19 0.15 78 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.48 0.21 0.19 0.12 42 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.19 0.31 0.19 0.31 26 
Upper quartile 
  
0.19 0.19 0.22 0.41 37 
N 
  
65 42 36 40 183 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.15: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.89 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1980)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.39 0.22 0.20 0.18 127 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.34 0.24 0.34 0.07 41 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.23 0.38 0.13 40 
Upper quartile 
  
0.21 0.17 0.31 0.31 29 
N 
  
81 52 64 40 237 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.16: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.52 
 
Sons 
Married mothers (1980) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widows (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.31 0.27 0.23 0.20 142 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.36 0.23 0.24 0.17 95 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.32 0.22 0.19 69 
Upper quartile 
  
0.31 0.30 0.19 0.19 83 
N 
  
123 107 86 73 389 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.17: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and sons. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.63 
 
Sons 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1990)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.35 0.25 0.22 0.19 269 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.35 0.24 0.27 0.14 136 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.17 109 
Upper quartile 
  
0.29 0.27 0.22 0.22 112 
N 
  
204 159 150 113 626 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.18: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980. 
Immobility index: 2.49 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1980)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.39 0.27 0.17 0.16 92 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.22 0.32 0.14 0.32 50 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.24 0.33 0.12 0.30 33 
Upper quartile 
  
0.30 0.30 0.22 0.17 23 
N 
  
62 59 32 45 198 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
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Table C.2.3.19: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1980 and 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.85 
 
Daughters 
Married mothers (1980) 
 
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
and widows (1990)   quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.43 0.22 0.17 0.18 138 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.31 0.33 0.22 0.14 94 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.36 0.23 0.20 0.21 81 
Upper quartile 
  
0.14 0.16 0.42 0.28 76 
N 
  
128 92 93 76 389 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
Table C.2.3.20: 1970 cohort. Transition matrix with computed transition probabilities 
between mothers and daughters. Family structure observed in 1990. 
Immobility index: 2.75 
 
Daughters 
   
Lower Lower middle Upper middle Upper  N 
Widows (1990)     quartile quartile quartile quartile   
Lower quartile 
  
0.41 0.24 0.17 0.17 230 
Lower middle quartile 
 
0.28 0.33 0.19 0.20 144 
Upper middle quartile 
 
0.32 0.26 0.18 0.24 114 
Upper quartile 
  
0.18 0.19 0.37 0.25 99 
N 
  
190 151 125 121 587 
Note: The quartiles refer to the position of the person in question relative to the income distribution of his or her 
cohort. The person's income is the average of log annual income over a period of five years. The year in which 
the family structure is observed is depicted in parenthesis. N depicts the number of children and parents in the 
respective quartiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
